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ABSTRACT
Why and how has the U.S.-Japan alliance survived the end of the Cold War? 
More generally what happens to an alliance when the international security environment 
changes? The present dissertation aims at developing a new model of alliance politics 
that explains the continuity of an alliance by focusing on cultural factors of international 
security. Building on the constructivist theory of international relations, the present 
dissertation argues that the U.S.-Japan alliance has survived even after the demise of the 
Soviet Union, against which the alliance was originally formed, because the two allies 
have interdependent national security cultures that are deeply institutionalized in their 
defense policies. The two allies not only share identity as capitalist democracies, but also 
embrace complementary norms of national security. Namely, to secure its longstanding 
norm of homeland protection, the United States needs Japan’s assistance in maintaining 
its military presence in Asia so that it can minimize threats from the region. For its part, 
Japan, in an Asian regional security environment full of threats, needs the United Sates’ 
assistance in maintaining the antimilitarist national security norm that grew from the 
bitter experience and memory of World War II.
By analyzing domestic processes of revising basic defense policies after the Cold 
War in Washington and Tokyo, as well as the bilateral negotiations for the New 
Guidelines for Defense Cooperation between the United Sates and Japan, the present 
dissertation demonstrates that institutionalized national security cultures in both countries
provided ideational bases for their post-Cold War national security policies. These 
ideational constructs established the foundation for defense policies that the two countries 
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CHAPTER 1
RESEARCH QUESTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Research Question
Why Did the U.S.-Japan Alliance Survive the End o f the Cold War?
The survival and “redefinition” of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War has 
been both a theoretical and practical puzzle. The United States and Japan decided not 
only to maintain their bilateral alliance but also strengthened it by revising the Guidelines 
for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in 1997. Under the new Guidelines, the two 
countries agreed to develop joint plans for regional contingencies, especially ones in the 
Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait (Funabashi, 1999). Japan also agreed to 
participate in the development of a regional ballistic missile defense system led by the 
United States. In short, Japan has decided to play more active roles within the bilateral 
alliance after the Cold War.
Political scientists, especially realists, expected that the demise of the common 
threat, which the alliance was originally formed against, should have promoted 
dissolution of the alliance and more independent and assertive national security policy of 
Japan (Walt, 1987; Waltz, 1993, 2000). The U.S.-Japan Alliance is not an isolated case. 
The majority of American Cold War alliances have survived the end of the Cold War, 
including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (McCalla, 1996), the U.S.-
South Korean alliance, and the U.S.- Philippines alliance. Considering the fact that the 
central drive of international relations for the last 5 centuries has been the cycles of 
alignment and realignment among great powers (Gilpin, 1981; Kennedy, 1980), the 
existence of stable alliances among major powers today is worth closer attention and 
analysis (Jervis, 2002).
In addition, the risks of entrapment and abandonment by allies are as serious 
problems as external threats (Samuels, 2007; Snyder, 1997). Throughout the Cold War 
Japan faced the risk of being entrapped into the wars the United States fought in Asia. At 
the same time, Japan has been under criticism of being a free rider of the alliance and 
been under constant pressure from the United Sates to assume more responsibilities in its 
own national defense and the regional security, which triggered the fear of abandonment 
by the United Sates unless Japan should share more burden of the alliance. Because of 
those risks involved in an alliance, realists assume that a state prefers building its own 
defense capabilities first then seeks alliances to balance against the threats it cannot 
handle unilaterally (Waltz, 1979). But in the Japanese case, the order of preferred means 
of national security is reversed. Instead of developing more independent and offensive 
military capabilities of its own, Japan has focused on defensive capabilities and building 
closer ties with the United States. Although the Japanese defense budget ranks seventh in 
the world and it has acquired some of the most sophisticated weapons, its ability to act 
independently of the U.S. has been severely limited by the types of weapon systems that 
it has acquired, by the kinds of missions for which its forces train, and by various 
institutional limitations placed on its armed forces (Berger, 1996).
Institutionalists have been puzzled by the persistence of the bilateral alliances and
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the weakness of multilateral security institutions in the Asia Pacific region and Japan’s 
adherence to bilateralism in its national security policy. As some Japan experts argue, 
“Japan may increasingly have need of resources to develop alternative multilateral 
security options” (Hughes & Fukushima, 2004, p. 56); thus, a multilateral, not bilateral 
security organization could have better served national interests of Japan in the post-Cold 
War world. Similarly, the United States has had reasons for developing a multinational 
regional security institution in Asia after the Cold War in order to maintain its hegemonic 
status by utilizing institutional efficiency (Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002).
In addition, the bilateral alliance has been costly for both the United States and 
Japan. As President Clinton closed numbers of military bases both in the United States 
and overseas, maintaining large military forces in peacetime was fiscally unjustifiable. 
Moreover, overseas bases are easier to close because they have much less electoral and 
economic impact than domestic bases and more problems with local populations (Calder, 
2007). Among the overseas U.S. military bases closed after the Cold War, Subic Bay 
Naval base and the Clark Air Base in the Philippines best illustrated the changed cost- 
benefit calculations of maintaining overseas bases. After the eruptions of Mt. Pinatubo 
and the refusal of the Filipino Senate to renew the leases, Washington decided not to 
renegotiate a base agreement with the Philippines (Brands, 1992).
Closure of the U.S. military bases in the Philippines offered a stark contrast with 
those in Okinawa. In spite of the high fiscal and political costs, the Japanese government 
has failed to reduce the number of U.S. military bases in Okinawa to the level which the 
local population had demanded. People in Okinawa have suffered from the noise of the 
aircrafts, the danger of stray shots and aircraft accidents, and repeated crimes by U.S.
3
soldiers, their families and military contractors. What is worse, Okinawa Prefecture 
alone hosts over 75% of the U.S. military bases in Japan while the rest of the nation 
enjoys the benefits of the security guarantee the alliance offers (Giarra, 1999). Not only 
has Japan provided locations for U.S. military bases, it has also been the most generous 
provider of host nation support funds among U.S. allies. In order to cover stationing 
costs of the U.S. military forces, the Japanese government has paid over 4 billion dollars 
every year (United States Department of Defense, 1999).
The United States and Japan had policy options other than retaining and 
strengthening their bilateral alliance after the Cold War. For example, Colin Dueck 
explored four options for the post-Cold War American grand strategy: strategic 
disengagement, liberal internationalism, balance of power, and, primacy. Strategic 
disengagement policy advocates a complete withdrawal from political and military 
commitments of the Cold War and a return to isolationism. Liberal internationalism 
promotes a liberal world order through multilateral institutions. The balance of power 
strategy focuses on preserving a power equilibrium among major states in the key areas 
of the world. The last option and the one the U.S. has chosen is primacy, the strategy to 
maintain America’s political and military predominance in the world and to prevent the 
rise of any challenger to the America’s preponderance (Dueck, 2006). John Ruggie also 
predicted that “sustained engagement by the United States for the sake of a stable 
international order will prove more problematic in the years ahead than it was during the 
Cold War” (Ruggie, 1997, p. 92). In sum, both realist and liberal scholars had good 
reasons for predicting the dissolution of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War.
Likewise, Japan had alternative strategies. For example, Michael Green discussed
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five issues around which Japan’s post-Cold War foreign defense policy has been debated: 
alliance or autonomy, constitutional revision, Asia or the West, bilateralism or 
multilateralism, and economic security versus military security (Green, 2001). Although 
Japan has chosen an alliance over autonomy, preservation of the “peace” constitution 
over revision of it, being a part of the West over Asia, bilateralism over multilateralism, 
and economic security over military security, the choices between the competing options 
have never been easy and there has been room for more nuanced and integrated solutions. 
For example, the U.S. tried to develop multilateral security organizations in Asia, such as 
the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), only to find a web of bilateral 
alliances more effective (Borden, 1984b). More recently, the United States and Japan 
have tried a multilateral approach to the North Korean nuclear development. But the Six 
Party Talk has failed to produce meaningful and lasting solutions to North Korean 
nuclear problem, which has given more incentives to the United States and Japan to 
strengthen their bilateral alliance.
The U.S.-Japan alliance survived not only the end of the Cold War, but also the 
9/11 terrorist attacks. The Koizumi administration made military contributions to the War 
on Terrorism by dispatching the Maritime Self Defense Force to the Indian Ocean to 
support the U.S. Navy and the Ground Self Defense Force to Iraq for relief and 
reconstruction missions (Kliman, 2006). Although sending Self Defense Forces overseas 
seemed to be a significant departure from the post-World War II national security policy 
of Japan, its missions in the War on Terrorism were carefully limited to reconstruction 
and logistic support. And most importantly, Prime Minister Koizumi justified his 
decision to send SDF to international conflicts without U.N. authorizations by asking
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“What country would defend Japan in case a foreign country should attack us?”(Koizumi, 
2003, ^.14). While NATO allies were divided if they should support the United States in 
the Iraq War, the United States and Japan have emerged as closer allies since 9/11. If 
dramatic changes in international relations after the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks could not end the U.S.-Japan alliance, what would?
In sum, there were both theoretical and practical reasons for which the United 
States and Japan could have taken alternative national security policies to their bilateral 
alliance in the post- Cold War era. But there were no serious public discussions in the 
United States or Japan to terminate the bilateral alliance. Rather Japan found it rational 
to keep placing the U.S.-Japan alliance at the center of its national security policy after 
the Cold War. Likewise, making the U.S.-Japan alliance the cornerstone of its Asia- 
Pacific policy is a rational option for the United States. What the United States and Japan 
did not question were their sources of rationality, ideational foundations of their national 
interests. How and why have the United States and Japan kept choosing each other as 
major allies in spite of significant changes in international and domestic politics in both 
countries since 1951, when the two countries signed the original Mutual Security Treaty? 
What has made the asymmetrical alliance acceptable for both the United States and Japan 
so long? Allies have to find their national interests to be mutually compatible, or even 
complementary, in order for an alliance to survive for an extended period and changes in 
domestic and international politics. The present research will ask why and how the 
United States and Japan conceive of their national security and place each other within 
their ideas of national security.
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Literature Review
Existing literature of international security and the U.S.-Japanese relations has 
addressed the puzzle of the surviving U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War only 
partially at best. While realist scholars have contributed to the majority of alliance 
studies, they tend to ignore or downplay ideational factors of alliance politics (Snyder, 
1997; Walt, 1987; Waltz, 1979). On the other hand, constructivists have made significant 
contributions to revitalize cultural studies of national security, especially that of Japan, 
but paid little attention to unique aspects of American foreign defense policy. In 
addition, constructivists have not reached a consensus on what level of analysis they 
should focus on. Some constructivists emphasize the importance of shared norms and 
identities among states in their studies of weapons of mass destruction, and humanitarian 
intervention (Finnemore, 1996), NATO (Risse-Kappen, 1996), and Pan-Arabism 
(Barnett, 1996). Others focus on domestically shared norms and identities to explain 
unique aspects of particular countries such as Japan, Germany, China, and Russia 
(Berger, 1998; Hopf, 2002; Johnston, 1995a; Katzenstein, 1996a). Although Alexander 
Wendt admits that shared norms and identities do not always facilitate cooperation 
among states, his discussion of the three cultures of international anarchy suggests that 
states have to share the Kantian culture to engage in high level of international 
cooperation (Wendt, 1999). Likewise the literature on security community, a 
constructivist study of alliance, argues that shared norms and identity help states to form 
a zone of peace where international conflicts are solved without military forces(Adler & 
Barnett, 1998).
The present research aims at combining the insights of the two kinds of
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constructivism, analyzing the roles of internationally shared and domestically driven 
unique norms and identities of national security between Japan and the United States. 
While the United States and Japan share liberal political and economic identities as 
advanced industrialized democracies, they are not the only ideational foundations binding 
the two allies. In reality, the differences of national security cultures between the United 
States and Japan have contributed to security interdependence, not the break-up of the 
alliance. As a private company acquires or merges with another with complementary 
technologies and assets to expand its scope of business, a country seeks allies with shared 
and complementary power resources. And as constructivists argue, the structure within 
which a state makes foreign and defense policies is ideational as well as material. In 
order to understand how and why a state develops and uses different power resources, 
one needs to look into norms and identities of national security of that state (Katzenstein, 
1996b). For that purpose, the following sections will survey cultural studies of American 
and Japanese foreign and defense policies, and studies of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the 
Cold War in general.
Since publication of The Culture o f National Security and Cultural Norms and 
National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan by Peter Katzenstein in 1996, 
the body of scholarly work on Japanese national security has expanded through dialogue 
between cultural, or constructivist, and realist oriented approaches. Katzenstein focused 
on the norm of nonviolence which has been domestically shared and given an ideational 
structure to both domestic and international security policies of Japan since the end of 
World War II (Katzenstein, 1996a). Along with Katzenstein, Thomas Berger employed a 
cultural approach to explain why Japan and Germany have been reluctant to regain
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9military power even after they achieved remarkable economic development. Berger’s 
answer to the question is the antimilitarist cultures that are deeply rooted in the two 
countries’ national psyches (Berger, 1998). Thus the cultural study on foreign policy 
solved the puzzle of policy continuity of Japan after the Cold War that was not answered 
by structural realists. The strength of the research by Katzenstein and Berger lies in their 
integration of ideational and domestic factors with material and external factors to 
explain seemingly irrational or unique aspects of Japanese defense policy that structural 
realism failed to explain.
Another group of Japan specialists are inspired by realist theories and explain the 
weakening norms of antimilitarism and emergence of more independent and active, or 
“normal,” national security policy of Japan in the post-Cold War era. For example, 
Michael Green summarizes his findings about an emerging “reluctant realism” of Japan 
as follows: a greater focus on balance of power, frayed idealism, a higher sensitivity to 
security, a push for independent foreign policy, a focus on Asia, and a more fluid foreign 
policy making process (Green, 2001). Based on Green’s notion of “reluctant realism,” 
Daniel Kliman analyzes changes in Japan’s national security strategy since 9/11. He 
explains recent changes in Japanese defense policy by external threats from North Korea 
and China, the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi, declining Japanese economic 
power, and generation changes in Japan (Kliman, 2006).
Instead of siding with one school of international relations theory, Richard 
Samuels’ Securing Japan takes a synthetic approach between constructivism and realism 
to analyze Japanese grand strategies since the Meiji Restoration. He demonstrates how 
international constraints and domestic politics have interacted at different historical
periods to form Japan’s grand strategies such as “Rich Nation, Strong Army” and 
“Yoshida Doctrine.” Samuels is a realist when he emphasizes pragmatic strategic 
thinking and the end-means rationality of Japan. At the same time, Samuels is a 
constructivist when he argues that Japanese strategic culture emphasizes autonomy and 
prestige. He also analyzes the dynamics between ideational and material factors of 
Japan’s national security strategy by examining how national discourse and consensus on 
foreign relations and defense issues have alternated as new world orders have come and 
gone. Samuels explains recent changes in Japanese foreign defense policy by the rise of 
China, reckless foreign policy by North Korea, and doubts about the U.S.’ security 
commitment, and the decline of the Japanese economy. Because of those external forces, 
New Autonomists, Neo-Revisionists, Realists, Globalists, Mercantilists, and Asianists are 
competing for a new grand strategy after the demise of the Yoshida Doctrine (Samuels, 
2007).
One of the surprisingly weak links in constructivist studies of international 
relations is the United States. There is no chapter on the United States in Katzenstein’s 
The Culture o f National Security or a comparable book to Cultural Norms and National 
Security to ask what is the national security culture of America. This lack is even more 
surprising because cultural aspects to the U.S. foreign and defense policies have been one 
of the major topics in both political science and diplomatic history. To name a few, Hans 
Morgenthau established the foundations of classical realism in international relations by 
criticizing liberal traditions of American foreign policy (Morgenthau, 1948). Louis Hartz 
traced liberalism as a unifying tradition of both domestic and foreign policies of the 
United States since its beginning (Hartz, 1955). In the 1970s, political scientists began to
10
11
study what they call “strategic culture”(Snyder, 1977, 1991) and analyzed ideational 
factors of American ways of war in comparison with those of the Soviet Union. Inspired 
by Snyder’s work, Klein argues that the central tenet of American strategic culture is 
power projection (Klein, 1988). Lord examined the liberal democratic roots of American 
strategic culture (Lord, 1985). Diplomatic historians have also developed a large body of 
literature on styles and traditions of American foreign policy (Gray, 1981; May, 1973).
More recently, neoclassical realist scholars, such as Christopher Layne and Collin 
Dueck, explained the continuity of hegemonic grand strategy of the United States after 
the Cold War with ideologically and domestically driven liberal projects such as global 
free market and democratization, and a military balance of power at the international 
level (Dueck, 2006; Layne, 2006). Another body of literature that uses ideas as 
independent variables focus on the problem of expansionist ideas in U.S. foreign policy, 
which has led the United States to intervene in the periphery or the parts of the world that 
are not so vital to core national interests (Kupchan, 1994; Mearsheimer, 2001; Snyder, 
1991; Stein, 1993; Taliaferro, 2004).
What has made that hegemonic foreign defense policy of the United States 
possible is not only “a preponderance of power” (Leffler, 1992), but also a high respect 
for the military (Huntington, 1957; Johnson, 2004; Russett, 1990) and the rise of 
internationalism in the United States (Holsti, 1996, 2004; Legro, 2000). The United 
States started acting as a hegemon not when it had developed overwhelming material 
power but when it developed a national consensus to use its preponderant military and 
economic power and to assume international leadership. While Japan became a trading 
state by focusing on economic development after World War II (Rosecrance, 1986), the
United States assumed international leadership by developing a new identity of a 
“national security state” at the beginning of the Cold War (Leffler, 1992). In short, 
hegemony is not only a sate of balance of material power, but also a state of the national 
identity of the most powerful state in the international system.
While hegemonic identity of the United States emerged in the 20th century, John 
Lewis Gaddis points out that the most enduring tradition of the U.S. foreign policy is the 
norm of homeland security (Gaddis, 2004). Although the term homeland security has 
been used more commonly after 9/11, the prevention of foreign military attacks on the 
soil of the United States has been the unifying norm in both isolationist and 
internationalist foreign policy. Since the United States was dragged into World War I 
and II, it learned the country would not be safe as long as illiberal states dominated the 
power centers of the world. Instead of isolating itself from the dangers and evils of 
power politics, the best way to secure the homeland of the United States is to assume 
international leadership and make the world safe for democracies.
While ideational studies of American and Japanese foreign defense policies focus 
on characteristics and unique aspects of each country, both constructivist and realist 
theories of alliance and studies of the U.S.-Japan alliance highlight common factors that 
bind the two allies. Constructivists focusing on internationally shared norms and 
identities explain a pattern of international alignment, rather than defense policy of a 
particular state by pointing to shared norms and identities. For example, Emmanuel 
Adler and Michael Barnett developed the notion of a security community, in which war is 
inconceivable because of shared norms and identities (Shore, 1998). They were inspired 
by a pioneering work by Karl Deutsch on the trans-Atlantic community (Deutsch, 1957)
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and still the best case of a security community is Western Europe. Although the volume 
explores security communities in other parts of the world outside Europe, it failed to 
recognize the bilateral security community between the United States and Japan. Among 
constructivist research on the U.S.-Japan alliance, Henry Nau offers one of the most 
promising models. He explains stability of the Cold War Western alliances, including the 
U.S.-Japan alliance, by the combination of power asymmetry and shared identity as 
democracies (Nau, 2002).
While culturist and constructivist researchers focus on unique or even irrational 
aspects of Japanese defense policy and the U.S-Japan alliance, scholars employing the 
realist approach try to rationalize them. Although neorealism has failed to explain why 
the bilateral alliance survived in spite of fundamental changes in global balance of power 
after the Cold War, other variants of realism have offered partial answers to the research 
question of this dissertation. First, neorealism itself has offered an alternative 
explanation of international relations in East Asia after the Cold War by focusing on 
regional, not global, balance of power. The Cold War was not over in Asia in the same 
way as in Europe. Both China and Korea are ideologically divided and have been the 
major sources of potential military conflicts in the region. The United States and Japan 
need their bilateral alliance to balance against the threats from the rising power of China 
and the heightened threat from North Korea (Christensen, 1999; Friedberg, 1993; Green, 
2002). Kenneth Waltz goes so far as to argue that sooner or later Japan will adopt a more 
independent and assertive national security policy, including nuclear armament, matching 
its economic and technological capabilities in an increasingly dangerous region 
(Christensen, 1999; Waltz, 2000).
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In addition to the literature on the Japanese foreign defense policy, the literature 
on the U.S.- Japan alliance has grown since the end of the Cold War. The majority of 
this literature is in edited volumes focusing on the future of the alliance with strong 
policy orientations; however, these efforts have not addressed from a theoretical 
perspective the question of why the U.S.-Japan alliance survived the end of the Cold 
War. For example, the volume edited by Ikenberry and Inoguchi examines whether and 
how the U.S.-Japan security alliance can evolve and remain at the core of the region’s 
security order. Although they recognize the rise of multilateralism in Asia and the need 
for the alliance to evolve, they concluded that “even if all the external threats in the 
region were to disappear, the alliance would still be important for regulating relations 
between the United States and Japan” (Ikenberry & Inoguchi, 2003, p. 2). Green and 
Cronin examined the U.S.-Japan alliance by assembling both scholars and practitioners to 
examine the historical evolution of the bilateral alliance, the military, diplomatic, and 
technological connections between the U.S. and Japan, the domestic and international 
constraints on the alliance, and the linkages between economic and security issues. The 
volume as a whole successfully describes how deeply the two allies have been integrated 
not only militarily but also politically, economically and culturally. The editors 
concluded the volume with four policy recommendations: gradual enhancement of 
military cooperation, engagement with China, bilateral cooperation in global security 
issues, and a long-term commitment to a forward U.S. military presence in Asia (Green
& Cronin, 1999).
While other books on the U.S.-Japanese relations after the Cold War are 
anthologies, two monographs have made significant contributions to further
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understanding of the dynamics and the complexity of the bilateral alliance. One is 
Alliance Adrift by Yoichi Funabashi. Funabashi provided in-depth stories of the 
diplomatic negotiation which led to the revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense 
Cooperation in 1997. Until the official documents of the negotiation are available under 
the Freedom of Information Act in the U.S. and until the Japanese government decides to 
release them, Funabashi’s book will serve as the best source for insider stories of the 
redefinition process of the U.S.-Japan Alliance after the Cold War. As one of the top 
journalists in Japan, Funabashi interviewed key negotiators and decision makers of both 
governments numerous times between 1991 and 1996. He successfully demonstrated how 
the personalities, backgrounds, and experiences of individual decision makers mattered in 
the diplomatic negotiations between the two allies (Funabashi, 1999).
Kent Calder’s new monograph starts with the argument that the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance is in danger of “quiet erosion” and questions the basic rationale of the alliance 
from both the American and the Japanese sides. Calder’s book is more theoretical than 
other works on the U.S.-Japan alliance since the end of the Cold War. He employs 
comparisons with other cases across time and space to examine why and when not only 
the U.S.-Japan Alliance, but also alliances in general, survive changes in international 
and domestic environments. He argues that the political, economic, and transnational 
personal networks between the United States have been weakened while global military 
cooperation has been enhanced. The imbalance between the enhanced military 
cooperation and the weakened political, economic, and personal infrastructure of an 
alliance is a dangerous combination (Calder, 2009). While Calder asks an important 
question about alliance continuity and employs comparative methods with historical
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cases such as the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Anglo-Portuguese alliance in order to 
explain the changes in the U.S.-Japan alliance since 2001 and predict its future, he does 
not ask why the alliance survived the end of the Cold War and his analysis of the 1990s is 
rather brief. The changes in the bilateral alliance in the post-9/11 era should have never 
happened without its redefinition in the 1990s. He also ignores the entire body of 
constructivist research on Japanese security although he emphasizes the importance of 
cultural bases of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
While constructivism and realism have mainly contributed to the debate on 
Japanese defense policy and the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War, liberalism and its 
subtheories could provide alternative explanations with their focus on economic relations, 
domestic regime types, and institutions in the United States and Japan. First, the two 
allies are so economically interdependent that any military conflict would hurt the 
interests of the both countries (Keohane & Nye, 1977). But most experts of U.S. -  
Japanese relations see economic ties as a source of conflict rather than cooperation 
between the U.S. and Japan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Instead of strengthening 
ties, economic issues endangered the survival of the U.S.-Japan alliance (Funabashi,
1999; Green, 2000).
Liberalism also expects peaceful relations among democracies by shared identity, 
norms of peaceful conflict resolution, and institutional constraints on war-making 
decisions (Brown, Lynn-Jones, & Miller, 1996; Doyle, 1997; Russett, 1993). Although a 
shared identity as democracies seems to have contributed to the survival of the U.S.- 
Japan alliance, democratic peace theory is not the best theory to explain the bilateral 
alliance after the Cold War. First, democratic peace theory does not argue that
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democracies necessarily form an alliance. It only argues that democracies do not engage 
in war against each other. Second, a democratic identity is just one of the ideational 
foundations of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In order to understand asymmetrical security 
interdependence between the U.S. and Japan, other cultural factors, such as other 
identities and national security norms, should be considered.
Liberalism tries to explain the survival of the U.S.-Japan alliance by 
institutionalization of security cooperation between the two allies. As McCalla argues 
that institutionalization prolonged the life of NATO by finding new missions after the 
Cold War (McCalla, 1996), the U.S. and Japan have developed domestic laws, national 
bureaucracies, military forces, and domestic industries to manage the bilateral alliance. 
Those interests in both Japan and the United States contributed to extend the life of the 
alliance (Tsuchiyama, 1997). McCalla also argues for the need to analyze an alliance as 
an organization, paying more attention to diversity of scope and depth of alliance 
structure and process, and internal dynamics of allies. In other words, alliance politics is 
a two-level game. Like any other foreign policy making, decision makers try to balance 
external pressures and domestic political needs. This view is particularly helpful in 
analyzing alliance politics during peacetime when decision makers in both Tokyo and 
Washington were more sensitive to domestic pressure than during the heat of the Cold 
War. Barnett and Levy also argue that the choice of strategy depends on a combination 
of systemic and domestic factors, including the perceived degree of external threat to 
state security, the perceived degree of domestic instability and threat to the government, 
and the constraints that derive from the domestic political economy (Barnett & Levy, 
1991).
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While institutional explanations have an advantage of bridging international and 
domestic levels of explanations and material and ideational bases of an alliance, the very 
mediating function of institutions can be a weakness. In the case of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, the asymmetrical nature is a reflection of either material power balance between 
the American and the Japanese military forces or of active or passive national security 
norms. While the institutions could delay the changes caused by power or cultural shift 
among allies, institutions alone cannot change power balance or national security 
cultures.
The review above has demonstrated both the strengths and weaknesses of 
different approaches. As dominant theory of international security studies, realism offers 
various explanations of survival of the U.S.-Japan alliance. But they fail to explain how 
different realist prescriptions, from free riding to the U.S. security umbrella to Japan’s 
nuclear armament, can be rational at the same time. In order to justify their claims, 
realists need to look into the sources of rationality and national interest of both the United 
State and Japan.
Thus, realist scholars have argued that the existing and newly rising external 
national security threats in the Asia-Pacific region were the main causes of the survival of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War. For their part, liberal scholars would 
emphasize factors such as institutionalization of the bilateral alliance, economic 
interdependence, and shared democratic identity between the United States and Japan. 
These competing explanations are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary, and 
any serious analysis of the case should synthesize them, rather than singling out one or 
the other class of explanations in isolation.
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Moreover attempting to explain the survival of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the 
Cold War by realist or liberal reasons alone can lead to analytical contradictions. Both 
realism and liberalism are so broad and ambiguous that each of them could provide 
conflicting explanations and predictions. For example, realism could explain and predict 
both the dissolution and continuity of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War. In 
general realist theories tend to emphasize the dynamic, rather than stable, nature of 
military alliances because of the risks of entrapment and abandonment (Snyder, 1997). 
Based on this strain of realism, the U.S.-Japan alliance should have dissolved when the 
original common threat, the Soviet Union, disappeared. When allies face disparate rather 
than common threats, they run the risk of being entrapped into disputes or conflicts that 
do not directly affect their individual national interests. Similarly, when a state engages 
in a military conflict with a third country which its allies do not see as a threat, it runs a 
higher risk of being abandoned by those allies.
Realism would also offer another explanation of a possible dissolution of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance by focusing on states’ interests in limiting hegemonic dominance. 
According to this line of realism, because the United States had much greater power than 
any other country in the Asia-Pacific region at the end of the Cold War, Japan should 
have aligned with China to balance against the United States. In a similar manner, the 
United Sates should have allied with China to preempt possible Japanese challenge to the 
U.S. hegemony (Friedman & LeBard, 1991). By emphasizing the importance and 
influence of norms of national security, constructivism can explain not only Japan’s 
reluctance to challenge U.S. hegemony, but also America’s willingness to extend its 
security guarantee to Japan in spite of persistent asymmetry in burden sharing and
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division of labor within the U.S.-Japan alliance, even though the power gap between the 
two allies had closed significantly during the Cold War.
Instead, realist scholars have emphasized common threats from North Korea and 
China as the main reasons for the continuing cohesion of the U.S.-Japan alliance (Green, 
2001; Kliman, 2006; Samuels, 2007). Yet they failed to fully explain why the United 
States and Japan have perceived North Korea and China as more threatening than each 
other without mentioning shared liberal identities and institutionalization of the bilateral 
alliance. Liberalism and constructivism provide more convincing rationale for the 
stability of the alliance.
Similarly, liberalism offers multiple, also often inconsistent, explanations for the 
endurance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. First, the democratic peace theory strands of 
liberalism would argue that the alliance survived the end of the Cold War because of 
shared democratic identity between the United States and Japan (Mochizuki & O'Hanlon, 
1998). Second, economic liberalism would emphasize economic interdependence 
between the two countries. As the largest and the second largest economies in the world 
and one of the top trading partners with each other at the end of the Cold War, the United 
States and Japan had unmistakable interest in maintaining peaceful relations. Third, 
neoliberal institutionalism would emphasize highly institutionalized nature of the U.S.- 
Japan alliance, as well as NATO (McCalla, 1996). But the first and the second factors 
only explain peaceful relations between the two countries, not the need for a military 
alliance in peacetime. Even assuming that the shared interests as democracies and 
capitalist countries have positively affected alliance cohesion between the United Sates 
and Japan and that institutionalization extended the life of the military alliance, liberalism
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has failed to sufficiently explain how these different factors combined contributed to the 
survival of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Furthermore, liberalism fails to explain ever- 
increased tension between Japan and China in spite of a growing level of economic 
interdependence. It is clearly necessary to consider historical issues between the two 
countries in order to account for this phenomenon. In short, both realism and liberalism 
contain competing explanations not only against each other but also within themselves.
Constructivism not only enables the synthesizing of explanations from competing 
realist and liberal theoretical propositions that are more powerful than either can provide 
independently, but it can also help rationalize internal inconsistencies within each 
separate theoretical tradition (Barkin, 2003; Katzenstein, 2005; Katzenstein & Okawara, 
2001; Sterling-Folker, 2000, 2002). Constructivism adds more explanatory and 
specifying power to realism by highlighting ideational factors such as threat perceptions, 
construction of national interests, and soft power. In the case of liberalism, liberal 
institutionalism and constructivism are combined, the effects of identities and norms in 
forma and informal institutions will be revealed (Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002).
Constructivism will help realism by asking why the U.S. hegemony has been in 
Japan’s national interest, rather than a threat to it. By adding shared liberal identities and 
interdependent national security norms between the two countries to the balance of power 
analysis of the regional security in Asia after the Cold War, the present dissertation 
reveals rationality behind mutual friendly perceptions between the United States and 
Japan. My argument can also provide more coherent explanations as to why the United 
States and Japan have perceived North Korea’s nuclear development and China’s rise as 
a regional hegemonic power as common threats.
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As for liberalism, constructivism will specify when close economic relations 
through international trade and investment lead to either interdependence or vulnerability 
(Baldwin, 1980). By adding identities as an intermediate variable, Constructivism will 
explain why the high level of economic interdependence between the United States and 
Japan has enhanced their alliance cohesion, while that between the United States and 
China has triggered the fear of vulnerability. Because of the shared identities as capitalist 
democracies and allies, the United States and Japan do not have to fear that any economic 
disagreements on conflicts will lead to military conflict between the two countries. But 
when it comes to China, in contrast, both Japan and the United States need to consider the 
possibility that China may use its economic leverage gained through interdependence to 
achieve their security and diplomatic goals. Thus, economic interdependence without 
security and cultural interdependence contains the risk of vulnerability rather than the 
promise of international cooperation.
Conversely, liberal institutionalism can help constructivism by highlighting how 
the national security norms of the United States and Japan have been institutionalized 
with commensurate durable impact on their respective national security policies 
(Sterling-Folker, 2000). Abstract ideas, however persuasive, do not have real impact on 
government policy unless they are written into laws, regulations, and organizations, and 
unless budgetary and human resources are allocated to put them into practice. The third 
and the fourth chapters will examine how identities and norms of national security of the 
United States and Japan became strongly institutionalized and a source of policy 
continuity in the changing international security environment.
Thus, constructivism will demonstrate that the combination of the shared liberal
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identities, economic interdependence, and institutionalized asymmetrical military alliance 
have made the U.S hegemony in the Asia Pacific region an integral part of Japan’s 
national interest. Similarly, constructivism would rationalize the threat perceptions of the 
United States and Japan toward China and North Korea. It is the combination of 
undemocratic political systems and increasing military capabilities that have made the 




HYPOTHESES, METHODOLOGY, AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Hypotheses
Based on the preceding literature review, the combination of constructivist and 
realist models of national security and alliance is most promising in explaining the 
alliance politics between the United States and Japan in the 1990s. As realists argue, a 
state uses alliances in order to fill the gap between its goals of national security and its 
means (Morgenthau, 1948; Walt, 1987; Waltz, 1979). But realists’ focus on balance of 
material power often fails to explain threat perceptions of states. In addition, the choices 
of allies and the content and specifics of security cooperation between allies cannot be 
explained without asking how and why a state defines its national interest (Barnett,
1996). Constructivism provides the answers to those questions. It argues that the 
identities and norms of national security, which are the main components of a state’s 
national security culture, define national interest (Katzenstein, 1996b). And then a state 
develops national security institutions, including alliances, to defend and promote 
culturally defined national interests (Katzenstein, 1996a). By looking into ideational 
basis of national interest and state’s rationality, the current research explains why the 
United States has been the only ally for Japan and why Japan has been the most important 
ally for the U.S. in the Asia Pacific region as well as the asymmetrical nature of their
bilateral alliance.
Based on the theoretical models of alliance and national security developed by 
realists and constructivists above, the present dissertation will test 4 sets of hypotheses 
below.
1. The U.S.-Japan Alliance survived the end o f the Cold War because they have 
developed interdependent national security cultures.
a. Interdependent national security cultures develop when allies have both 
common and complementary identities and norms o f national security.
2. U.S. national identity as a liberal hegemon and its norms o f homeland security 
and respect for the military allowed the U.S. to include the survival and 
prosperity o f other industrial democracies into the America’s own national 
interest.
3. Japan’s national identity as a liberal trading state and its norm o f antimilitarism 
have made powerful American hegemony and close relations with it integral parts 
o f Japan’s own national interest.
4. The U.S.-Japan alliance has filled the gaps between the national interests and the 
means to them for both the United States and Japan.
a. The United States needs Japan to project its power in Asia.
i. Because of its liberal hegemonic identity, the survival and 
prosperity of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are in the national 
interest of the U.S.
ii. Because of its liberal hegemonic identity, preventing China from 
dominating East Asia is in the national interest of the U.S.
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iii. Because of its liberal hegemonic identity, North Korea’s nuclear 
development has threatened the national interest of the U.S.
iv. Because of its norm of homeland security and respect for the 
military, the U.S. protects those interests by maintaining overseas 
bases in Japan and South Korea.
b. Japan needs the United States to protect the country from external threats.
i. Because of its liberal trading state identity, strong US hegemony 
and close relations with it are in the national interest of Japan.
ii. Because of its liberal trading state identity, preventing China from 
dominating East Asia is in the national interest of Japan.
iii. Because of its liberal hegemonic identity, North Korea’s nuclear 
development has threatened the national interest of the U.S.
iv. Because of its norm of antimilitarism, Japan has protected its 
national interest by hosting U.S. military bases and by keeping a 
minimal level of its own military forces.
Figure 1 illustrates the proposed cultural model of alliance and its application to 
the U.S.-Japan alliance. The first row represents the causal relations among state identity, 
national interests, national security norms, and defense policy. The second row shows 
how the general model can be applied to explain U.S. national security policy and the 
third row represents the relations between Japanese national security culture and its 
defense policy.
Before a further discussion of national security culture, some key terms need to be 
defined. First, culture, following a widely quoted definition by anthropologist Clifford
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Figure 1. Cultural Model of Alliance
Geertz, is “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system 
of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men 
communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their attitudes toward 
life” (Geertz, 1973). This definition highlights several key characteristics of culture.
First, culture is a social idea shared by a group of people. When a certain set of ideas is 
held by a single individual, it is not a culture. But when individuals form groups of 
almost any size, culture quickly manifests itself. For example, the Catholic Church, 
Apple Computers, the New York Yankees, the United States of America, the 
International Monetary Fund, Asia, and Western civilization all have distinct cultures that 
give unique characteristics to the groups. Second, for culture to exist, it must be shared 
across time. Although culture does change, it does so slowly and the main elements of a
culture survive changes over time. Thus, culture tends to serve as an ideational anchor 
that contributes to historical continuity of the group. Third, culture is a system of values, 
rather than a set of concrete material facts. Nevertheless, its ideational and inter- 
subjective nature creates a perception shared by the group and has important influences 
over the group’s behavior. Therefore, cultural explanations can be useful in cases that 
concrete material factors cannot explain or have difficulty in explaining. In sum, culture 
provides the basis for behavioral continuity in the face of environmental and structural 
changes, as well as for behavioral diversity among actors with similar material properties.
Political culture is a subculture of a national culture. It is a set of citizens’ beliefs 
about, attitudes toward, and expectations for the political system, process, and policy 
(Almond, Dalton, Powell, & Strom, 2006). Political culture sets both cognitive standards 
on political actors and institutions and evaluative standards on how they should behave 
(Katzenstein, 1996b). The studies of political culture address questions such as: Who 
belongs to the nation? What type of the government should the nation have? Who should 
be political leaders? What are citizens’ rights and duties? How should the government 
address political issues? What are proper roles of the government in citizens’ lives? The 
studies of political culture cover three levels of political attitudes: political system, 
political process, and policy. For example, the system-level studies of political culture 
focus on the notion of legitimacy while the process level studies how particular type of 
political culture affects the level of citizens’ participation in politics.
For example, the recent debate over health care insurance in the United Sates can 
be better understood if one is familiar with American political culture. It has been a norm 
among other developed countries that the government offers universal health insurance
28
coverage to its citizens. International observers have wondered why so many Americans 
are resistant to the notion of national medical insurance, especially when the United 
States spends a much larger share of its GDP on health care than any other OECD 
members. Similarity of political and economic institutions, as well as income level, 
among OECD members leads to expectations for similar policy preferences in health care 
issues, leaving a puzzle as to why the United States is so dramatically different. Inclusion 
of American political culture into the analysis, however, helps to solve the puzzle. 
American political culture emphasizes the liberty of individual citizens over equality and 
solidarity among them, individual property rights, independence from overdependence on 
the government, and preference for limited roles of government in economy and society. 
Adding political culture to the analysis better explains the late and difficult adaption of 
public health insurance, one of the key policy features of the modern welfare state. Thus 
political culture, along with other factors, defines the identities and norms of the 
government and its citizens, as well as the relations between the ruler and the ruled.
National security culture is a set of norms and identities which define national 
interests, national enemies, and the proper means to defend the nation (Katzenstein 
1996a). It develops out of the domestic and diplomatic history of a given nation and is 
institutionalized to serve as a basis for the continuity and stability of national security 
policy. National security culture provides the ideational structure within which a state 
develops its national security policy.
In order for states to develop a reliable and durable alliance, they must have 
interdependent national security cultures. Interdependent national security cultures result 
from two main factors. The first of these is commonality. An alliance survives better in
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peacetime, when allies share common identities and norms that set common interests. In 
the case of the U.S. and Japan, they are both capitalist democracies. The two countries 
share the interest of making the world safe for democracies and beneficial for capitalism. 
While the origins of the Japanese democratic and capitalist identities can be largely 
attributed to the American military occupation after World War II (Dower, 1979; Iokibe, 
1985) and the bilateral alliance with the U.S., those new identities initially established by 
the U.S. have taken firm root in Japan and have contributed to the survival of the alliance 
after the Cold War. In contrast, the Allied Powers of World War II lacked interdependent 
national security cultures and were divided into two camps with opposing political and 
economic ideologies.
But common identities alone are not sufficient to develop interdependent security 
cultures between states; they must also have complementary identities and norms. The 
U.S. and Japan have developed such mutually constitutive identities as the two allies need 
each other to remain who they are. While the U.S. developed identity as a hegemon and 
national security state, Japan has developed the complementary identity as a junior 
partner of the U.S. and a trading state (Rosecrance, 1986). Japan needs U.S. military 
protection and an open U.S. market to keep their antimilitarist norm and trading state 
identities while the United States needs military bases in Japan and diplomatic and 
economic support to act as a global hegemon. In short, both countries needed each other 
to maintain their different but complementary identities after the Cold War.
The norms of national security, which provide the basis of culturally defined 
national interests, are different but compatible between the U.S. and Japan. The norm of 
homeland security and respect for armed forces have been developed and institutionalized
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in the course of American history. Because the United States has experienced a limited 
numbers of foreign military attacks on its homeland but has nevertheless been dragged 
into two world wars, fighting war overseas, rather than waiting for enemies to attack the 
U.S. homeland, has become one of its most important norms of national security. In 
order to achieve homeland security, the United States has had to maintain large military 
forces and project its military power globally since the World War II, even during 
peacetime. Such expansive national security goals are only possible to achieve in a 
country where the respect for military services is high. Because of highly integrated and 
friendly nature of civil-military relations dating back to its War of Independence 
(Huntington, 1957), the respect for the military is one of the strongest social and political 
norms in the United Sates. Building on the existing literature of nationalism and the 
national character of the United States (Citrin, Haas, Muste, & Reingold, 1994), its 
militarism (Bacevich, 2010; Glain, 2011; Hixson, 2008; Johnson, 2004), civil-military 
relations (Feaver & Kohn, 2001), strategic culture (Booth & Trood, 1999; Johnston, 
1995b; Lord, 1985), and grand strategy (Art, 2009; Dueck, 2006; Layne, 2006), the 
current research explains the interaction between domestic and international politics, as 
well as the relationship between cultural and material factors that have shaped the U.S. 
national security policies in the postwar era.
Japan’s post-World War II national security culture is a mirror image of that of 
the United States. While the United States learned from two world wars that it cannot be 
safe and wealthy by seeking to isolate itself in a world full of authoritarian and imperial 
governments and that it must be prepared to use its power and military forces to make 
this world safe for America, the Japanese people and government learned that even strong
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military forces cannot protect the nation. As a result Japan has developed new national 
security culture based on its new identities as a trading state, democracy, and pacifist 
middle power. Pre-World War II exclusivist, religious, militant, and imperial nationalism 
have been replaced with international, secular, pacifist, and democratic nationalism 
(McVeigh, 2004). These new Japanese identities have set the foundations of post-World 
War II Japanese national security policy, which emphasizes nonmilitary dimensions, 
close ties with the United States, and the aspiration of multilateralism. The guiding 
norms of Japan’s national security policy have been those of nonviolence and civilian 
control of armed forces, and they have been firmly institutionalized in Article 9 of the 
Constitution of Japan, the three nonnuclear principles, an exclusively defense-oriented 
policy, the subordinate status of Defense Agency, and the 1% of GDP limit on the 
defense budget (Berger, 1998; DiFilippo, 2006; Katzenstein, 1996a). Another norm that 
has shaped Japan’s foreign defense policy has been follower-ship or avoidance of 
international responsibility. Instead of taking initiatives in international security issues, 
Japan has followed the lead of the United States.
Thus the two different but complementary national security cultures of the United 
States and Japan have mutually constituted, reinforced each other, and kept defining their 
national interests. Their culturally defined national interests have been stable and slow to 
change in spite of the changes in external environment after the Cold War. Thus the 




I will analyze how the interdependent national security cultures of the U.S. and 
Japan shaped their national interests, national security institutions, and national security 
policies, especially alliance policies. For that purpose, the main methods employed in the 
present research are qualitative and descriptive, supplemented by quantitative methods 
whenever possible. First, I define national security culture as nationally shared identities 
and norms that define the subjects of national defense, threats to them, and proper means 
of national security (Katzenstein 1996a). In other words, the culture of national security 
defines who we are, who are our enemies, and how to defend ourselves.
Followed by literature review and methodology chapters, in the third and fourth 
chapters of the dissertation, I will describe what American and Japanese security cultures 
are. Based on the analytical framework developed in The Culture o f National Security 
(Jepperson, Wendt, & Katzenstein, 1996), I will focus on the two countries’ national 
security identities and norms. As in any culture, political or otherwise, identities and 
norms in a national security culture are contested ideas. Among competing identities and 
norms of national security, I will focus on liberal and hegemonic identities and the norms 
of homeland security and respect for the military in the United States. For the Japanese 
part, I will examine its liberal and trading state identities and the norm of antimilitarism.
I will employ statistical data to measure the impact of those norms of national 
security policies of the two countries. For example, data on defense budgets will be 
analyzed chronologically and comparatively. By looking at changes in defense budgets 
and developments in international relations, the research will show that external threats 
are not the sole deciding factor of a country’s defense spending. Comparatively the U.S.
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has spent much more money on its defense than Japan, not only absolutely but also in 
relation to GDP. The U.S. has spent about 4 to 5 % of its GDP for its defense; Japan has 
spent 1 %. Similarly, the size of military forces in relation to the population and national 
security institutions with in the U.S. and Japanese government will be analyzed to 
demonstrate the civil military relations in each country. The size of defense industry is 
another indicator of importance a country places on military forces. By comparing the 
two countries’ defense industries, I will demonstrate how the norm of antimilitarism has 
restricted development of the military industrial complex in Japan, while the norms of 
homeland security and respect for the military have promoted the growth of it in the 
United States.
I will also utilize public opinion polls to show similarities, differences, and 
compatibilities in the ideas on national security held by the Americans and the Japanese 
as nations. For example, the Japanese government has accumulated public opinion polls 
on foreign and defense policies since the 1970s and asked such questions as: “Do you 
feel friendly toward the U.S.?” and “What is the best way to defend Japan?” In the 
United States, public opinion data have been primarily collected not by the government 
but by private companies such as Gallup, ABC News, and New York Times as well as 
nongovernmental organizations such as the Chicago Council of Global Affairs.
Then I will analyze how the national security cultures of the two countries have 
defined their national interests. In this part, I will examine how American and Japanese 
national interests are defined and expressed in major defense and foreign policy 
documents of the two countries published in the 1990s, including the Quad-annual 
Defense Reviews, National Security Strategy of the United States, the United States
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Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region for the U.S., and the National Defense 
Program Guidelines of Japan, Mid-Term Defense Program, Defense of Japan, and 
Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan for Japan. By analyzing the contents of those documents,
I will demonstrate both the similarities and differences of the two allies’ definition of 
their national interests and the compatibility between them.
In this part I will analyze how the liberal identity shared between the U.S. and 
Japan served as an ideational base for their national interests in a global free market and 
the security of democratic states. Conversely, different identities and norms of national 
security in the U.S. and Japan will be demonstrated through the two countries’ differing 
definitions of national interests. For example, the hegemonic identity and the norm of 
homeland security in the U.S. found its national interests in maintaining the largest and 
strongest military forces even during peacetime. In a similar way, the Japanese trading 
state identity and the norm of antimilitarism has made good relations with the United 
States, the strongest military power and the largest trading partner, the primary 
determinant of its national interest.
Third, I will analyze what kinds of institutions the U.S. and Japan have developed 
to pursue and defend their culturally defined national interests. In the Japanese 
government, the antimilitarist norm and the trading state identity is institutionalized in 
Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, the notion of Comprehensive Security, its 
Exclusively Defensive policy, the Three Nonnuclear Principles, the 1% of GDP ceiling 
for defense budget, and the subordinate position of the Defense Agency until 2007. In 
the U.S., the norms of homeland security and respect for the military have been 
institutionalized through development of large and strong military forces with emphasis
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on power projection capabilities, and in the prominence of defense related positions in the 
executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government, including the Department of 
Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the National Security Council, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and others.
In the fifth chapter I will analyze how the interdependent national security 
cultures of the United States and Japan contributed to the survival of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance after the Cold War. By examining a series of diplomatic negotiations between 
Japan and the United States between 1993 and 1997 to redefine their bilateral alliance, I 
will employ the case study method. Through this redefinition process, the two allies 
decided not only to keep the alliance, but also strengthen it. In this case study, I will 
analyze how the national security cultures of Japan and the United States shaped their 
national interests, threat perceptions in the Asia Pacific region, and roles each ally should 
play within the alliance. In this case study, I will use process tracing. Process tracing 
enables researchers to explain actual process and mechanism of policy making while 
large N studies confirm or deny correlations among variables. I begin by tracing the 
actual process of the diplomatic negotiations of alliance redefinition in detail. Such 
process tracing gives a researcher a large number of observation opportunities even in 
small number of cases involving multiple variables (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). 
Second, after identifying those multiple variables through process tracing, I will compare 
and contrast these variables to determine which are most important in explaining the 
endurance of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
I will use official documents including the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on 
Security and the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, and press releases
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regarding the negotiations issued by the U.S. and the Japanese governments. Although 
the full minutes and memos of actual negotiations are not yet available, parts of them 
were documented by journalists such as Yoichi Funabashi of Asahi Shinbun and reported 
by major Japanese and American newspapers and magazines. Another important source 
for this case study comes from the legislative branches of the American and the Japanese 
government. In the U.S. Congress officials from the Defense and State departments 
appeared before hearings at the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Service Committees 
and the House International Relations Committee to explain the importance of the U.S.- 
Japan alliance. The Japanese Diet created a special committee on the new Guidelines for 
U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation to discuss domestic legislation to implement the new 
guidelines. In the special committee, Foreign ministers, the directors of the Defense 
Agency, and the Defense Facilities Administrative Agency and members of ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party justified the continuation of the alliance. Those legislative 
documents are particularly useful in process tracing because they include competing 
arguments about the bilateral alliance and will show how a particular position won over 
others.
Lastly, the current research will verify if the diplomatic agreements between 
Japan and the United States were actually implemented. One of the problems of using 
official announcements and documents to demonstrate the power of ideas in foreign 
policy is that they are not always implemented as agreed upon. More than a decade has 
passed since the United States and Japan redefined their bilateral alliance in the mid- 
1990s. Has the United States reduced the size of military forces in Japan? Has Japan 
taken more active roles in the alliance? Has the scope of the U.S.-Japan alliance
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expanded? Have the two allies developed concrete contingency plans in case of 
emergencies in the areas surrounding Japan? In this part, I will mainly focus on the 
activities of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and the U.S.-Japan 
Security Consultative Committee (2+2). SACO was created in 1995 to solve the 
problems between local communities of Okinawa and the U.S. military forces there by 
reorganizing military bases and improving implementation of the Status of Forces 
Agreement. The 2+2 was upgraded to the cabinet level bilateral meeting after the Cold 
War and has tracked the progresses on the bilateral agreements on strengthening the 
bilateral alliance.
Contributions
The proposed research is expected to make several contributions to the study of 
international security. First, this research tries to bridge the gap between realism and 
constructivism in research on alliances. By specifying under what conditions and through 
what process national security culture has impact on alliance politics, the current research 
will show the dynamic relations between material and ideational, as well as domestic and 
international forces in foreign policy making. Much of the existing research emphasizes 
dichotomies between materialism and ideationalism, rationalism and postmodernism, or 
realism and constructivism in a futile attempt to definitively support one side and 
discredit the other. The current research will take the more productive approach of 
seeking to explain how those contrasting forces interact in international relations.
Second, the current dissertation proposes a cultural model of alliance. Some 
constructivists argue that states sharing cultural elements, including norms and identities,
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tend make and maintain an alliance (Nau, 2002; Shore, 1998). As the dysfunction of the 
trans-Atlantic alliance after 9/11 has demonstrated, shared identities of capitalist 
democracies are not enough to secure active cooperation among NATO members. The 
current research emphasizes the importance of cultural interdependence, which requires 
not only shared but complementary national security cultures between allies.
Third, the current research aims at introducing mainstream theoretical analysis 
into research on the U.S.-Japan alliance. Most of the recent scholarship on the U.S.- 
Japan alliance has weak theoretical bases and contributions. Rather they are more 
interested in specific policy issues such as the rise of China, the North Korean nuclear 
crises, the possibility of multilateral security institution in Asia, and others (Ikenberry & 
Inoguchi, 2003; Krauss & Pempel, 2004). Most of the literature on revisions in the U.S.- 
Japan alliance after the Cold War has been journalistic, rather than academic (Akiyama 
2002; Funabashi 1999). While admitting the cultural uniqueness of post-WW II Japanese 
national security policies, the current dissertation explores what aspects of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance can be explained and then generalized by existing theories of international 
security. In other words, the current research will ask not only what is unique about the 
U.S.-Japan alliance, but also ask what parts of it are common with those of other 
alliances; the study will develop an analytical framework out of Japanese cases that can 
be applied to other parts of the world.
Lastly, it analyzes ideational bases of American alliance policy from 
constructivist perspectives. Although The Culture o f National Security contains chapters 
on NATO (Risse-Kappen, 1996), no contributor of the volume asked what is the national 
security culture of the United States. Because the international order reflects the
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identities, norms, interests, and institutions of a hegemonic state (Ruggie, 1982), it is 
crucial to study national security culture of the United States. While middle and small 
powers have little room for projecting their cultural and domestic preferences into their 
national security policies in the face of external and material constraints, a hegemonic 
state has more choices and liberty to impose its cultural preferences in an international 
system than any other country. In the case of post-World War II international relations, it 
was the United States that provided not only material but also cultural foundations of 
international order, especially within the Western camp (Ikenberry, 2001). Japan was one 
of the biggest beneficiaries of not only material but also cultural frameworks of 
international order the United States has laid out since World War II. The present 
dissertation will demonstrate Japanese national security culture has been developed 
within the framework the American national security culture has provided. Thus studying 
the U.S.-Japan alliance to the balance of material power, the balance of national security 
cultures constraints states’ behavior.
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CHAPTER 3
NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE OF JAPAN 
Introduction
In this chapter I will trace the historical developments of Japan’s national security 
culture between 1945 and 1960. The Japanese postwar security culture born and 
developed during this period has defined Japanese national security policy and alliance 
politics with the United States even after the end of the Cold War. Japan’s national 
security culture is a product of domestically shared experience of World War II and 
institutionalized in the creation of a new national identity of Japan as a peaceful merchant 
state with a democratic government and capitalist economy. As a result postwar Japan 
has developed a much weaker and smaller military establishment than realist theories of 
international politics predict. According to realist arguments, a strong economic power 
should also be a strong military power.
First, I will explore how the Japanese security culture developed since the end of 
World War II and was institutionalized by 1960, when the United States and Japan 
revised their bilateral security treaty. I will trace the ideas and opinions about Japan’s 
postwar national security of key figures of the Supreme Command of Allied Powers 
(SCAP), the Japanese government, and intellectuals. By the 1960s, the Yoshida Doctrine, 
a major consensus on national security had been accepted among Japanese public and
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elite. The doctrine prescribed a grand strategy focusing on economic development, 
limiting Japan’s independent defense capabilities to bare minimum, and developing a 
close alliance with the United States. It served as an anchor to secure policy continuity 
through the 1980s. Although the Japanese government steadily and gradually developed 
a more capable Self Defense Force and provided crucial support to U.S. military forces in 
Japan, it had kept a disproportionally low profile in international security issues 
throughout the Cold War. By 1980, the Japanese government had formally 
institutionalized antimilitarist national security culture including Three Nonnuclear 
Principles, Exclusively Defense-Oriented policies, civilian control of the SDF, and GNP 
1% ceiling of defense budget. Thus, the relatively stable national security environment 
around Japan between 1960s and 1990s enabled institutionalization of the Yoshida 
Doctrine. Yet, stability and continuity of Japan’s antimilitarist national security policy 
since World War II could be a phase in much longer cycle of change and continuity of 
Japan’s national security policy. National security cultures tend to go through phases of 
dramatic changes and stability. Japan adopted militaristic and imperial national security 
policy in the late 19th century and democratic capitalist and antimilitarist foreign policy 
after World War II (Samuels, 2007). National security culture is not static and it does 
change. But generally it changes more slowly than external security environment, 
especially in peacetime, thus causing delay in institutional adjustment to environmental 
changes. But, in a crisis situation, especially in a serious failure in national security 
policies, dramatic changes in national security culture lead institutional changes. At the 
end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and former communist countries went through far 
more dramatic institutional changes in their national security institutions, including the
break up of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (Hopf, 2002), than their 
counterparts in the West, which have kept most of their national security institutions, 
including NATO and other Cold War alliances.
Second, I will discuss the current national security culture of Japan. Since the end 
of the Cold War, Asia regional specialists and political scientists have engaged in debate 
over the questions of whether or not Japan would become a regional hegemon by 
building up stronger and more independent military forces. Roughly speaking, political 
scientists who take the realist view argue that Japanese remilitarization would be 
inevitable because the changing regional balance of power would not allow Japan to 
maintain a low profile militarily and that economically powerful nations have always 
transformed themselves into military power (Friedman & LeBard, 1991; Waltz, 1979, 
1993). On the other hand, Japanese experts and political scientists who look into 
domestic factors shaping Japanese security policy tend to deny such a possibility (Berger, 
1993; Katzenstein, 1996a; Katzenstein & Okawara, 1993). The latter group points out 
the importance of Japanese security culture, characterized by antimilitarism, taboo 
against nuclear armament, civilian control of the military, a comprehensive view of 
national security, and dependence on the United States.
Finally, I will synthesize the realist and constructivist analyses of Japanese 
security policy by focusing on Japan’s alliance with the United States. Changes and 
continuity in Japanese national security policy have been and will be heavily influenced 
by its relations with the United States, which have provided both a material and an 
ideational framework to Japan’s national security policy since the end of World War II.
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Development of Japan’s Postwar National Security Culture
Most of the elements of Japan’s postwar national security culture can be traced 
back to the period between 1945 and 1960. Through its defeat in World War II and the 
American military occupation afterwards, Japan developed a completely new national 
security culture. Until the end of World War II, Japan embraced its imperial and 
militaristic national security culture and sought regional hegemony by trying to eliminate 
Western influences from Asia and through subjugation of other Asian countries by brute 
force. Politically, Japan developed a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral 
legislature, modeled after the Great Britain. Although it developed some democratic 
institutions, including expansion of franchise to universal male suffrage by 1925, Japan 
also developed a nationalistic, religious, and militaristic oligarchy by the 1930s. 
Economically, prewar Japan embraced mercantilism with heavy intervention into the 
national economy. For example, the Japanese government established the Tomioka Silk 
Mill in Gunma Prefecture in 1872 to promote exports of silk textiles. In order to produce 
the best quality steel for industrialization and the military build-up of the nation, the 
Japanese government established the Yahata Steel Mill in Fukuoka Prefecture in 1895. 
The diplomatic and military history of the Japanese Empire is primarily the story of 
attempts to catch-up industrially and militarily with the European great powers. After 
national unification under the Meiji Emperor, Japan developed modern military forces by 
inviting military advisors from Britain, Prussia, France, and the United States, and by 
sending missions to those countries. Between 1867 and 1939, Japan allied with Britain, 
the hegemon at the time, to balance against Russia, its major regional rival, fought and 
won three wars (the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and World War I),
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acquired and expanded overseas colonies, and subsequently realigned itself with the 
European Axis partners to challenge the existing international order in World War II.
As the forgoing illustrates, most of Imperial Japan’s behavior in international 
relations can be explained by realist theories; however, the foreign and defense policies 
of postwar Japan require the additional insights of liberal and constructivist theories. For 
example, Takashi Igarashi, a professor at Tokyo University, portrays the postwar Japanese 
diplomatic system, Gaiko Taisei, as a dual system where realist diplomatic ideology of 
power politics and ideational democratic pacifism peculiarly coexist (Igarashi, 1995).
According to Igarashi, the postwar diplomatic system is the product of two 
different political ideologies. One is liberal pacifism that envisions international peace 
through international laws and institutions, particularly by the United Nations, and 
economic development through free trade and international investment. Domestically, it 
aims at democratization of politics and liberalization of economy. Those who supported 
this line of ideas argued for making peace with all Allied Powers, including the Soviet 
Union. They denied a need for any form of military forces and expected that the United 
Nations would provide protection if a foreign nation were to attack Japan. In the case of 
postwar Japan, this ideal was embodied in the Constitution that prohibits the use of 
military forces as means of achieving national goals. Domestically, this line of argument 
was supported by the left wing Socialist and Communist parties and by liberal 
intellectuals, such as University of Tokyo’s President Shigeru Nambara (Igarashi, 1995).
The SCAP’s initial reform programs in occupied Japan also represented the ideal 
of a peaceful Japan. These programs promoted demilitarization, democratization, and 
deconcentration of the economy. The SCAP tried to separate postwar Japan from its
militarist past dating back to the Samurai era in the12th century. By purging wartime 
political and military leaders, such as the former Prime Minister Tojo Hideki and the 
former Foreign Minister Hitota Koki, and reinvigorating liberal political elements, the 
SCAP tried to liberalize and democratize Japanese politics. The dissolution of the 
Zaibatsu, such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo, was central to this deconcentration 
and liberalization process, through which the economic foundation of militarist Japan was 
destroyed (Dower, 1979; Takemae, Ricketts, & Swann, 2002). The SCAP also enforced 
war reparation programs by confiscating machinery and plants from Japanese factories 
and giving them as reparations to Asian nations that had suffered from Japanese wartime 
aggression (Borden, 1984; Schaller, 1985). Through land reform, the SCAP carved the 
economic and political power of the rural landlords, who had also been the strong 
supporters of the prewar imperial militarist government. Land reform created a 
considerable number of independent farmers in rural Japan, and later they became a solid 
political support base for postwar Japanese political establishment dominated by the 
Liberal Democratic Party. In terms of politics, the SCAP legalized the Japanese 
Communist Party and released prewar political criminals from jails. Additionally, the 
Japanese people won true universal suffrage in 1948 because the new Constitution has a 
gender equality clause (Dower, 1979; Gordon, 1999; Takemae et al., 2002). In short, the 
initial occupation policies were reflection of Progressive and New Deal reforms back in 
the United States (Cohen & Passin, 1987).
The other political ideology reflected in the postwar Japanese diplomatic system 
is realism, which sees international relations as predominantly a power struggle among 
nations (Gilpin, 1981; Mearsheimer, 2001; Morgenthau & Thompson, 1993; Waltz,
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1979). It was this line of thought that forced a change in American occupation policy 
around 1948. Policy makers in Washington, especially George Kennan of the State 
Department Policy Planning Staff (PPS), felt a strong need to rebuilt Japan as a Cold War 
ally in Asia, rather than to punish it as a former World War II enemy (Leffler, 1992).
In 1948, the same year the Marshall Plan was promulgated in Europe, Kennan 
was sent to Japan to review and assess the American occupation of Japan. Kennan 
recommended to Secretary of State Marshall that the SCAP should not proceed any 
further with their original reform programs, and stop purging Japanese leaders, stop 
economic deconcentration and war reparations to the Allied powers, and delay a formal 
peace with Japan. In contrast to MacArthur, Kennan took the Soviet threat to Japan as a 
much more immediate threat to both domestic and international security (Gaddis, 1982).
The so called “reverse course” of American occupation policy in Japan and the 
realignment among major powers after World War II are better explained by realist 
theories of international security. The realist theory of balance of power argues that 
nations ally against the most powerful or threatening nations in the international system. 
After they defeated common enemies in the war, the United States began to perceive its 
former ally, the Soviet Union, as the major threat in the postwar world. Not only did the 
Soviet Union install communist regimes in Eastern and Central European countries after 
liberating them from Nazi Germany, but also it began supporting communist regimes in 
Asia. Against this geo-strategic background, Japan and West Germany, former enemies 
of the United States, emerged as its new allies in the Cold War.
In regard to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, realism won over idealism. In spite 
of persistent hopes for peace with all parties, Prime Minister Yoshida decided to make
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peace only with Western nations. Yoshida made the decision to ally with the United 
States based on realist assumptions. Although he strongly opposed rebuilding large 
military forces in Japan, he was not able to ignore the reality of the emerging Cold War. 
Because the newly created United Nations was not powerful enough to guarantee Japan’s 
national security, it needed to either defend itself or ally with others to balance against 
communist threats. In addition, Yoshida wanted to secure the earliest possible peace 
settlement of World War II so that Japan could regain its political independence and 
access to American market and other economic resources necessary for its economic 
recovery. The alliance with the United States was the only feasible option to meet 
imminent and serious national security threats without diverting scarce financial and 
human resources to build large military capabilities of its own. (Dower, 1979; Igarashi, 
1995). Yoshida wanted to place primacy on liberal goals of economic growth and 
democratization; in order to create the necessary security environment he decided to 
employ realist means.
Prof. Soeya of Keio University looks at the causal relationship between Japan’s 
dualist approach to international relations and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. This 
dualism is manifest in two seemingly incompatible approaches to the international 
system. On one hand, Japan seeks to be a powerful actor in international relations that 
uses traditional means to pursue its foreign policy goal. On the other hand, it seeks to be 
unique in assuming a pacifist orientation toward its relations with other major power. He 
argues because of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Japan has been able to maintain its dual 
identity (Soeya, 1998).
It is more productive to look at the mutually constitutive relationship between the
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U.S.-Japan security treaty and the postwar Japan’s dual political system than to speculate 
on the causal direction between the two. The U.S.-Japan treaty system and the postwar 
Japanese political system developed to preserve each other: The Japanese government 
used the U.S.-Japan alliance to maintain antimilitarist national security policy, and at the 
same time, Japan’s passive defense policy allowed the United States to keep its largest 
overseas military presence in the strategically important Asia-Pacific region.
Antimilitarism and Pacifism
In order to explain Japan’s postwar antimilitarism one has to look beyond 
structural factors of international relations and examine the domestic cultural and 
institutional context where Japanese defense policy has been made. Defeat in World War
II and American military occupation afterwards, and the way in which the experiences 
were interpreted by domestic political actors, Japan has developed beliefs and values that 
make it particularly reluctant to use military force (Berger, 1996).
Defeat in World War II taught the Japanese an important lesson that military 
power was useless to defend national independence. Since the Meiji era, building strong 
military forces had been the major impetus behind the expansion of the Japanese empire, 
along with economic development under the national slogan of Fukoku Kyohei (Rich 
Nation, Strong Army) (Samuels, 1994). The Japanese had built their modern nation state 
under the name of the emperor, who was the head of the state, the commander in chief of 
the military, and the head of Shintoism under the Meiji Constitution. Until World War II, 
military forces served as a source of Japanese national pride and provided a sense of 
security. In the Sino-Japanese, Russo-Japanese wars, and in World War I, Japan gained
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overseas territories and established its international status as a great power, the first non­
Western nation to achieve this status. The government educated the nation to sacrifice 
their lives for the Emperor and the nation. The Imperial Message on Education of 1980 
reads “should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard 
and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth.” 
Although economic development and national security were the twin goals of prewar 
Japan, the latter had priority over the former. The best and the brightest of Japanese 
young people went to the military and the government, not to private companies.
Antimilitarism was institutionalized by the new constitution drafted by SCAP and 
modified and accepted by the Japanese. Its Article 9 reads:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
Demilitarization was one of the initial core occupation programs of the SCAP, 
along with democratization and deconcentration of economy. As soon as the occupation 
started in August 1945, the SCAP instructed the Japanese government to collect, record 
and destroy all weapons and military supplies stored and hidden in Japan and surrounding 
small islands. Starting on September 2nd, 1945 in Okinawa and the Korean Peninsula, 
Japanese troops were ordered to surrender to US Army Forces in the Pacific. On 
September 13th, Imperial general Headquarters was dissolved and the SCAP ordered the 
War and Navy Ministries to start demobilization (Takemae et al., 2002).
Instead of blaming Japanese public in general for their support of the militarist 
government, SCAP prosecuted leading politicians, military officials, and the zaibatsu,
business conglomerates. SCAP interpreted Japanese wartime aggression as resulting 
from the militarist takeover of Japanese government and society. According to this 
interpretation, ordinary Japanese citizens were also victims of militarism. This 
interpretation helped the postwar Japanese government and people to move forward, 
leaving their militarist past behind. But in the long run, this self-victimization prevented 
the Japanese people and government from facing their war guilt toward Asian nations 
(Orr, 2001).
Emperor Hirohito was also exonerated and allowed to lead the nation in 
reconstruction as a symbolic leader without any political or military authority.
MacArthur was convinced that he needed the Emperor to make Japanese occupation 
effective and peaceful. But other allied powers such as the Soviet Union and Australia 
demanded execution of the Emperor as a war criminal (Dower, 1979). Some postwar 
Japanese politicians had similar perception of Japanese national security at the end of 
World War II. Resurgence of militarism, which had driven Japan into aggression and war 
against the United States, was in their mind the main threat to postwar Japanese national 
security, rather than external threats from other countries. Prime Minister Yoshida called 
military “political cancer” and insisted on taking it away from Japan by “surgical” 
measures (Tanaka, 1997, p. 21).
Based on his antimilitarist stance, Yoshida was initially against rearmament. In 
June 1946 before the Diet, Yoshida clearly denied Japan’s right of self-defense. “I think 
that the very recognition of such a thing (a nation’s right of legitimate self-defense) is 
harmful. It is an obvious fact that most modern wars have been waged in the name of the 
right of legitimate self-defense of the nation. Thus, I believe that to recognize a right of
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legitimate self-defense is, however unintentionally, to provide rationale for provoking 
war” (Dower, 1979, p. 379).
But the development of the Cold War in Asia completely changed international 
security environment and consequently, Japan’s approach to making a peace with former 
enemies. In 1948, the People’s Republic of China was established and in 1950 the 
Korean War broke out. The Truman administration reversed the existing Japanese 
occupation policy and began to engage in an alliance building in Asia. Subsequently, 
SCAP ordered the Japanese government to create the National Police Reserve. Because 
of strong antimilitarism among ordinary Japanese citizens and his initial opposition to 
rearmament, Prime Minister Yoshida was forced to move toward rearmament under 
disguise. For example, the National Police Reserve was a semimilitary force of 70,000 
personnel and officially was a part of the police. But it was the first effort of the Truman 
administration to build up Japan’s defense capability so that it would be a stable ally of 
the United States (Dower, 1979; Kowalski, 1999).
In spite of Yoshida’s concern of politicization of rearmament, the vast majority of 
the Japanese people did not pay attention to politics and devoted themselves to survival 
and the economic recovery of the nation (Packard, 1966). Dower notes the use of the 
word “Kyodatsu” to describe the mental condition of Japanese people soon after the end 
of World War II, emphasizing that ordinary people were separated from politics and 
government. They stopped believing in and expecting something from the government. 
The Japanese people no longer believed in lofty public causes, but instead began pursuing 
private and material welfare (Dower, 1999).
While the Yoshida administration secretly developed a rearmament plan with
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SCAP, a group of intellectuals formed the Peace Problems Discussion Circle in order to 
provide an alternative plan to the Yoshida administration. They called for a 
comprehensive peace with all allied nations of World War II, including the Soviet Union 
(Igarashi, 1995). In spite of the concern of Japan’s remilitarization expressed by the 
Peace Problems Discussion Circle, the Truman administration’s expectation of Japan as a 
Cold War ally was realistic. Due to growing strength of leftist political parties, especially 
the Japan Socialist Party and the Japanese Communist Party, Washington was afraid of 
the possibility of Japan’s communization. They fear that if  Japan joined the Communist 
camp, an alliance among Communist China, the Soviet Union, and Japan would be 
invincible and unstoppable. Japan had fought for 4 years almost single-handedly against 
the United States. If Japan should have allies with strong industrial bases, rich natural 
resources, and large military forces, the United States would be overwhelmed in any 
conflict. So the minimum requirement became for Japan to remain as an ally to in the 
Western block. The Truman administration did not expect Japan to engage in a battle 
with Communist nations as long as the Japanese government prevented the nation from 
becoming communist. The American fear of Japanese communization was reflected in a 
clause in the original U.S. -Japan Security Treaty, allowing U.S. forces in Japan to assist 
in quelling domestic disturbances. Although the clause was repealed in the renewed 
treaty in 1960, it clearly demonstrates American concern over potential communist 
infiltration into Japan. Limited U.S. expectations for Japanese military capability were 
reinforced by widespread antimilitarism in the Japanese political leadership.
In his Culture o f Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan, 
Thomas Berger summarizes the wide-spread cultural foundation of post-World War II
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defense policy of Japan; “This negative view of the military is shared all along the 
political spectrum in the postwar Japan, and was held only by the far left, but many 
conservatives and even far right-wing figures as well” (Berger, 1993, p. 137).
Antinuclear Weapon Sentiment
No historical event is more significant in Japan’s national security culture than the 
nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. August 6th and 9th of 1945, when atomic 
bombs were dropped, have been remembered as symbols of the inhumanity, brutality, 
destruction, and futility of war among Japanese public as well as the beginning of the 
nuclear age in international security.
The antinuclear norm has provided ideational, historic, and domestic reasons why 
Japan has not developed an independent nuclear capability. Japan has ample external 
imperatives that would have given little choice but develop its own nuclear weapons. 
After World War II, it was surrounded by nuclear powers and the most violent wars 
during the Cold War broke out in its neighbor. After the Cold War, North Korea started 
its own nuclear weapon programs and has used it to blackmail the members of the Six 
Party Talks to extract concessions such as food, fuel, and commercial nuclear power 
plants (O'Hanlon & Mochizuki, 2003). Technologically and economically, Japan is 
capable of developing its own nuclear arsenal. It has enough nuclear materials from 
highly developed civilian nuclear power programs and rocket technologies that can be 
applied to intercontinental ballistic missiles (L. Hughes, 2007; Kamiya, 2003).
Japan’s policy regarding nuclear weapons consists of three principles. First,
Japan should not develop nor possess its own nuclear weapons, as institutionalized by the
Three Nonnuclear Principles. Second, it should rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella to 
defend the nation from nuclear threat. Third, it should promote nuclear disarmament by 
supporting the Nonproliferation regime, which Japan joined by signing the treaty in 1970 
and ratifying it in 1976 (DiFilippo, 2006).
The three principles above are the products of serious contention between strong 
antinuclear weapon sentiment by the general public and pragmatic national security needs 
of the Japanese government. In addition to the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, an accident caused by an American nuclear weapon test promoted the 
antinuclear weapon movement in Japan. In 1954, a Japanese fishing boat named “Daigo 
Fukuryu-maru” was exposed to radiation from the U.S. nuclear weapon test at Bikini 
Atoll. The Japanese public responded to the accident very negatively. By the end of the 
year, more than 20 million Japanese, led by former Prime Minister Testu Katayama and 
Nobel Prize laureate Dr. Hideki Yukawa, signed a petition demanding the abolition of all 
nuclear weapons throughout the world. The Diet in 1957 also passed the Atomic Basic 
Act (Genshiryoku Kihon-ho) that limited use of nuclear technologies to peaceful 
purposes and that effectively banned the Japanese government from developing, owning, 
and using nuclear weapons (DiFilippo, 2006). In addition, the Japanese people were so 
apprehensive of nuclear weapons that they also tried to control the weapons of American 
military forces in Japan. In 1960, the United States and Japan agreed on having prior 
consultation if U.S. forces in Japan were to make major changes in troops and weapons. 
Based on the agreement, members of minority parties and peace activists demanded that 
the Japanese government should confirm the absence of nuclear weapons in U.S. military 
bases in Japan. This issue was particularly sensitive because Japan hosts major naval
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bases for the U.S. 7th Fleet, including Yokosuka and Sasebo. Officially the Japanese 
government held the position that if  the U.S. government had not consulted with the 
Japanese government, the latter assumed that no major changes had been made in U.S. 
forces in Japan. From the U.S. perspective, however, removal of nuclear weapons from 
U.S. Naval vessels each time they stopped in a Japanese port was highly problematic and 
unpractical. Throughout 1960s and 1970s, when a U.S. aircraft carrier stopped at the 
Sasebo or Yokosuka ports, the probable presence of nuclear weapons on board was 
heatedly debated, and on some occasions, these port visits were greeted by antinuclear 
weapon demonstrations.
In December 1967, the Japanese government formally institutionalized the 
nation’s antinuclear weapon sentiment into a government policy by introducing the Three 
Nonnuclear Principles, which pledge that Japan shall not possess, produce, and permit the 
introduction of nuclear weapons into its territory. Being the only county in the world that 
was attacked by nuclear weapons has given Japan a unique national security identity. The 
term “Yuiitsu no hibakukoku,” literally translated the only country bombed (by nuclear 
weapon), has been the key word in Japanese public discourse on war and peace.
Even today, antinuclear weapon sentiment among the Japanese is strong. August 
6th and 9th are commemorated nationally as the days for remembering the victims and 
horror of nuclear weapon. Both Hiroshima and Nagasaki hold ceremonies to remember 
the victims of the atomic bombs and to renew the pledge not to repeat the tragedies. Since 
1971, Japanese Prime Ministers have attended the ceremonies in either or both cities. 
N.H.K., a Japanese public television, broadcasts the ceremonies nation-wide. Hiroshima 
Peace Memorial Museum and Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum are one of the most
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common destinations for school excursions among junior and senior high schools in 
Japan (Orr, 2001). In spite of occasional attempts by hawkish Japanese politicians and 
repeated predictions by foreign scholars and journalists that Japan would develop nuclear 
weapons, even the mere discussion of nuclear armament is a public taboo in Japan 
(DiFilippo, 2006).
Long-standing public support for the Three Nonnuclear Principles demonstrates 
remarkable strength and durability of antinuclear weapon sentiment considering nuclear 
proliferation in Japan’s neighborhood. Starting with the Soviet success in its 
development of nuclear weapons in 1949, China developed its own nuclear weapon in 
1964, and even North Korea declared development and possession of nuclear weapons in 
the 1990s. Yet, because of the historical memories of nuclear weapons dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and because of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, it is unlikely that the 
Japanese people will support nuclear armament of the nation.
The Japanese government has adopted a pragmatic policy to deal with the 
regional nuclear threat by accepting the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Unlike the Three 
Nonnuclear Principles and Nonproliferation Treaty, reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella 
has not been codified. Yet both the U.S. and Japanese governments assume that the best 
deterrence against nuclear attacks on Japan is the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
Civilian Control of the Military
Since the end of the World War II, the Japanese public not only hated nuclear 
weapons, but also war and the military in general. SCAP as well as Yoshida tried to 
blame a handful in the military leadership for the militarism of prewar Japan and portray
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ordinary Japanese citizens as victims of extreme militarism. In order to prevent 
resurgence of militarism, postwar defense institutions were established based on the 
principle of civilian control. First, postwar Japanese military forces were established as a 
part of the national police force. The new force, named the National Police Reserve 
(NPR), was established in July 1950 soon after the Korean War broke out. SCAP ordered 
the creation of the NPR in order to maintain domestic security after a large number of 
American occupation troops were reassigned to the Korean Peninsula (Dower, 1979; 
Igarashi, 1995).
The Japanese government itself had little to say about whether the country should 
have paramilitary forces or not. The NPR was created by an order from SCAP. Justin 
Williams of the Government Section warned some minority party leaders not to dispute 
establishing the NPR in the Diet. By shutting down almost all input from the Japanese 
government and people, SCAP also successfully prevented the former Japanese military 
establishment from exercising any influence on the newly created NPR. Instead, the 
NPR sought key leadership from the national police and other civilian officials. For 
example, the first head of the NPR was Keikichi Matsubara, a former Interior Department 
bureaucrat who was Governor of Kagawa Prefecture (Tanaka, 1997).
In order to educate future officers who would understand and embrace the 
principle of civilian control of the military, Japan’s Defense University was established in 
1952. It was Yoshida’s idea to create a single educational institution for military leaders 
in postwar Japan, instead of separate military academies for army and navy. He believed 
that prewar military education generated unnecessary and dangerous competition and 
conflict between the Imperial Army and Navy. Especially, he disliked the Japanese
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Imperial Army that forcefully drove the nation into an invasion of China while the 
Imperial Navy, especially Admiral Yamamoto, was against war with the United States. In 
the new Defense University, future officers were immersed in the ideal of democracy and 
civilian control taught to serve for the security of the people as well as state (Dower,
1979; Kowalski, 1999).
In order to prevent strong military influence on the government and society, the 
postwar Japanese government tried to isolate the nation’s armed forces. Both Japan 
Socialist and the Japanese Communist parties officially declared that the Self Defense 
Force is unconstitutional. In spite of Prime Minister Yoshida’s effort to separate the 
Imperial Army and Navy with newly created SDF, ordinary Japanese tended to associate 
any form of armed forces with negative and destructive images of Word War II and tried 
to distance themselves from them. The Japanese government had not tried to discuss the 
nation’s defense issues and publicize works of SFD up front until the end of the Cold 
War. It was not until 1970 when the Defense Agency published the first Defense White 
Paper. Even today, after decades of increased promotion of SDF and defense issues 
among Japanese public, about 40% of respondents to an opinion poll would oppose if 
someone close to them should try to join SDF. The main reasons for the opposition 
include lack of information on SDF, low social status of SDF, and low level of social 
adaptability resulting from isolation of SDF from general public, as well as the dangers of 
duty (Naikaku-fu, 2010). Even in Ichigaya, Tokyo, where the Ministry of Defense is 
located, it is rare to see men and women in uniform. Consequently, military conscription 
has never been on the political agenda since the end of World War II.
This principle of civilian control has been institutionalized in the Japanese
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government. Until 2008, Japan did not have a full cabinet level Ministry of Defense, but 
only the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA). In the Japanese government, an agency is a 
subordinate organization to a ministry. The Japanese government has been known for its 
strong and efficient bureaucracy, with bureaucrats, not elected politicians, taking most 
major policy initiatives. In the Diet, most of politicians typically only read manuscripts 
of questions and answers prepared by bureaucrats. But defense bureaucrats were not as 
powerful as their counterparts in the Ministry of Trade and Industry or the Ministry of 
Finance. First, most of years during the Cold War, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), not JDA was the central actor of Japan’s national security policy-making. With 
its pro-U.S. policy orientation and priority of diplomatic and economic means of 
statecraft over military ones, MOFA developed Japan’s defense policy by keeping close 
ties with the United States while limiting its own military capabilities. Moreover, 
officials temporally assigned from other ministries filled majority of senior positions in 
JDA. In the budget making process, requests from the Defense Agency were closely 
scrutinized and kept to bare minimum (Katzenstein, 1996a). As a result, it became a 
norm in the Japanese government to limit defense spending to less than 1% of GDP.
Although the creation of the Self Defense Force was a major retreat from the 
popularity of antimilitarism among the public, the force structure of the SDF well reflects 
the defensive and minimalist approach of Japanese postwar security culture. First, the 
size of the SDF is proportionally much smaller than most developed nations and Japan’s 
neighbors. For example, the SDF has about 260,000 standing soldiers to protect 130 
million Japanese people, while North Korea has 1.1 million standing soldiers for 22 
million (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994).
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In addition, the Japanese defense budget is relatively small considering its 
economic size. Japan has spent nearly 5 trillion yen (about $42 billion) annually since 
the early 1990s. Depending on how to measure and compare defense spending 
internationally, Japan is ranked from 5th to 7th in the world today (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2013; Hofbauer, Hermann, & Raghavan, 2012; Stockholm International Peace 
Institute, 2013). But this is due to size of the Japanese economy. Japan is the third 
largest GDP in the world, only after the United States and China. Japan continues to 
spend only 1% of its gross domestic products (GDP) on defense while the United States 
do 4 to 6%. The growth rate of the Japanese defense budget in the last 5 years is less 
than 1% while China’s defense budget has increased by 57% in the same period. 
Compared with other government spending, the defense budget is relatively small. Japan 
spends 23% of its national budget for welfare and 10% for infrastructure. The defense 
budget consists of only 6% of the total national budget. In addition, only 30% of the 
Japanese defense budget is spent for weapons. The rest is spent for other purposes: 45 % 
goes to salaries of military and civilian personnel of the SDF and JDA; 10% is paid as 
compensation and environmental improvement to local governments where military 
bases of SDF and U.S. forces are located; another 15% goes to US military forces in 
Japan to help cover their stationing costs (Japan Defense Agency, 1997). Based on this 
evidence, it is clear that the Japanese defense budget is not as large as it might look.
The Japanese government has long tried to avoid the discussion of the 
constitutionality of the SDF. Yoshida once spoke at the commencement of the Defense 
University and asked graduates to be patient even if they would never be in the spotlight, 
or worse be treated as an “illegitimate child.” Economically, the postwar Japanese
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government focused on the civilian sector. SCAP dissolved the zaibatstu and banned 
some strategic industries such as aviation and arms. Japan was allowed to keep a certain 
level of arms industry by the time of the San Francisco Peace Conference in order to 
provide supplies and minor weapons to U.S. forces and the SDF, but the Japanese 
government restricted the domestic arms industry to this level and prevented the 
development of a strong arms industry (Otake, 1988). Instead, human and financial 
resources were concentrated on civilian industries such as steel, ship-building, 
automobile, electronics. The best engineers worked in the civilian industries, eventually 
leading Japan to economic prosperity. For the SDF, the Japanese government has 
procured the most sophisticated and expensive weapons from the United States, instead 
of developing them domestically. By maintaining the distance between ordinary Japanese 
citizens and military forces, the Japanese government tried to prevent a rise of the 
military industrial complex similar to that which drove prewar Japan into war.
The Comprehensive Security
The Japanese definition of security goes far beyond what most American officials 
would recognize, defining its national security in comprehensive terms. It emphasizes 
the social, economic, and political aspects of security rather than just military aspects 
(Katzenstein, 1996a). The Japanese concern with economic security dates back in World 
War II. Japan justified the war as a struggle between “have and have not” nations and 
sought to expand its overseas colonies to secure natural resources and export markets for 
its manufacturing products, following the methods of European powers since the 14th 
century. After defeat in the war, Japan wanted to pursue the same goals but this time
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without military forces. The long Asia-Pacific war, beginning with the Manchuria 
Incident in 1933, and Japan’s ultimate defeat devastated its economy. It lost all overseas 
colonies, a significant part of the most productive workforce, and industrial bases through 
the war. Reconstruction of the economy was the top priority of the postwar Japanese 
government because it was directly connected with the survival of the people. At the 
same time, both the Japanese and American governments feared that a poor economy 
would be a hotbed of communism. In order to prevent the infiltration and expansion of 
communism among ordinary citizens and politicians, rapid economic reconstruction and 
recovery were essential (Samuels, 1994; Tanaka, 1997).
Yoshida’s notion of national security already had some elements of 
comprehensive security even though it was not until the 1980s that the notion of 
comprehensive security formally was adopted in Japanese defense policies. In January 
1951, Yoshida explained his position on rearmament in Diet. “It is obvious that in reality 
any significant rearmament is beyond the capability of our defeated country. The security 
and independence of a nation is not merely a questions of armaments or military 
strength” (Dower, 1979, p. 390).
Thus, the U.S. government provided massive economic aid along with security 
protection in order to stabilize postwar Japan and prevent both its remilitarization and 
communization. Between 1946 and 1951, the United States gave Japan about 2 billion 
dollars in economic aid and SCAP provided both internal and external security until the 
Korean War began in 1950. Under these circumstances, Japanese policy makers were 
able to devote themselves almost solely to economic development and did not have to 
worry about traditional security concerns (Soeya, 1998).
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By the end of the 1960s, however, Japanese policy makers could no longer take 
the security and economic advantages of Pax Americana for granted. Because of the 
Vietnam War and the related economic slow down, the United States was unable to 
provide security protection and economic benefits to its allies unconditionally as they did 
in the 1950s. Consequently, Japanese security experts and decision makers had to re- 
conceptualize Japan’s security needs and the idea of comprehensive security as a major 
component of defense policy was born. The concept was formalized by both economic 
and security experts and presented to Prime Minister Ohira in 1980. Comprehensive 
security can be seen as preoccupation with primarily economic security that permitted 
Japan to disregard military security issues because of the continued military security 
protection provided by the United States. But in reality, the concept of comprehensive 
security came from the Japanese government’s perception that the United States was a 
declining hegemonic power. Japan, which lacked sufficient defense capability, felt a 
strong need to protect its economic interests, which had become the most important 
national interests of Japan (Hughes, 2004) .
The Comprehensive Security Report in 1980 argued that by the introduction of a 
new American security policy based on the Nixon Doctrine, Japan needed to reconsider 
the importance of traditional military security issues for Japan and to create its own new 
security policy based on the principle of self help (Soeya, 1998). The report 
recommended the development of “denial defense capability” in order to deter small 
scale and limited aggression on Japanese soil. The report assumed that under the U.S.- 
Japan security treaty, Japan’s limited defense capability would be enough because lager 
scale conflicts were subject to the bilateral alliance and the major military role assumed
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by the U.S. forces.
The notion of comprehensive security is reflected in the transformation of 
Japanese national identity from that of a militarist empire to that of a democratic trading 
nation. By minimizing its own military power as the main pillar of its national defense, 
Japan sought to put the preponderance of resources into economic development and 
social welfare of the nation. One of the implications of comprehensive security policy is 
increased importance of nonmilitary means in Japanese national security policy. For 
example, the Japanese government justifies relatively large sum of official development 
aid in the name of national security. Japan’s Official Development Aid Charter reads, 
“(t)he objectives of Japan's ODA are to contribute to the peace and development of the 
international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan's own security and 
prosperity”(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003). By the end of the Cold War, Japan 
became the second largest ODA donor in the world.
Reliance on the United States for National Security
Thus the Japanese conception of comprehensive security leads to another feature 
of Japanese security culture: dependence on the United States for the military component 
of national security. Under the original U.S.- Japan security treaty in 1951, the United 
States committed to provide the military security of Japan in exchange for the stationing 
of U.S. military forces in Japan. The alliance was renewed in 1960 and the basic 
framework of the United States protecting Japan from external threats has not changed up 
to the present. The Articles V and VI of the 1960 treaty reads:
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories
under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety
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and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its 
constitutional provisions and processes.
For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of 
international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is 
granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1960).
Although the Cold War ended and the need for extended deterrence by the United 
States should have been deceased significantly, Japan has continued to devote a relatively 
small amount of resources to defense and to rely heavily on U.S. forces to protect it in 
any major contingency.
Nothing shows more clearly the institutionalization of this “unequal” security 
partnership than the Japanese government’s Defense Facilities Administration Agency 
(DFAA Bouei Shisetsu cho). DFAA’s mission is to provide defense facilities to both U.S. 
forces and the SDF. They are responsible for the acquisition of facilities and settlements 
of dispute between military forces and residents around bases. Since the late 1980s, they 
have provided financial assistance to U.S. forces. DFAA covers the stationing costs of 
U.S. forces and the budget for this purpose is called the “Sympathy (Omoiyari) Budget.” 
Prime Ministers of Japan have justified the sympathy budgets, about 200 billion yen 
annually, by saying it is the cost of being protected by U.S. forces (Yoda, 2006). The 
Japanese government prefers paying the United States for military defense over spending 
to build up its own military to levels sufficient to accomplish the task.
Japanese reliance on the United States for its external security has been 
institutionalized through transnational personnel links as well as through formal treaty 
and agreements. Japan and the United States have established some institutions that 
facilitate personnel communication and exchanges between defense policy makers and
national security bureaucrats of the two nations: the Security Consultative Committee 
(SCC), the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC), the Security Subcommittee 
(SSC), the Security Consultative Group (SCG), and the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee 
(Katzenstein & Okawara, 1993).
The institutional makeup of the Self Defense Force also symbolizes close 
relations with and reliance on the United Sates. While the Imperial Government of Japan 
modeled its army after Prussian Army and its navy after the British Royal Navy, the three 
branches of the SDF are modeled after the U.S. military: Ground Self Defense Force 
(GSDF) is comparable to U.S. Army; the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) to the 
U.S. Navy, and Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) to the U.S. Air Force. Some SDF 
soldiers are trained by US forces and some SDF officials are educated in American 
defense educational institutions such as the National Defense University. Most 
technologically advanced weapons used by the SDF, including F-15 fighter jets, Patriot 
missiles, Aegis ships, and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), come from 
the United States because having the same weapons as US military forces enhances 
interoperability with them in the event of a military conflict. In terms of SDF 
contingency plans for foreign attacks, most of them presuppose joint operations with U.S. 
forces in Japan rather than stand-alone operations by the SDF.
In short, Japanese defense institutions and force structure have been designed and 
developed under the assumption that the U.S.-Japan alliance will remain in essentially the 
same form as it has since the early 1950s, at least in the foreseeable future. By 
combining the offensive capabilities of the U.S. forces and defensive capabilities of the 
SDF, Japan secures itself from external threats.
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Concluding Thoughts: Back to the Future?
In spite of the half century of antimilitarist and peaceful history of postwar Japan, 
there have been some events and groups of people that have sought to promote a return to 
the old national identities of a regional hegemon and a major military power or to build a 
new national identity as a “normal” nation, with more independent and stronger military 
capabilities(Oros, 2008).
The year 2003 appeared to be pivotal as the beginning of the end of the post 
W.W.II pacifist history of Japan. In May of that year, three defense related bills were 
passed in the House of Representatives, allowing the SDF to confiscate or control private 
property in case of a national security emergency. Critics of the bill warn that it is similar 
to the Comprehensive National Mobilization Act (Kokka Sodoin Ho) of prewar Japan.
The Japanese government also tried to reestablish “healthy” nationalism recently. 
The Asahi Shimbun reported that 178 elementary schools in 11 prefectures evaluate 
patriotism in students’ report cards, stemming partly from the revised Education 
Guidelines from the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science that aim to foster love 
and appreciation of Japanese traditions and history (Asahi Shimbun, 2003).
But other people and events demonstrate that diehard postwar pacifism continues 
in present day Japan. On August 6th, 2003, for example, Mayor Akiba of Hiroshima City 
proposed the New Three Nonnuclear Principles: allow no production, possession, or use 
of nuclear weapons (Hiroshima Shi, 2003). Is this a last, desperate cry of postwar 
Japanese antimilitarism, created by Japanese war memories and sustained by U.S. 
security protection by the U.S. under the Cold War international system? In coming 
years, Japanese antimilitarism will face stiff challenges from growing external threats
such as instability in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits, a potential new 
economic and military superpower in a rising China as well as the pressure from the 




NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE OF THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
Since its independence from England in 1776, the United States has surprised, 
been loved, admired, feared, and hated by the rest of the world owing to its rewriting and 
redefining of the norms, principles, and common sense understanding of international 
relations. It was the first colony that won political independence from a European 
colonizer by force. It is the first modern democracy in the world and has been the 
strongest advocate of democratization of the rest of the world. It was the first great 
power from the Western Hemisphere whose influence has had global reach. It was the 
first nation that became a world power without overseas colonies. It was responsible for 
a creation of global collective security institution, yet failed to join it. It was the first 
state that developed and used a nuclear weapon. It was the first state that extended 
multilateral foreign aid to other countries. The United States has been also responsible 
for the development of global capitalism. Not only did free it itself from the British 
Empire economically, but it also promoted capitalism whenever and wherever it found an 
opportunity to do so.
Behind its transforming power, the United States has been driven by unique ideas 
about itself, its enemies, its national values and interests, and the proper means to defend
them, which collectively, I call its culture of national security. The present paper aims at 
answering three basic questions about American national security culture: What are U.S. 
national security identities? What are U.S. national security norms? How does U.S. 
national security culture shape its foreign and defense policy?
What Is National Security Culture and Why Is It Important?
In general terms, national security culture is a set of norms and identities that 
define national interests, national enemies, and the proper means to defend the nation 
(Jepperson et al., 1996; Katzenstein, 1996b). It develops out of the domestic and 
diplomatic history of a given nation and is institutionalized to serve as an ideational basis 
for the continuity and stability of national security policy. While realist and liberal 
studies on national security have focused on material factors including the sizes of 
military forces, economy, territory, population, natural resources in determining states’ 
foreign and defense policies, constructivist studies have analyzed how national security 
culture gives meaning to those tangibles and provides the ideational structure within 
which a state develops its national security policy.
By studying national security culture, one can better understand unique aspects of 
foreign and defense policies of a particular country and the enduring features of them in 
spite of changes in material reality, including the military balance of power in the region 
the subject country is in, the size of its economy, technological development, and its 
population.
One of the surprising deficiencies in the constructivist studies of national security 
cultures is the lack of attention given to the United States. There is no chapter dedicated
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to the United States in Katzenstein’s The Culture o f National Security and a comparable 
book to Cultural Norms and National Security that seek to define and analyze the 
national security culture of America (Katzenstein, 1996a, 1996b). This lack is even more 
surprising because cultural aspects of the U.S. foreign and defense policies have been 
major topics in both political science and diplomatic history. To give a few examples, 
Hans Morgenthau established the foundations of classical realism in international 
relations by criticizing the liberal traditions of American foreign policy (Morgenthau, 
1948). Louis Hartz traced liberalism as a unifying tradition of both domestic and foreign 
policies of the United States since its inception as a nation (Hartz, 1955). In the 1970s, 
political scientists began to study what they call “strategic culture”(Snyder, 1977, 1991) 
and analyzed the ideational factors that influenced the American way of war in 
comparison with that of the Soviet Union. Inspired by Snyder’s work on strategic 
culture, Klein argues that the central tenet of American strategic culture is power 
projection (Klein, 1988). Lord examined the liberal democratic roots of American 
strategic culture (Lord, 1985). Diplomatic historians have also developed a large body of 
literature on styles and traditions of American foreign policy (Gray, 1981; May, 1973). 
More recently, experts on international security have renewed their interests in cultural 
sources of American defense policy from both realist and constructivist perspectives 
(Dueck, 2006; Layne, 2006; Legro, 2005; Nau, 2002).
But the majority of existing research on ideational sources of American foreign 
and defense policies takes cultural influences as given and fails to examine the specific 
causal mechanisms through which American national security culture shapes its foreign 
defense policy.
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What Is National Security Culture of the U.S.?
Liberal Hegemonic Identity 
Any model that traces the sources of state’s rationality needs to specify the 
cultural traits of the subject country. National security culture is a part of a political 
culture and shared ideas of who they are, who their enemies are, and how to defend 
against them. The most important parts of national security culture are national identities 
and norms of national security. In the case of the United States, scholars agree that two 
dominant and persistent traits of its national security identities can be identified: liberal 
and hegemonic identities (Berger, 1998)
First, liberal national identity defines the United States as a nation of a democratic 
government and a capitalist economy. For the United States national security includes 
not only physical protection of its population and territory but also “the nation’s core 
values, its organizing ideology, and its free political and economic institutions” (Leffler, 
1992, p. 13). Not only have liberal identities defined America’s national interests, but 
“have acted as a filter on potential policy options in the United States, allowing certain 
strategic alternatives and rendering others unthinkable” (Dueck, 2006, p. 4). For liberal 
policy options, it has been relatively easier for decision makers in Washington, D.C. to 
mobilize domestic support.
Domestically, the American political and economic systems emphasize the 
Lockean principles of individual freedom, equality of rights, majority rule, progress, free 
enterprise, the rule of law, and limited government (Dueck, 2006). A mature democracy 
is characterized by frequent and contested elections, separation of powers and checks and 
balances among government branches, and protection of individual rights of voting,
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assembly, free speech, religion, and due process of law. The U.S. Constitution 
institutionalizes all these characteristics of democracy and the American political system 
has been recognized as one of the most democratic one internationally. For example, the 
Polity IV’s Authority Trends has consistently identified the United States as 
“consolidated democracy” with the highest mark of + 10 since 1946 (Marshall, 2009). 
Liberal identities of the United States is products of both domestic history unique to 
America and diplomatic history in which the country interacted with other countries 
(Nau, 2002). Domestically, history of the United States is a continuous process to “form 
a more perfect Union” in which more groups of individuals including racial, religious, 
gender, and handicapped minorities, have gained political rights and civil liberties 
through elections, legislation, constitutional amendments, social movements, court cases, 
and even a civil war. As Louis Hartz insightfully pointed out, “the psychic heritage of a 
nation ‘born free’ is ... a colossal liberal absolutism” (Hartz, 1955, p. 284) and no other 
political ideology has come close to challenging the dominant position in American 
politics that liberalism has occupied since the beginning of the nation.
Not only domestically but also externally liberalism has played significant roles to 
guide policies of the United States because “the success of American policy abroad and 
the fate of American freedom at home ... are tied up in an intricate knot” (Hartz, 1955, p. 
284). Protection and promotion of democracy and capitalism have been driving forces of 
major wars the United States has fought since its beginning. First it fought two wars with 
Great Britain to win political and economic independence in 1776 and 1812. Nearly a 
century after the United States solidified its independence in the War of 1812, President 
Wilson justified U.S. participation in World War I as a quest to make the world “safe for
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democracy.” Responding to Wilson’s speech, the U.S. Senate voted 82 to 6 to declare 
war against Germany. The House of Representative followed the suit of the Senate and 
endorsed the decision by a vote of 373 to 50. Wilson’s war declaration also mobilized 
important public support. For example, New York World wrote, “[O]ld isolationism is 
finished. We are no longer aloof from the rest of the world. Whatever happens now 
concerns us, for none of it can be withheld from the force of our influence” (KCNET, 
2001c). With strong public support for the war, Wilson also managed to institute a 
military draft by passing the Selective Service Act of 1917 and drafted 2.8 million 
(Chambers, 1987).
Wilson proposed new principles and institutions of international relations, 
inspired by German liberal philosopher Immanuel Kant. In the name of “new 
diplomacy,” Wilson announced a new framework for world order based on democratic 
political institutions and a market oriented economic system (Ferrell, 1985; Knock, 1992; 
Tucker, 2004). In his Fourteen Points speech, he proposed following policies along with 
others:
I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no 
private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed 
always frankly and in the public view.
V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial 
claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such 
questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have 
equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be 
determined.
X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to 
see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to 
autonomous development.
XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants 
for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and
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territorial integrity to great and small states alike. (Lillian Goldman Law Library, 
2008c)
The liberal international order Wilson envisioned did not immediately materialize
and the United States had to fight World War II against the three totalitarian regimes of
Germany, Italy, and Japan. It was a war to defend and promote liberal economic and
political systems throughout the world. Following Wilson’s vision at the end of World
War I, Roosevelt, in collaboration with Churchill, issued the Atlantic Charter to present a
liberal vision for a new international order after World War II, which includes:
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government 
under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self 
government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;
Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the 
economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, 
economic advancement and social security;
Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as 
spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no 
future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be 
employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their 
frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent 
system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They 
will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten 
for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments. (Lillian Goldman 
Law Library, 2008a)
Like that of Wilson, Roosevelt’s dream of a liberal international order protected 
by four major powers and a new international organization experienced significant 
problems in its implementation. After defeating fascism in World War II, the United 
States faced a new challenge to democracy from communism. The Truman Doctrine in 
March 1947 represents threat perception the administration held toward the Soviet and 
the nature of the global ideological struggle between the two political systems:
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between
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alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is 
based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, 
representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, 
freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The 
second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the 
majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed 
elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples 
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures. (Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008d)
President Kennedy followed his predecessors in his inaugural address by
declaring renewed commitment to democratization of the world:
Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any 
price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in 
order to assure the survival and the success of liberty. (Lillian Goldman Law 
Library, 2008b)
He justified the commitment to democratization overseas in his speech in Berlin 
in June, 1963.
I want to say on behalf of my countrymen who live many miles away on the other 
side of the Atlantic ... that they have been able to share with you ... the story of 
the last 18 years ..
[L]et me ask you ... to lift your eyes ... beyond the wall to the day of peace with 
justice, beyond yourselves and ourselves to all mankind.
Real, lasting peace in Europe can never be assured as long as one German out of 
four is denied the elementary right of free men, and that is to make a free choice. 
Freedom is indivisible, and when one man is enslaved, all are not free. (WGBH 
Educational Foundation, 1996)
President Reagan was even more blunt and called the Soviet Union an “evil
empire” because it was an enemy of democracy and proposed
to foster the infrastructure of democracy, the system of a free press, unions, 
political parties, universities, which allows a people to choose their own way to 
develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful 
means. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)
Skeptics of American overseas democratic promotion point out that the public
statements above were merely symbolic or rhetorical and that the United States supported 
numerous undemocratic governments and groups in Asia, Middle East, and Africa in the 
name of anticommunism (Johnson, 2000). During the Cold War, however, the Soviet 
Union and communist regimes in its satellite countries suppressed any democratic 
movement including Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland while American key allies in 
Western Europe grew into mature democracies. In Asia democratization started in Japan 
has spread to Taiwan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia during the Cold War. By the end 
of the Cold War American allies and friends were more democratic than the Soviet 
counterparts. Henry Nau found that the closer a nation’s relation with the United Sates 
is, the higher level of democratization of it (Nau, 2002). So it was only after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union that democratic regimes were established in former communist 
countries.
The most successful examples of American democratic promotion overseas can 
be found in Germany and Japan after World War II. Two world wars were caused by the 
rise of undemocratic regime and policy makers in Washington D.C. felt they needed to 
democratize its former enemies to avoid being dragged into another world war in future 
(Fromkin, 1995). Both countries went through military occupation led by the United 
States and became mature democracies during the Cold War. In both countries new 
democratic constitutions with protection of basic human rights were drafted, political 
parties were permitted to organize, free elections were held, and wartime political, 
military, and economic leaders were purged through war tribunals. Prewar political 
prisoners were released (Smith, 1994). At the same time, they became two of the most 
powerful allies of the United Sates. By the end of the Cold War, the two countries
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became the second and third largest economies in the world and hosted the largest 
number of U.S. military forces overseas.
In addition to Germany and Japan, impacts of American democratic promotion 
have been visible in other divided nations. At the end of the Cold War, both Taiwan and 
South Korea were more democratic than their communist counterparts and economically 
more developed. While West Germany was successfully reunified with East Germany 
under favorable conditions for the West and has secured a central position in the 
integrated Europe in collaboration with France and Britain, prolonged ideological 
divisions in Asia have been a source of instability in the region. In spite of significant 
economic interdependence, different political ideologies continue to serve as a source of 
friction and conflict between China and the United States (Christensen, 2001). North 
Korea’s staunch resistance against any democratic process or power shift from the Labor 
Party to its people has denied any hope for peaceful reunification in the Korean 
Peninsula. The North Korean regime has been so determined to maintain its existing 
nondemocratic regime that it has developed nuclear weapon to deter attempts of regime 
change by external forces (Cha & Kang, 2003; O'Hanlon & Mochizuki, 2003; Perry, 
2006).
After all, throughout the nation’s history, the greatest national security threats to 
the United States have come from nondemocracies, including Britain in the War of 
Independence and the War of 1812, the Axis powers during World War II, and the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War. These nondemocratic enemies of the United States not only 
imposed authoritarian rule within their own countries, but also sought to establish 
international orders unfriendly to and even dangerous for democracies. Historical
79
international orders established by nondemocracies were characterized by domination 
and exploitation of the weak by the powerful, endless competition and conflict among 
powerful states seeking to enlarge their spheres of influence, and secret collusion against 
common enemies (even though commitments were often transitory as perceptions of 
interests changed), and severe restrictions on international trade and investment. In such 
international environments, democracies are forced to exist in constant fear of foreign 
invasion with consequent loss of political and economic freedom both at home and 
abroad.
As these historical enemies transitioned from authoritarian rule to democracy, 
they became less threatening to and even cooperative with the United States. By the end 
of the 19th century, relations between Britain and the United Sates had improved to such 
an extent that Britain supported the United States in the Spanish American War of 1898. 
In addition to their shared strategic interest in curbing Spanish influence in the Western 
Hemisphere and the Pacific, broader national interests of the two countries, now mature 
democracies, began to converge. The United States had ended slavery and expanded 
suffrage to African Americans through the Civil War while Britain gradually 
democratized itself by expanding suffrage to 60% of males between 1867 -1918. The 
convergence of the Anglo-American identities was a significant factor in the United 
States joining World War II on the Allied side (Burton, 1999; Perkins, 1968; Rock,
1989). In addition to tangible threats to America’s commercial interests posed by the 
German submarine warfare, President Wilson justified the U.S. entry into the war as 




Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the 
life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up among the 
really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and 
of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles.... the 
menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments 
backed by organized force.
A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of 
democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith 
within it or observe its covenants.
Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may be, from 
generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within 
the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and 
privileged class.
The right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight . .  for democracy, for 
the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own 
governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion 
of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all 
nations and make the world itself at last free. (KCNET, 2001a)
Following Britain, Germany and Italy became American allies after World War II
by joining NATO. Initially, formation of NATO was driven by strategic calculations to
“keep the Russians out” according to its first Secretary General Lord Ismay. By the end
of the Cold War, both countries had matured as democracies and have occupied crucial
parts of the trans-Atlantic security community, within which states can solve any
international conflict without resorting to force. Not only have Germany and Italy
improved their relations with the United States, but also with other democratic members
of EU and NATO (Adler & Barnett, 1998; Deutsch, 1957). Although Russia still has yet
to become a mature democracy, U.S.-Russian relations nevertheless have been more
peaceful and cooperative than when Russia was under Soviet communist rule.
John Ikenberry explains these dramatic transformations of U.S. relations with its
former enemies by pointing out the constitutive relations between democratization and
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international cooperation.
The democratic character of the states involved also facilitated institutional
agreement...... Democracy was both an end and a means. Western leaders
repeatedly justified their unprecedented commitments as necessary for the 
protection of common democratic values. But they also argued that such 
commitments were particularly credible and effective because they were 
established between democracies. (Ikenberry, 2001, p. 164)
What is common among the approaches of all these American leaders is a
symbiotic interpretation of democracy and capitalism. True to the philosophical tradition
of John Locke who argued that a man needs the rights to life, liberty, and property to be
free, the American notion of democracy contains not only political but also economic
rights. Political and economic freedom cannot be separated. Since the War of
Independence which was culmination of series of political struggle over economic and
property rights between England and its American colonies, economic freedom has
maintained equal standing with political freedom as a worthy cause for the American
government and the people to go to war.
Both domestically and externally, the United States has strived to be a champion
of capitalism. Capitalism is an economic system of private property ownership, market
economy, and minimal roles of government in distribution of wealth in a society. While
the body of the U.S. Constitution mainly focuses on the relations between states and the
newly created federal government, the Founding Fathers added the Bill of Rights to
protect basic rights of American citizens from potential abuse by the new central
government. Especially, the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution clearly represents
the prominence of economic freedom as essential to political freedom and protects
property rights of its citizens by stipulating “nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”
The American people generally believe in the efficiency and fairness of the 
market mechanism in distribution of scarce resources over government redistribution of 
them (McClosky & Zaller, 1984). The American dream envisions a self-made man 
accumulating private property and making a fortune though his or her entrepreneurship in 
free and competitive market economy. Quoting the well-known words of President 
Calvin Coolidge, "[a]fter all, the chief business of the American people is business” 
(Peters & Woolley, 1999), pursuit of economic opportunities have been one of the most 
important reasons, along with religious and political freedom, for which so many people 
from all over the world have migrated to the United States.
More than 2 centuries after the Bill of Rights was drafted, the United States has 
developed one of the most capitalistic economic systems in the world. The World Survey 
of Economic Freedom by Freedom House measures the level of economic freedom by six 
indicators: freedoms to own property, to earn a living, to operate a business, to invest 
one’s own earnings, to trade internationally, and to participate in a market economy.
Since its inception, the Freedom House survey has given the full marks in all six 
indicators to the United States and ranked it number one along with other five Western 
nations (Messick & Kimura, 1996).
Externally the United States has sought economic freedom for Americans 
engaging business overseas and tried to spread capitalism whenever and wherever 
possible. Between its independence in the 18th century and World War II, the United 
States made a series of efforts to challenge the European dominated colonial economic 
system and open foreign markets for free trade to expand and secure sources of natural
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resource and for export markets for American products. For example, the Monroe 
Doctrine of 1823 was “a kind of hemispheric alliance with fellow independent states in 
South America” (Nau, 2002, p. 66), hedging for return of European colonialism in the 
region. The document argues that United States “should consider any attempt on their 
part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace 
and security” (Smith, 1994, p. 24). In 1899 and 1901 Secretary John Hay issued the 
“Open Door” notes to ensure protection of equal privileges among countries trading with 
China and in support of Chinese territorial and administrative integrity when European 
powers and Japan tried to divide it into exclusive spheres of influence (G. Smith, 1994).
The United States fought World War I, not only “to make the world safe for 
democracy” but also make it open to free trade. In his Fourteen Points speech, President 
Wilson demanded:
III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment 
of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace 
and associating themselves for its maintenance. (Lillian Goldman Law Library, 
2008c)
American determination for developing a liberal international economic order was
repeated by President Roosevelt in the Atlantic Charter, too.
Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to 
further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, 
on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are 
needed for their economic prosperity. (Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008a)
Roosevelt followed through his vision for a liberal international economic order
in the Atlantic Charter by proposing global economic institutions in the Bretton Woods
Conference in July 1944. The new international financial system the conference
introduced was a “managed open system,” in which exchanges rates among major
currencies were pegged to the U.S. dollars and governments had “tools for economic 
stabilization and expansionary options for macroeconomic imbalances” (Ikenberry, 2001, 
p. 205). European countries learned that political danger caused financial instability from 
the Revolutions of 1848 and 1849 and the Great Depression and preferred economic 
stability to high economic growth, which an open global market would promise.
Although the new international economic institutions were results of the compromises 
between the United States, which aimed at an open global market, and European allies, 
which were more interested in safeguards and protections against postwar economic 
dislocation and unemployment (Ikenberry, 2001), they were symbols of significant 
departure from the old imperial international economic order and laid foundations for a 
truly global liberal economic order based on multilateralism (Ruggie, 1992).
The Bretton Woods institutions, which were originally aimed at rebuilding 
European economy and decolonizing the global economy, have contributed to higher 
level of economic interdependence among key American allies in Europe and Asia. The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, commonly called the World 
Bank, was established to lend funds to rebuild economies of the member states. The 
International Monetary Fund was established to stabilize exchange rates among the 
currencies of member states and provide short-term credits to survive financial crises.
The Bretton Woods System of international finance was specifically designed to forge 
close financial ties between the United States and its Western allies by pegging the 
currencies of the latter with the U.S. dollar, the only currency backed by gold. This 
hybrid system of gold standard and fixed exchange rates between the United States and 
other Western economies kept the value of U.S. dollar relatively high. While American
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consumers enjoyed a higher standard of living thanks to the strong purchasing power of
the U.S. dollar, exports from western European countries and Japan to the United States
proliferated due to their price advantage over American made products.
The third institution, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was
established to promote a free market for international trade in 1948 after an American
attempt to create more powerful International Trade Organization failed. GATT, in spite
of its limited roles and power over its members, had evolved into one of the most
important global economic institutions by the end of the Cold War. By the end of the
Uruguay Round, the average tariff rates on goods had decreased to 3% from 40% since
GATT’s establishment (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2012). Its membership had increased
from 40 to 128 between 1948 and 1994 (World Trade Organization, 2013). Between
1960 and 1994, merchandise trade as a share of world GDP had increased from 17.8% to
32.4% (World Bank, 2013).
These institutions were developed out of the lessons of the Great Depression and
World War II. Decision makers in Washington came to a loose consensus that economic
prosperity of the United States and political stability of the world depended on an open
global economy where countries depend on each other through free trade and
international investment (Pollard, 1985). For example, Secretary of State Cordell Hull
justified U.S. involvement in European economic reconstruction as follows;
[U]nhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair 
economic competition, with w ar.. .if we could get a freer flow of trade.. .freer in 
the sense of fewer discriminations and obstructions.. .so that one country would 
not be deadly jealous of another and the living standards of all countries might 
rise, thereby eliminating the economic dissatisfaction that breeds war, we might 
have a reasonable chance of lasting peace. (Ikenberry, 2001, p. 176)
Some historians and political scientists have called that tradition of American
foreign economic policy “Open Door,” naming after famous diplomatic notes Secretary 
of State John Hay issued in 1899 and 1901, hoping that China would not be divided 
among the European nations and Japan and that American economic interests in the 
country would be respected (Layne, 2006; Williams, 2009). The “Open Door” policy 
aims at creation and protection of an international economic system based on liberal 
values and institutions. In such an economic system, private commercial interests can 
engage in international trade and investment to achieve optimal economic efficiency 
through division of labor based on the principle of comparative advantages. In other 
words, the policy is projection of American domestic economic norms, principles, and 
institutions into foreign countries and based on the belief that American economic 
interests would be best served in global capitalist economic system. At the same time, 
the “Open Door” policy reflects a persistent distrust and fear Americans have developed 
toward illiberal economic systems including colonialism and socialism. As demonstrated 
by World War I and II, American way of life would be endangered in an illiberal 
international economic order. No longer was isolationism an effective policy option for 
the United States, either. Instead of playing defensive against threats of illiberal 
international economic system, the Roosevelt and Truman administrations decided to 
create an international economic order serving American economic interests, as well as 
any other countries that would play by the same rules of capitalism.
During the Cold War, the United States promoted capitalism overseas not only to 
prevent the world from repeating its past mistakes but also to prevent the Soviet Union 
from taking over the international economic system. Top officials of the Truman 
administration believed in the importance of economic factors to the U.S. national
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security interest. First, the United States would be able to defeat the Soviet Union in war 
because the industrial power and logistic capabilities of the United States would enable it 
to deploy forces to Soviet controlled territories, but not the other way around. Second, 
poverty is a hot bed for the establishment and growth of communism. In order to prevent 
its further spread, the United States had to help other countries, including its former 
enemies, to rebuild and develop their economies. Thus, U.S. Containment policy included 
not only military, but also economic measures. Starting with aid to Greece and Turkey 
announced in the Truman Doctrine, the United States provided over 13 billion dollars of 
economic aid to 17 western and southern European countries under the European 
Recovery Act, better known as the Marshall Plan. Secretary of State Marshall explained 
that the goal of Marshall Plan was “the revival of a working economy in the world so as 
to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can 
exist.” (Smith, 1994, p. 117).
Although foreign aid was an important policy measure to help the recovery of 
European and Japanese economies from wartime destruction, it was chiefly American 
trade policy that promoted the long-term economic development and growth of the 
Western block during the Cold War. The United States was generous enough to open its 
domestic market to imports from other Western countries first and then patient enough to 
negotiate trade deals to reciprocate market access in respective countries for American 
exports later. Trade negotiations with the United States also encouraged liberalization of 
its trading partners’ economies. Most successful U.S. trade partners have largely 
subscribed to the strategy of export-led growth, rather than that of import substitution.
The former strategy is more conducive to creating liberal economies with smaller
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government roles than the latter. Trade negotiations with the United States, either 
through a multilateral organization like GATT or through bilateral negotiations, including 
ones between Japan and the United States, have forced American trading partners to 
liberalize their domestic markets so that American companies could expand the business.
Today promotion of democracy and capitalism has no longer been limited to 
American foreign policy, shared by many American allies in Europe and Asia, and 
institutionalized by such international organizations as the United Nations, WTO and 
IMF. What separates American national security culture from those of other 
industrialized democracies is American exceptionalism (Hunt, 1987; McEvoy-Levy,
2001). It is the belief that the United States is an extraordinary nation with a special role 
to play in human history, a nation that is not only unique but also superior. While the Old 
World represents feudalism and imperialism with repressive government and secretive 
balance of power politics, the New World, which the United Sates exemplifies, provides 
positive and constructive alternatives with its democratic political system, economic free 
enterprise, and peaceful foreign relations based on law and diplomacy. American 
exceptionalism has formed not only one of the core elements of American nationalism 
since its inception, but has also justified its liberal and hegemonic identity. (McCrisken,
2002). The American people and government long believed that their unique political 
and economic systems were better than other systems. When the United States became 
the world’s preeminent economic power by the early 20th century it began to assume 
international leadership and to rebuild the rest of the world after the American model.
Some scholars point out that American foreign policy is not much different from 
those of other great powers. For example, Lepgold and McKeown demonstrated that the
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United States acted in a similar manner with other great powers. It has engaged in power 
politics by maintaining powerful standing military, making peacetime commitments to 
other countries security, and overseeing other countries domestic problems for the sake of 
American national interests (Lepgold & McKeown, 1995).
Focusing on individual decisions and short-term impacts of past American foreign 
policy, one might find more commonality with the actions of other great powers. But 
public perception of American foreign policy and politicians’ rhetoric widely subscribe 
the notion that the United States should play unique and constructive roles to make the 
world a better place for all of humanity. Compared with other countries, the impact of 
exceptionalism is stronger in the United States, which helps one to understand another 
important aspect of American national security culture.
The second most important part of American national security identity is its 
hegemonic identity. A hegemon is a state with predominant military and economic 
power with which it establishes international order and rules (Keohane, 1984). While 
developing the strongest military force and the largest economy with the most advanced 
technological bases are necessary conditions for hegemony, they are not sufficient. 
Hegemony stems from not only a state’s position in the balance of material power in an 
international system, but also from the national identity of a leading power. Political 
leaders and citizens, especially in a democracy, need to recognize their country’s 
leadership roles in the world and be ready to bear the burdens necessary to perform them. 
In contrast to its liberal identity, the origins of the hegemonic identity of the United States 
are relatively new.
Although by the end of the 19th century, the United States was the largest
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economy and had one of the largest naval forces in the world at the end of World War I, 
it was not until the end of World War II that the United States assumed hegemonic 
leadership. During the interwar period, the United Sates did not have a will to lead the 
world. In his The Rise and Fall o f the Great Powers, Paul Kennedy demonstrated the 
power shift among major powers between 1890 and 1938 by measuring population, 
levels of urbanization and industrialization, energy consumption, industrial output, and 
size of military forces. In seven demographic and economic indicators, the U.S rose to 
the top in six by 1913. But the U.S. was at best a second-rank military power before 
World War I (Kennedy, 1987).
The roles of the United States in international relations expanded during the 
interwar period in such areas as naval arms control (Buckley, 1970; Iriye, 1965) and the 
reconstruction of German economy; nevertheless, American grand strategy up until 
World War II remained basically isolationist in character. It avoided military 
intervention outside of the Western Hemisphere, peacetime alliances, and collective 
security institutions, notably the League of Nations (Dueck, 2006; Iriye, 1965; Legro, 
2005). Indeed, American diplomacy since World War I was more internationalist than 
that in preceding centuries, but half-hearted participation in development and 
maintenance of international order commensurate with its material power prevented the 
United States from becoming a hegemon.
What the United States needed to become a hegemon after World War II was the 
will to lead the world by itself. Through two world wars, the United States learned that it 
could not be safe and prosperous alone (Gaddis, 1972). As President Wilson justified the 
entry into World War I as a quest “to make the world safe for democracy,” President
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Roosevelt similarly had an ambitious, yet naive, plan for the post-World War II 
international order, in which American national interests and identities would be 
protected better than in the prewar era in collaboration with other great powers. 
Roosevelt’s approach during World War II can be best explained by internationalism. 
Essentially, Roosevelt believed “that societal well-being is best served by committing 
national military power to relationships with the major powers in Europe and by 
supporting international institutions” (Legro, 2005, p. 52).
One of the first major documents through which Roosevelt expressed his 
internationalist vision for the post-World War II world order was the Atlantic Charter of 
August 1941. Along with ideals of individual freedom, the Charter proposed a new 
international order based on the principles of national self-determination, territorial 
integrity, nonaggression, freedom of the seas, and open access to markets and raw 
materials. To realize these principles, the Charter proposed a new global collective 
security institution, arms control, and international economic institutions, which would 
later be known as the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions. Along with 
other Allied Powers, the United States would serve as a world policeman to keep 
international order. Still, Roosevelt did not envision that the U.S. would take over a 
hegemonic position with global reach in the near-term. Instead, he negotiated dividing 
the world into loose spheres of influence among major powers in the wartime summits 
during Cairo, Casablanca, and Yalta. These loose spheres of influence would replace and 
be improvement over the traditional colonial system. Simply put, Roosevelt’s vision for 
the post-World War II international order was somewhere between isolationist and 
hegemonic policies. The United States would more actively engage in establishment and
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maintenance of an international order in the post-World War II world than in post-World 
War I world. Yet, it would do so through managed balance of power using international 
organizations, something similar to the Concert of Europe in the 19th century (Jervis, 
1982, 1985). The U.N. is designed to give the major Allied Powers privilege to “police” 
the world as the Permanent Members of the Security Council. By giving them a veto 
power, the U.N. aimed at status quo of the world after World War II and any major 
changes should be accepted by the Permanent Members.
But Harry Truman had different understanding of post-World War II world from 
that of Roosevelt (Gaddis, 1972; Leffler, 1984). The differences between Roosevelt and 
Truman on their visions of postwar international order are clear when one compares the 
Atlantic Charter and the Truman Doctrine. Although the two presidents agreed on the 
limitations of pre-World War II American grand strategy based on isolationism, they 
came to different conclusions on America’s relations with other great powers. While 
Roosevelt hoped that the United States would actively engage in international relations in 
the key parts of the world, especially in Europe, as one of leading powers, Truman 
recognized that his country had to lead the rest of the great powers to fight against 
communism.
While the Atlantic Charter lists eight liberal principles of international relations 
Roosevelt and Churchill agreed upon, there is no specific reference to what special roles 
the United States would play in development of a new international order based on those 
principles. But the Truman Doctrine contains words of American commitment to the 
leadership in post-World War II international relations. It was announced in response to 
British urgent request for help when it could no longer provide economic aid to Greece
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(Gaddis, 1982). The document is about what the United States would do for the rest of 
the world.
There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn.. .No other nation 
is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek 
government.
One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the 
creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a 
way of life free from coercion.
To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United 
States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations 
it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting 
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.
The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their 
freedoms. (Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008d)
And President Truman was well aware of what was at stake. “If we falter in our 
leadership ... we may endanger the peace of the world.. .Our deepest concern with 
European recovery is that it is essential to maintenance of the civilization in which the 
American way of life is rooted" (Leffler, 2007, p. 63).
In addition to the optimistic vision of the U.S.-Soviet relations after the war, 
Roosevelt overestimated continuing influence and power of Britain and France in world 
affairs. During the war, Roosevelt closely consulted with Churchill on Allied strategies 
against Germany and Japan and postwar settlements in wartime summits in the Atlantic 
Ocean, Casablanca, Cairo, and Yalta. Atlee was invited to such summits as the Bretton 
Woods Conference to discuss establishment of international economic organizations and 
the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945 to discuss problems arising from 
Germany's defeat, including the arrangements for military occupation and the trial of war 
criminals, and issued an ultimatum to Japan demanding surrender.
But successors of President Roosevelt found themselves to take over international
leadership from Britain and France and fight against communism in Greece, Turkey,
Indochina, on their behalves. Instead of policing the rest of the world in cooperation with 
the United States, Britain and France ended up begging the United States to join the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization to balance against communist threats in Europe 
(Dueck, 2006). Great powers in the pre-World War II world turned into client states of 
the United States in the Cold War. In addition to material destruction, psychologically 
Europeans were not ready for another extended war after World War II. After two world 
wars, war became not only “unprofitable,” but also “unthinkable,” in the minds of most 
of Western Europeans (Mueller, 1989). Both the Allied and Axis powers lost significant 
numbers of civilian population and major parts of their industrial bases, which made it 
almost impossible to mobilize the nations for another war.
Another important factor of formation of the asymmetrical trans-Atlantic alliance 
was the advent of nuclear weapon. The United States not only monopolized the weapon 
at the time of NATO formation, but also the Truman administration was ready to use it to 
defend American allies of the Cold War. Although the United Kingdom developed its 
own nuclear weapons in 1952 and France did the same in 1960, the two countries would 
not use their nuclear weapons to defend other NATO members. America’s extended 
nuclear umbrella maintained its importance for American leadership within NATO 
throughout the Cold War. In order to balance against large and technologically advanced 
nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union, NATO members had to rely on the United States 
(Bundy, Kennan, McNamara, & Smith, 1982).
The hegemonic grand strategy extending deterrence to its major allies in Europe, 
Asia, and Middle East would have been impossible without public support in the United 
States. Unlike after World War I, internationalist and hegemonic foreign policy by the
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Roosevelt and Truman administration received strong support from the Congress. The 
UN Treaty, Marshall Plan and the NATO treaty were all approved by the Congress with 
over 80% of votes. Gallup Polls found a wide range of social support for the containment 
policy. Not only in Washington, the containment policy won wide public support across 
the party line. For example, over 70% of Republican and Democrats believe that the U.S. 
should play active roles in world affairs in the February 1946 Gallup Poll. 56% of 
Republican and Democrats supported the Truman Doctrine while less that 35% opposed 
it. In the April 1948 Gallup Poll about two thirds of Republicans and Democrats 
supported the plan for the NATO (Holsti, 1996).
In contrast to post-World War I era, the executive and legislative branches of the 
U.S. government share threat perception of communism. When the Truman 
administration was lobbying the Congress for the European Recovery Program, the 
members of Congress were more often convinced by national security threats from 
communism, rather than long term economic benefits the program would bring to 
American economy (Layne, 2006). The general public also formed a loose consensus on 
American foreign policy during the Cold War. First containment of communism was a 
widely accepted goal of American foreign policy. Second, American public opinion 
shifted from isolationist to internationalist views of a proper America’s role in the world. 
In a Gallup survey in February 1943, 76% of the respondents agreed that the U.S. should 
take a more active role of postwar international orders (Holsti, 1996).
Backed by public support, since the end of World War II the United States has 
adopted the grand strategy of extraregional hegemony, developing predominant military, 
economic, and diplomatic influence over international order in the world’s three most
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important regions; Western Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf, in addition to the 
Western Hemisphere (Layne, 2006). Initially, U.S. leaders hoped that multilateral 
institutions for the postwar world economy would reduce the need for the United States 
to keep giving large foreign aid and to intervene frequently to maintain financial 
equilibrium (Keohane, 1984).
But by 1947, the Truman administration found that multilateral economic 
institutions alone would not save Western Europeans from economic collapse. European 
economic health had security implications because the Cold War was an economic 
struggle, as well as military and diplomatic one. Top officials in Washington saw real 
danger that people in economically devastated countries would choose communist 
governments. The Soviet Union appeared to threaten the American way of life by 
spreading a socialist economic system worldwide and limiting American economic 
opportunities in foreign markets. George Kennan understood the economic implications 
of the Cold War and supported economic means to fight communism, including foreign 
economic aid, opening American domestic markets for imports from American allies 
(Leffler, 1992).
The hegemonic and liberal identities of the United States have sometimes 
contradicted each other. The United States has been criticized for supporting 
undemocratic regimes in Asia, Middle East, and Latin American in the name of 
anticommunism (Johnson, 2004). But because of its liberal identity, the American style 
of hegemony is different from those of Britain the Soviet Union. Simply put, American 
foreign policy toward its allies and friendly nations have been guided by liberal theory of 
international relations. Based on the optimistic view that states can cooperate for
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common interest even in the anarchical international relations, the United States created 
multilateral organizations to promote economic interdependence, enhance collective 
defense, and democracy.
In spite of persistent criticism, the way the United States has led the world is more 
benign than those by England and the Soviet Union. While England developed its 
hegemony by colonizing the key parts of the world and building an empire where the sun 
never sets (Ferguson, 2003), the United States built the Western block by a combination 
of military alliances, overseas bases, multilateral organizations, foreign aid, trade, and 
investment. Although the United States has developed an extensive network of its 
overseas bases, it has not used military forces to its allies to solve significant policy 
differences. For example, when France withdrew from the integrated military structure 
of NATO in 1967, the United States did not use military force or threat of it. Even during 
the Suez Crisis in 1956, the Eisenhower administration was able to force the British and 
French governments to withdrew their troops from Egypt without a threat of military 
force. Instead the United States held up U.S. financial assistance to the two allies until 
their military evacuation was complete. But the Soviet Union was as aggressive to its 
own allies as to its enemies. For example, the Soviet sent its troops to suppress the 
democratic movements in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.
The United States adopted a hegemonic identity because of its mistrust in multi­
polarity and balance of power mechanism of the European centered international politics 
(Layne, 2006). The United States entered two world wars to end the cycles of alignment 
and realignment among great powers. Both Wilson and Roosevelt seemed to believe that 
the United States could lead the world into the course of linear progress toward lasting
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peace rather than going back to the cycle of war and peace. Both presidents called world 
wars “the war to end all wars” but also try to replace balance of power system with some 
form of collective security organizations.
Even before the U.S. entry into World War I, Wilson understood that the cycle of 
war and peace driven by balance of power among European states needed to be 
terminated. In his address to the U.S. Senate in January 1917, Wilson proposed “a peace 
without victory” :
Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance 
of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, 
who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement?.... There must 
be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but 
an organized common peace. (KCNET, 2001b)
Then he warned of the fragile nature of punitive peace, which had been common 
in Europe:
Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon 
the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an 
intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon 
which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. 
Only a peace between equals can last, only a peace the very principle of which is 
equality and a common participation in a common benefit. (KCNET, 2001b)
President Roosevelt was more realistic in his attempt to transform rules of
international relations than President Wilson. He understood the reality of power politics
and gave special privilege to largest allied powers in the Security Council in the United
Nations. Roosevelt seemed to understand the difficulty in maintaining peace even when
his nation was winning the war. In his speech he prepared for Jefferson Day, 13 April
1945, a day before he died, he would argue that “the work, my friend, is peace. More than
an end of this war—an end to the beginnings of all wars” (Knowles, 2008). He was
ready to recognize the Soviet’s sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe to keep
wartime cooperation between the United State and the Soviet Union. But, ironically, 
after his death, the United States had to engage in another cycle of international power 
struggle, this time as a hegemonic power, with the Soviet Union.
The Norm o f Homeland Security
While national security identities define contents of national interests of a 
particular state, national security norms provide ideational framework within which the 
sate selects a means of defending culturally defined national interests. The most 
important national security norm of the United States is defense of its homeland.
Physical security of their nationals and territorial integrity are the two essential subjects 
of national security policy of all nations. For that purpose, the majority of developed 
countries have military capability only enough to respond to foreign military attacks. 
What is unique about the American norm of homeland security is the nation’s willingness 
and readiness to use military forces to prevent a foreign attack on its civilian population 
in its homeland.
The term “homeland security” has been used more commonly since establishment 
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In July 2002, the Bush Administration 
issued National Strategy for Homeland Security and defined the term of homeland 
security as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United 
States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and 
recover from attacks that do occur” (United States Office of Homeland Security, 2002).
While the DHS specifically seeks to defend the United States from terrorism after 
9/11, the norm of homeland security, expressed by President George W. Bush as “the
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reason we're fighting them over in Iraq is so we don't have to fight them here at home,” is 
not a brand new idea in U.S. defense policy. Rather, the American norm of homeland 
security was developed through its unique historical experiences dating back to its 
inception. The United States became a great power without fighting a major international 
war on its homeland and thus without significant civilian casualties. In American history 
the largest numbers of war deaths was recorded in the Civil War. No foreign army has 
come to the U.S. homeland and killed its citizens in large numbers. Thus for ordinary 
Americans, remaining safe from harm in its homeland, even when American soldiers are 
fighting war overseas, has become the normal expectation.
The United States has been exceptionally safe from external attacks for a great 
power in modern history. It is protected by the two oceans and sandwiched by two 
weaker and friendly neighbors. The United States and Canada signed the first border 
demilitarization treaty in modern history (Shore, 1998). Its process of territorial 
expansion marked much less military conflict with other countries in comparison with 
those of European great powers. For the most part, its territorial expansion was 
accomplished through diplomatic negotiations and purchase, as well as military 
conquests of Native American’s land. For example, President Jefferson doubled U.S. 
territory through the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. It cost the United States just $15 
million to add 828,000 square miles to the national domain, from the Mississippi River to 
the Rocky Mountains (DeConde, 1976). In 1867, Secretary of State William Henry 
Seward bought Alaska from Russia for $7.2 million, which not only added about one- 
fifth the size of the present contiguous United States but also has supplied valuable 
natural resources, including petroleum and uranium (Naske, 2001). Some parts of the
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U.S. territories were acquired by war. For example, the United States gained the territory 
which later became today's states of California, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, 
and parts of Colorado and Wyoming as a result of the Mexican War (1846-48), but 
without a significant number of civilian casualties.
The importance of a national security norm is expressed best when it is breached. 
Instead of abandoning the norm, the American government and the people reconfirmed 
the importance of homeland security and intensified their efforts to prevent next foreign 
attacks on American homeland and the people. Historically, the norm of homeland 
security has been breached only four times: the War of Independence, the War of 1812, 
the Pearl Harbor Attack of 1941, and the 9/11 (Chace & Carr, 1988; Gaddis, 2004). After 
the first two incidents, the United States adopted the strategy of isolationism and tried to 
prevent foreign military forces from coming to the United States by minimizing its 
involvement in European great power games. In short, the United Sates should have had 
least incentives for oversea expansion. “For over two centuries the aspiration toward 
eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective 
American foreign policy” (Chace & Carr, 1988, p. 12)
But the United States learned that it could not be safe and prosperous alone after it 
had been dragged into two world wars. Since World War II the United States has tried to 
secure homeland security by expanding its defense parameters and by promoting 
democracy and capitalism in the key parts of the world. Thus since World War II, U.S. 
military forces have put heavy emphasis on power projection capabilities.
As a result, American public do not know modern warfare in the same way their 
counterparts in Europe and Asia do. In modern all-out war, the entire nation pays the
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price of war. National economy is mobilized for war production. The government asks 
more tax and issues war bonds. Scarce resources are rationed. Some key industries are 
nationalized. Through national conscription, not only professional soldiers, but also 
ordinary citizens are sent to battlefields. Worst of all, in modern warfare there is no or 
little distinction between civilians and combatants. For example, during World War II, 
more civilians were killed in the Soviet Union, China, Germany, and Japan than 
combatants.
But except for few occasions, foreign military forces reached the mainland of the 
United States and killed U.S. citizens. The most notable exceptions were the terrorist 
attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C. on September 11th, 2001, in which more 
than 3,000 civilians were killed. However, compared with the civilian casualties in the 
other wars, even that number looks small. In addition, the United States terminated 
military draft after the Vietnam War. The majority of American public will no longer 
have to fear that his or her family members or close friends should be drafted and sent to 
battlefields. In sum, the combination of historical records of civilian’s security in the 
U.S. homeland and isolation from human costs of war for American general public 
resulted in another key national security norm of the United States; respect for the 
military.
Respect for the Military 
As discussed in the previous section, fighting war overseas, rather than waiting 
for enemies to attack the U.S. homeland, has become one of the most important U.S. 
national security norms. In order to achieve homeland security, the United States has,
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since World War II, maintained large military forces even in peacetime along with the 
capability to project its military power globally. Such expansive national security goals 
are only possible to achieve in a country where the respect for military service is high.
Based on the Gallup’s “Confidence in Institutions” survey, the military has 
received higher public confidence ratings than the presidency, the U.S. Supreme Court, 
and the Congress from 1975 to 2010. As of 2010, 75 % of the respondents had either a 
“Great deal” or “Quite a lot” of confidence in the military. In addition, the level of 
confidence in the military has increased over the long-term while, those in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the presidency, and the Congress have decreased (see Table 1) (Gallup, 
2010). Furthermore, only a small percentage of the respondents had strong negative 
opinions toward the military. Even in the worst year, 1984, the combined number of 
“very little” and “none” was smaller than “some” (see Figure 2).
Reflecting the high level of public respect for armed forces, military service is an 
asset and lack of it, or a bad record of it, is a liability in American politics. For example, 
presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Carter, and George H. Bush effectively used their 
military service records during their presidential campaigns while presidents Clinton and 
George W. Bush suffered from accusations of draft dodging. Although, the president of 
the United Sates assumes multiple responsibilities, ranging from the chief executive to 
the head of the state, no other title commands more public respect than “Commander in 
C hief’ of the armed forces.
Not only presidents, but also members of the U.S. Congress are well aware of the 
political advantages of association with the U.S. military brings. In the 111th Congress, 
102 members of the House of Representatives and 29 members of the Senate served in
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Table 1. Confidence in the military. From 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx#1 
Copyright © 2013 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved 




Great Quite Very None No Quite
deal a lot Some little (vol.) opinion a lot
% % % % 96 % %
2012 .Tun 7-10 43 32 18 5 1 1 75
2011 Jun 9-12 47 31 16 3 * 1 78
2010 Jul 8-11 44 32 18 4 1 1 76
2009 Jun 14-17 45 37 12 5 * 1 82
2008 Jun 9-12 45 26 20 7 1 1 71
2007 Jun U-14 39 30 21 8 1 * 69
2006 Jun 1-4 41 32 19 5 1 1 73
2005 May 23-26 42 32 18 7 1 * 74
2004 May 21-23 36 39 19 5 * l  75
2003 Jun 9-10 48 34 14 4 * * 82
2002 Jun 21-23 43 36 16 5 * * 79
2001 Jun 8-10 32 34 24 6 2 2 66
2000 Jun 22-23 25 39 26 7 1 2 64
1999 Jun 25-27 34 34 26 6 * * 68
1998 Jun 5-7 33 31 25 8 1 2 64
1997 Jul 2:5-27 30 30 27 10 2 1 60
1996 May 28-29 30 36 25 7 * 2 66
1995 Apr 21-24 33 3J- 27 7 1 1 64
1994 Mar 25-29 30 34 26 8 * 2 64
1993 Mar 22-24 32 35 23 8 1 1 67
1991 Oct 10-13 35 34 20 8 1 3 69
1991 Feb 28-Mar 3 52 33 11 3 *  1 85
1990 Aug 16-19 37 31 22 7 1 2 68
1989 Sep 7-10 31 32 26 9 * 3 63
1988 Sep 23-26 23 .35 30 9 1 2 58
1987 Jul 10-13 24 37 28 9 1 2 61
1986 Jul u-14 29 34 24 10 1 2 63
1985 May 17-20 24 37 28 8 1 2 61
1984 Oct 6-10 28 30 24 15 — 2 58
1983 Aug 5-8 23 30 29 12 1 5 53
1981 Nov 20-23 22 28 29 14 6 2 50
1979 Apr 6-9 25 29 29 14 1 3 54
1977 Jan 7-10 23 34 25 11 1 6 57
1975 May 30-Jun 2 27 31 25 11 1 5 58
1973 May 4-7 _ _ _ _ _ _  __ _
(vol.) = Volunteered response 
* Less than 0.5%
G A L LU P
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the military sometime in their lives (Chambless, 2012). Membership on the Senate 
Armed Services Committee and House Armed Services Committee has gone to powerful 
members and has been used as training for future presidential candidates and secretaries 
of state and defense and helped them to accumulate expertise and experience in national 
security policy. Recent examples of such members of the Congress include Sen. John 
Kerry, Sen. John McCain, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
Not only in politics, but also in business, the U.S. military has won respect and 
developed strong ties and influence. Although up until World War II, the relations 
between business interests and the military were characterized by distrust and even Not 
only in politics, but also in business, the U.S. military has won respect and developed 
hostility, the wartime intermingling of civilian and military institutions and personnel
brought the two parties closer. President Truman surrounded himself with corporate 
internationalists including Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, Averell Harriman, Robert Lovett, and John J. McCloy, who were instrumental 
in developing early Cold War policy and institutions (Waddell, 2008).
In the following section, I will address why the military is well respected in the 
United Sates and how the U.S. government has institutionalized respect for the military.
Why do Americans respect the military?
Give me liberty or give me death. Patrick Henry
Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety
deserve neither liberty nor safety. Benjamin Franklin
Land o f the Free, Home o f the Brave. The U.S. National Anthem
Freedom is not free. Korean War Memorial
I  will bear arms on behalf o f the United States when required by the law; that I  
will perform noncombatant service in the armed forces o f the United States when 
required by the law. Naturalization Oath of Allegiance to the United States of 
America
As the words above well express, most Americans believe that liberty and 
freedom are worth fighting for and indeed, that the preservation of liberty requires 
continual sacrifice. Although not all American citizens are ready to join the military, 
there is a strong social consensus to support and respect men and women in uniform.
Respect for armed forces has been developed and institutionalized in the course of 
American history. Since its beginning, the United States has fought wars to establish,
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defend and expand democracy. Although historians and political scientists have revealed 
other reasons behind American wars, the most widely embraced narrative about wars 
among the American public is that war is “the price of freedom,” as the military history 
exhibition at the Smithsonian National Museum of American History is named.
As in many aspects of the American culture, individualism and self-reliance have 
established the basis for the U.S. national security culture. Use of violence for self­
defense and individual liberty is well accepted among American citizens. Nothing 
represents the individualistic and independent view of self-defense in American society 
more than the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. It protects people’s right to 
keep and bear arms because it is “necessary to the security of a free state.”
Based on Gallup opinion polls taken between 1960 and 2011, about 40 to 50 % of 
American households own a gun. In spite of widespread evidence that gun ownership 
makes a home more dangerous, the myth of self-defense through gun ownership has 
maintained strong support. For example, Dr. Wiebe’s 2003 study concludes that people 
who keep a gun in the home are almost 2 times more likely to be murdered with a gun 
and almost 17 times more likely to take their own lives using a firearm (Wiebe, 2003); 
yet a large number of Americans continue to believe that they are safer with guns in the 
home (see Figure 3).
Gun ownership in the United States particularly stands out when contrasted 
internationally. The United States is ranked at the top when it comes to civilian firearms 
ownership rate. For every 100 inhabitants, there are 88 guns in the United States, 
followed distantly by 54 per 100 inhabitants in Yemen (Zakaria, 2012) .
When it comes to questions of how strict gun control regulations should be, public
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Figure 3. U.S. Home Gun Ownership. From
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx 
Copyright © 2013 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved 
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opinion is divided almost equally (see Figure 4). But there have been few serious 
movements to repeal the Second Amendment from the Constitution or ban private gun 
ownership. Although Washington, D.C. tried to prohibit private ownership of handguns 
for self-protection, the U.S. Supreme Court found the D.C. law unconstitutional in the 
District of Columbia v. Heller (2008). Justice Scalia argued, in the majority opinion of 
the court, that the “inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second 
Amendment right. The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ 
that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful purpose. The 
prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of self, family, 
and property is most acute” (Whelan, 2008).
As the majority of Republican supporters do, when individual citizens believe the 
norm of self-defense and the right to bear arms, they also tend to support their
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In general, do you feel that the laws covering the sale o f firearms should he made more 
strict, less strict, or kept as they are now?
|  % More strict |  % Kept as now |  % Less strict
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 a o o i 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 
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Figure 4. U.S. Public Opinion on Gun Control. From 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx 
Copyright © 2013 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved 
The content is used with permission; however, Gallup retains all rights of republication.
government’s right for self-defense and strong military forces.
The second reason for high social respect for the military in the United Sates 
stems from the fact that the U.S. armed forces have successfully maintained homeland 
security, without abusing its power and privilege through actions against the civilian 
population. The third reason behind the high respect for the military is its media 
relations. In spite of traditional tensions between the news media and the military, 
especially during the Vietnam War, it has been mass media through which the majority of 
Americans have developed their views of the armed forces. Generally speaking, the 
mainstream national news media such as ABC, CBS, NBC in their daily reporting mainly 
focused on negative aspects of war including casualties, both combatants and civilians,
fiscal cost, misconducts of soldiers, and tactical failures.
On the other hand, local news media and some of special reporting programs by 
national media, such as 60 Minutes, pay more attention to local and human aspects of 
American wars. During the war, local news media report individual stories of soldiers 
returning from battlefields, struggles of families on their home front while their family 
members are deployed. In short, local news media personalizes war while national news 
networks communicate more generalized information of war focusing on political and 
strategic aspects, which happens in distant foreign countries.
In addition to the relatively positive and personal reports of wars by local news 
media, the U.S. military has established better control over the national news media after 
the Vietnam War. Instead of allowing journalists to investigate and report from the 
locations of their choices, more journalists are embedded with U.S. forces and relied on 
daily briefings from commanders on the ground and officials in Pentagon. Alarmed by 
the symbiotic relation between the military and the media, Professor Der Derian 
introduced the notion of “the military-industrial-media-entertainment-network” (MIME- 
NET) to describe powerful interests behind America’s expansive national security policy 
after 9/11 focusing on renewed and increased importance of information and cultural 
warfare against transnational and religiously motivated terrorism (Der Derian, 2001).
Until the Vietnam War, respect for the U.S. military had been developed and 
maintained by integrating it into the web of American civilian society. Based on the 
tradition of citizen soldiers, ordinary Americans had faced the possibilities that someone 
in their families or close friends should be drafted and sent to war. In the close civil- 
military relations, strong support of for the military is easy to explain. What is more
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important is continuing social support for the military since the Vietnam War. Although I
do not call the high level of social respect for the military “militarism,” I agree with
Stephen Glain on his bottom-up explanation of American civil-military relation.
American militarism is unique for its civilian provenance. It didn't come at the 
point of a gun, or with the military formally declaring its control of the 
government. This militarism is no conspiracy, but is rather a natural consequence 
of a uniquely American impulse to choose force over statesmanship. (2011, p. 11)
The high level of social support for the military has been translated into the
institutionalization and maintenance of large and capable military forces. The U.S.
government has enacted laws, established organizations, and developed customs to honor
the military.
Institutionalization o f respect for the military
Among ten national holidays of the United States, two are dedicated to men and 
women in uniform; the Memorial Day and the Veterans Day. The Memorial Day, the last 
Monday of May, is observed nation-wide with parades of current and former service men 
and women, military bands, and military vehicles, and with ceremonies at cemeteries 
decorated by national flags.
President Reagan portrayed the holiday as follows:
Today is the day we put aside to remember fallen heroes and to pray that no 
heroes will ever have to die for us again. It’s a day of thanks for the valor of 
others, a day to remember the splendor of America and those of her children who 
rest in this cemetery and others. (Brownfield, 2011)
The other national holiday for the military is Veterans’ Day, which is celebrated 
on November 11th. While Memorial Day remembers and honors the U.S. military 
personnel who died in or as result of their service to the nation, Veterans Day is
celebrated for all those who served in the U.S. military both in wartime and peacetime. 
Relatively speaking, Memorial Day puts more emphasis on deceased veterans while 
Veterans Day is saved for thanking living veterans for their service (Office of Public and 
Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of Veterans Affairs).
In addition to holidays to honor military services, the United States is full of war 
memorial monuments and museums. As Benedict Anderson highlights the importance of 
museums in nation building (Anderson, 1991), military monuments and museums have 
played critical roles in building the U.S. national security culture respectful to the 
military. Among American war memorials, the Korean War Veteran Memorial and the 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial present different ideas about how the public remembers 
wars. As the first nation that established a republic by fighting a war, most Americans 
accept war as a means of protecting individual freedom and liberty. The inscription of 
“Freedom is not free” on the Korean War Veterans Memorial well represents the core of 
the American national security culture and a positive discourse about the war.
On the other hand the Vietnam Veterans memorial symbolizes more complex 
views of the war. While other war memorials show little conflict with official views of 
past American wars, the Vietnam War Memorial stands in stark contrast, clearly 
displaying ambivalent views of American society toward the war. Vietnam was the first 
war that the United States was not able to claim clear victory in and its veterans were not 
treated with a high level of social respect like veterans of previous wars. In planning the 
Vietnam War memorial, the two conflicting views of the war struggled for supremacy 
and repeated dialogues. The official side wanted to emphasize on national healing and 
reconciliation to restore national unity and patriotism and portray a generally positive
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legacy of the Vietnam War. Veterans who had critical views toward the war, on the other
hand, wanted to emphasize tragic aspects, especially individual loss and sacrifice for an
uncertain and questionable cause (Bodnar, 1992).
In addition to war memorials, each service of the U.S. military has its own
museums. The Department of Defense as a whole owns 96 museums. They “are often the
most accessible and popular link between the public and military history.” Their
“artifacts and collections ... encourage and maintain the American public’s support for its
military.... By recruiting and training the warfighter, capturing the imagination of our
youth, educating and involving the community, and providing a legacy of the Military
Service members who defend our nation, military museums play a crucial role in our
Nation’s past, present, and future” (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Installations and Environment, 2010, p. 9). In 2009, about 8.1 million people visited the
Department of Defense museums. In order to maintain and operate the museums, the
Department of Defense spent $94 million out of its Operation and Maintenance, Military
Personnel, Military Construction, and Procurement appropriations. In addition, it raised
another $11 million from donation, gifts, and proceeds from museum shops.
The latest addition to these museums is the National Museum of the Marine Corps
in Triangle, VA. In its dedication in November 2006, then PBS news anchor, Jim Lehrer,
proudly explained to the public the values the U.S. Marine Corps represents:
this museum is about what it means to be a Mar ine . .  knowing that you are only 
as strong and as safe as the person on your right and on your left; that a well- 
trained and motivated human being can accomplish almost anything; that being 
pushed to do your very best is a godsend; that an order is an order, a duty is a 
duty, that responsibility goes down the chain of command, as well as up, as do 
loyalty and respect; that leadership can be taught, so can bearing, discipline and 
honor; that "follow me" really does mean "follow me"; and that that Semper 
Fidelis really does mean "always faithful"; and that the Marines hymn is so much
more than just a song. (Lehrer, 2006)
Another important public institution that promotes social respect for the military 
is the cemetery for veterans. The Department of Veterans Affairs maintains 131 national 
cemeteries. No other public institution in the United States is more sacred than Arlington 
National Cemetery. Not only it is “America's premier military cemetery” but also “A 
national shrine - A living history of freedom - Where dignity and honor rest in solemn 
repose” (Arlington National Cemetery, 2013). It performs 27 to 30 funeral services each 
day and serves as “the final resting place for more than 14,000 veterans.” It also educates 
the public values of military services for the nation through approximately 3,100 
nonfuneral ceremonies and approximately 4,000,000 tourists visit the cemetery annually. 
Even the strongest critics of on-going war think twice about staging demonstrations 
during military funerals near the cemetery. Because of its importance, the U.S. 
governments has spent a considerable amount of money to maintain the cemetery. Army 
National Cemeteries Program, which consists of Arlington National Cemetery in 
Arlington, Virginia and Soldiers’ and Airmen’s Home National Cemetery in Washington, 
DC, requested the budget of $45,800,000 (The Committee on Appropriations, 2011).
Thus the general public has opportunities to understand and appreciate the role of 
the military in American history although the majority of Americans has not served in the 
military. The visitors of these military museums, war memorials, and veterans’ 
cemeteries include civilians as well as veterans and their families and friends, and have 
different levels of association with the military. But regardless of their backgrounds, the 
visitors of these institutions tend to develop a closer identity with and higher respect for 
the military after the visit.
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But the reality of war and military service for individual soldiers is more 
complicated than the war memorials and cemeteries symbolize. Generally speaking, 
individual soldiers remember wars as private experiences: personal, concrete, often 
tragic, yet typically proud. Governments, military establishments, and powerful elites in 
contrast prefer to portray wars as public experiences: political, collective, patriotic, and 
glorious, yet abstract. In order to maintain positive images of war, a government 
sometimes tries to hide negative aspects of war from public eyes. For example, the 
Department of Defense tried to hide bodies of soldiers coming home from battlefields 
from mass media under the Bush administration.
In many countries, one perspective or the other dominates the public discourse of 
war. For example in developing nations, the official discourse often prevails, making it 
easier for the government to mobilize the society for armed conflicts. Conversely, in 
many developed nations, especially European democracies, individual and personal 
memories of war often prevail over official justifications of war making it more difficult 
for the governments to mobilize the nation into war.
American national security culture is unique in that the two contrasting views not 
only coexist but also sometimes reinforce each other to create broad consensus on respect 
for the military. For example, the film Saving Private Ryan initially shocked the 
audience by recreating the more brutal and explicit realities of war as experienced by 
individual soldiers to an extent greater than any previous war movie. But instead of 
provoking antiwar sentiments and pacifism among the public, the story of heroic acts of 
ordinary individuals in the movie has contributed to even greater societal respect for 
military service. In the long run, Saving Private Ryan has become a new kind of classic
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war movie, broadcast to teach public lessons on the value of military service. Thus, the 
integration of the personal sacrifices of ordinary citizens and the idealistic foreign policy 
goals of the United States has been employed to create broad consensus on public support 
for the military.
Then why do the contrasting discourses of war reinforce each other in the United 
States? American soldiers have a wide variety of means to share their individual 
experiences with the larger society, including mass media, museums, monuments, 
schools, and public holidays. Although many individual war experiences are full of 
hardship and tragedy, most war veterans prefer to communicate positive and constructive 
meanings of their services and sacrifice. Few want to admit that their contribution was 
meaningless or the war in which they fought was not worth it.
Thus the fortunate lack of civilian casualties and the predominance of victories in 
American wars, even tragic and painful personal experiences of individual soldiers tend 
to contribute toward positive attitudes toward war and the military in American society. 
By winning the majority of wars and preventing foreign military attacks and civilian 
casualties on American soil, the sacrifices of individual soldiers have been justified as 
honorable service to the nation and democratic ideals.
But opinions, values, views, and policy preferences of all social groups are not 
treated equally in the development of American national security culture. As the 
disturbance theory of interest group formation suggests, public policy is most influenced 
by the groups with highest stakes at the issue (Truman, 1951). Although men and women 
directly engaged in national defense are a minority in American society, they have 
dominated public discourse on war by isolating the general public from a full
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understanding of the cost of modern warfare. Those who paid the highest price in recent 
American wars, the men and women in uniform, their families and close friends, have 
vested interests in promoting positive narratives and remembrances of war. The general 
public has less authority and incentive to organize itself to express contrary views in the 
national discourse of war in America.
The role played by victories in shaping U.S. national security culture is further 
highlighted by the few cases in which America did not achieve a clear-cut victory. For 
example, the late 1960s and early 1970s were the low point for U.S. military forces in 
regards to public support. Because of the prolonged Vietnam War and mounting 
casualties, not only the approval rate of civilian leaders, especially that of President 
Johnson, but also public support for soldiers declined (Schwab, 2006).
The difference between American war experiences and its effect on national 
security culture and that of less fortunate countries is clearly displayed in respective 
approaches to making popular movies about war. For example, America’s choice of a 
movie, such as Saving Private Ryan, to remember World War II contrasts starkly with the 
Japanese film, Grave o f the Fireflies. This animation film produced by Studio Gibuli, has 
been chosen as a movie to remember the same war through airing more often than any 
other movie around August 15th, the day Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers. The 
movie does not contain many heroic combat scenes, but rather tragic stories of civilian 
casualties and survivors, especially orphans during and after World War II. The two 
main characters are a 14-year-old boy, Seita, and his 4-year-old sister, Setsuko. After 
losing their mother in the air raid by American warplanes, the two children try to survive 
on their own. They left unfriendly relatives who treated them like servants. Both during
118
and after the war, Japan was a difficult place to survive even for adults due to the lack of 
decent shelter and food. Unlike in Japanese society before the war, the two children had 
no support base in society; because of the destruction brought by war, they had no 
relatives, no neighbors, no school, and no public officials to turn to for help. Seita tried 
to feed his sister and himself by taking any job available, and in the end by stealing. Just 
before the war ends, Setsuko died from starvation. Although Seita survived the end of 
World War II, he eventually also starves to death a few weeks after his sister. The irony 
is that the two children survived the firebombs but could not survive the terrible 
economic and social destruction in wartime Japan.
The main message of the movie is the futility of war in general, which mirrors the 
dominant public discourse of World War II in Japan. The film also represents the official 
and popular interpretation of World War II, in which ordinary Japanese civilians were 
victims of a small number of vicious and crazy political and military leaders (Orr, 2001).
In democracies, public memories of war tend to shift from official, often simple 
and abstract, interpretations to more complicated sums of individual experiences. As a 
country matures as a democracy, individual citizens have more freedom and motivation 
to express and communicate their personal wartime experiences which assume greater 
provenience vis-a-vis the sanitized government version. This process of personalization 
of public war memories accelerates when a nation experiences war on its homeland and 
suffers a large number of civilian, as well as combat, casualties. As has occurred in 
Japan, the personalization of war memories has contributed to the deglorification of war 
and the military and to a realization of the limited efficacy of armed forces in modern 
warfare. Thus advanced democracies in Europe, including victors of World War II, have
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significantly reduced the size of their military forces and are more selective in using 
them. But the lack of civilian casualties in war has contributed more positive views of 
war and the military in the United States and maintenance of its large military force.
Education
Another institution that has supported the high level of social respect for 
American military is school. Although American schools have not engaged in explicit 
militarist education, they have provided venues and opportunities for the government to 
develop positive views of the nation and the constructive roles armed forces have played 
in it.
In response to the Sputnik shock of 1957, President Eisenhower signed the 
National Defense Education Act of 1958. The act aimed at educating Americans in both 
public and private sectors and advancing science, mathematics, and foreign languages by 
providing low-interest loans and fellowship to graduate students. In addition to those 
three areas of studies, the act also promoted technical education, English as a second 
language, counseling and guidance, school libraries, and educational media centers. 
Similarly, after the Cold War, President George H.W. Bush signed the National Security 
Education Act of 1991. The act established the National Security Education Board, the 
National Security Education Program and a trust fund in the U.S. Treasury in order to 
educate American citizens to understand foreign cultures, to strengthen U.S. economic 
competitiveness, and to enhance cooperation and security. The National Security 
Education Board composed of seven federal and six nonfederal officials provides 
program policies and directions. The National Security Education Program covers such
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areas as less commonly taught languages and cultures relevant to U.S. national security, 
education of future leaders in the government and universities, and scholarships and 
fellowships for both undergraduate and graduate students (Samuels, 2006) .
How Does U.S. National Security Culture Shape 
Its Foreign and Defense Policy?
Liberal hegemonic identity, the norm of homeland security, and respect for the 
military have provided ideational bases to U.S. foreign and defense policy. First, these 
elements of national security culture have had impacts on how the United States defines 
its national interest. In addition to physical security of its population and territorial 
integrity, the United States has included the survival and prosperity of other industrial 
democracies into its own national interest. As a liberal hegemon, preventing illiberal 
powers from dominating key areas of the world is in the national interest of the U.S.
Power Projection
The United States military force is not only largest in terms of the size of forces 
and defense budget, it has been distinguished from the rest of the world military forces 
with its heavy emphasis on power projection forces: U.S. Navy, Marines, and Air Force 
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994). Power projection is use of military 
force in a place remote from a country’s territory. It requires a large fleet of navy, air 
force capable of long-range attack, and amphibian forces (Klein, 1988).
Although other major powers have a certain level of power projection capabilities 
but not to the same extent as the United States. First, composition of U.S. military force
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represents its emphasis on power projection strategy. Navy, Marines, and Air Force,
major instruments, although not exclusively, of power projection, made up 64% of the
entire U.S. military forces. At the end of the Cold War, 609,442, about 30% of the U.S.
military personnel, were on duty overseas (Department of Defense, 1990). Andrew
Bacevich explains America’s belief in power projection capabilities as follows:
an abiding conviction that the minimum essentials of international peace and 
order requires the United States to maintain a global military presence, to 
configure its forces for global power projection, and to counter existing or 
anticipated threats by relying on a policy of global interventionism. (Bacevich, 
2010, p. 14)
As a result, even 20 years after the end of the Cold War, the United Sates has the 
largest number of aircraft carriers (11), warships (112), and submarines (74), and combat 
airplanes (3,600) as of 2009. Although China has a larger number of active soldiers (2.2 
million) than the United States (1.5), the ratio between active soldiers and general 
population of China is 1.7% while that of the United States is 3.2% (International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994).
Scholars and military strategists have explained America’s heavy emphasis on 
power projection capabilities with its geographic conditions. Admiral Alfred Mahan 
argued the supreme importance of naval force in his The Influence o f Sea Power upon 
History, 1660-1783 and provided an intellectual basis for developing a blue-water navy 
that is capable of defeating enemy forces at sea rather than waiting for them to come to 
its shore. Mahan puts it this logic as follows, “the enemy at ease as regards his own 
interests and at liberty to choose his own time and manner of fighting”(p. 9). But even 
Mahan did NOT expect that the United States would use its Navy to defend its allies. 
Mahan proposed a naval strategy to protect American commercial interests overseas and
open sea-lanes for international trade in both wartime and peace time so that the United 
States could pursue its economic interests without its own colonial empire (Mahan,
1918). Likewise Aaron Friedberg points out that “Those that could afford to worry about 
far-flung enemies and to inject themselves into distant conflicts have been the exception 
rather than the rule” (Friedberg, 1993, p. 5).
In order to project its military power effectively, the Department of Defense has 
created regional commands to cover the entire world. As of 1994, when the United 
States and Japan started “redefining” their alliance, the U.S. military had five Regional 
Commands: Atlantic (USLANTCOM), Southern (USSOUTHCOM), European 
(USEUCOM), Central (USCENTCOM), and Pacific (USPACOM) Commands. The 
Africa Command was added in 2007 in response to rising terrorist threats from the 
region.
Among the regional commands, USPACOM is the oldest, established in January 
1947. Its headquarters is located at Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Hawaii, and it has the largest 
area of responsibility, covering over 100 million square miles from the U.S. west coast to 
the east coast of Africa and from the Arctic to the Antarctic (less a part of the Pacific 
Ocean off South America under U.S. Southern Command and a part of the Indian Ocean 
and Arabian Sea under U.S. Central Command) and over half the world's population.
The Commander in Chief of USPACOM (CINCUSPACOM) is responsible for four 
subordinate unified commands, including U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and U.S. Forces 
Japan (USFJ), and four service component commands such as U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. 
Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Army Pacific, and U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific ("U.S. Pacific 
Command," 2001)
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The five regional commands were joined in the Unified Combatant Commands 
(UCC) system by four functional commands: Space (USSPACECOM), Special 
Operations (USSOCOM), Strategic (USSTRATCOM), and Transportation 
(USTRANSCOM). The UCC are responsible to the President and the Secretary of 
Defense for accomplishing the military missions assigned to them and exercising 
command authority over forces assigned to them. The operational chain of command runs 
from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the UCC.
The four functional commands were also designed to project U.S. military power 
overseas. The U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOMM) was established in 1992 by 
combining the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the Joint Strategic Target 
Planning Staff (JSTPS). JSPS was established in 1960s to coordinated nuclear strategies 
between the Air Force and the Navy.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) have changed the way in which states 
project their military power in a long distance. Traditionally, power projection required 
long-distance deployment of military forces by transporting weapons and soldiers on 
road, by sea, and, since World War I, by air. With the advent of ICBMs, combined with 
nuclear warheads, states acquired a capability to destroy distant enemies in a matter of 
minutes without sending their soldiers into harm’s way. When contending countries or 
coalitions of countries gain second strike capabilities, a major war became impossible to 
win. Thus the primary goal of national defense is to achieve deterrence against nuclear 
attacks (Jervis, 1989)
Like its predecessors, USSTRATCOMM’s primary missions were to deter 
nuclear attacks on the U.S. homeland and its allies and to fight nuclear war in case
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deterrence should fail. SAC tried to achieve nuclear deterrence and nuclear war-fighting 
capabilities by large number of long-range bombers during the Eisenhower 
administration and later development and maintenance of medium and long-range 
missiles since 1960s. SAC deployed those strategic forces not only in the United States 
but also overseas, including the United Kingdom, Germany, Turkey, South Korea, and 
Guam (Arkin, 1995). Overseas deployment of strategic forces not only gave the U.S. 
strategic advantages to strike the Soviet from closer and multiple locations but also 
reduced the risk of losing the majority of nuclear war fighting capabilities at once. SAC 
deployed its bombers to more than 50 domestic and foreign locations (Samuels, 2006). 
Although the majority of the American nuclear arsenal has been located in the United 
States, the targets of the U.S. nuclear weapons have other countries and the first choice of 
nuclear battlefield has been always overseas and the use of nuclear weapon within the 
United States has been considered as a strategic defeat, even though it is a tactical 
possibility.
Global power projection of U.S. military forces is only possible with effective 
management of logistics. The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) was 
created in 1987 and provides strategic land, sea, and air transport across the full range of 
military operations. USTRANSCOM also serves as the U.S. Department of Defense 
worldwide manager for common user ports of embarkation and debarkation. Military 
Traffic Management Command (MTMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Air 
Mobility Command (AMC) all report to USTRANSCOM.
On the other hand, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is the principal 
military advisor to the President, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security
125
Council. The JCS is responsible for the strategic direction and planning of the Armed 
Forces, which includes allocation of resources to fulfill strategic plans, recommendations 
for the assignment of responsibilities within the Armed Forces in accordance with and in 
support of those logistic and mobility plans, comparison of the capabilities of American 
and allied Armed Forces with those of potential adversaries, and others (United States. 
Office of the Federal Register., 1995).
For example, during the Gulf War, General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of 
the U.S. Central Command, was at the frontline of the war and was in charge of day-to- 
day operational conduct of the conflict. In contrast, General Colin Powell, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was in Washington D.C. and advised President George H. W. 
Bush and Defense Secretary Cheney on strategic and diplomatic aspects of the war (Bush 
& Scowcroft, 1998; Powell & Persico, 1995; Woodward, 1991). In short, the JCS is 
responsible for long-term strategic advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense 
while the UCC execute short-term operational and tactical matters of U.S. defense policy.
U.S. Special Operation Command is another institutional expression of power 
projection strategy of the United States. Created in 1987, USSOCOM is responsible for 
coordinating special operation forces across services, including Army Special Operation 
Forces (Green Berets), Rangers, Delta Force, Air, Navy SEALs, and others. Special 
forces are elite military units specifically trained and organized to conduct 
unconventional warfare. Their mission include guidance of precision weapons, mine 
installation, personal rescue, human intelligence gathering, assistance of foreign 
government in their domestic counter-insurgence, counter-terrorism, psychological 
warfare, counter-proliferation and other missions that large regular military forces are
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unable or unsuited to conduct (Samuels, 2006; Special Operations Command, 2008). The
goals of USSOCOM expressed outward orientation of special forces, quoting the words
of General Wayne Downing, Commander of USSOCOM between 1993 and 1996;
Conduct worldwide special operations, civil affairs, and psychological operations 
in peace and war in support of the regional combatant commanders, American 
Ambassadors and their country teams, and other government agencies” (Special 
Operations Command, 2008, p. 12, Italics added)
Extended Deterrence 
Another strategic choice the United States has made to keep the norm of 
homeland security is the policy of extended deterrence. Stein argues that “U.S. grand 
strategy in the twentieth century has been geared to maintaining the balance of power 
abroad and providing extended deterrence to others” (Stein, 1993, p. 97).
Deterrence is a policy of preventing potential enemies from attacking the state and 
its allies by the threat of retaliation. The notion of strategic deterrence was nothing new. 
But it has taken on renewed importance since the advent of nuclear weapons (Jervis,
1989; Mandelbaum, 1981) and the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet 
Union extended protection from nuclear threats from opposing side. What is called the 
“nuclear umbrella” requires both commitment and capabilities to punish a potential 
enemy if it attacks the United States or its allies.
Development of military technologies since World War I enabled and increased 
the need for extended deterrence and oversea military bases. The United States was no 
longer able to rely on its geographical isolation that had given the nation time to mobilize 
its forces after national security threats emerged overseas. Advent of aircraft careers, 
which Japan used to attack Pearl Harbor, submarines, long-range bombers, and most
importantly nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles started posing feasible 
threats to civilian population in the U.S. homeland. In order to prevent foreign military 
forces from coming close to the United States, U.S. military forces need to fight them 
overseas.
The most tangible signs of extended deterrence are U.S. military presence 
overseas especially deployment of nuclear weapons. The United States deployed 
thousands of tactical nuclear weapons across Europe to balance against presumably 
superior ground force of Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War. NATO developed 
its own nuclear stockpile. U.S. also deployed Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey and 
Thor missiles in U.K. In West Germany U.S. Pershing missiles, which was first 
deployed in 1964 and upgraded from 1983 onwards, were fixtures of the Cold War and 
the subject to peace and antiwar movements in the country. In addition, the United States 
adopted a nuclear first-use policy to assure European allies that the U.S. was ready to use 
its own nuclear weapons before Soviet nuclear weapons hit Europe (Schwartz, 1998)
Although the U.S. nuclear doctrine evolved from "balanced collective forces," 
"massive retaliation,” "mutual assured destruction," to "flexible response,” the basic 
assumption of remained the same. The goal of the U.S. nuclear strategy has been to 
“deter Soviet aggression and keep the peace by maintaining a credible connection 
between any large-scale assault, whether conventional or nuclear, and the engagement of 




The United States has maintained a large number of U.S. troops abroad even after 
the Cold War. As of 2007, over 190,000 U.S. troops stationed in 909 military facilities in 
46 countries and territories, excluding those in Iraq and Afghanistan (Lutz, 2009).
Major U.S. military bases overseas have been counted and mapped by numerous 
scholars. Calder points out that “(f)ollowing the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end 
of 1991 ... the global base network of Russia, Britain and France largely collapsed.” “the 
Unites States has filled .... All the major strategic functions of overseas basing” (Calder, 
2007, p. 38).
The deployment of troops abroad is the most visible sign of security commitment 
among allies. Naturally, it “has been among the most controversial aspects of American 
foreign policy since the beginning of the Republic” (Holsti, 1996, p. 91). According to 
opinion polls conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 1978, 1982, 
1986, 1990, and 1994, compared with the elite, the general public was much more 
reluctant to the use of U.S. military forces in hypothetical cases in which American allies 
and friendly nations should be invaded. For example, the 1978 survey, 54% of the 
general public supported the use of American military forces in case Soviet troops 
invaded Western Europe, while 92% of the elite approved such policy. In a more recent 
survey taken in 1994, 82% of the elite agreed on the use of U.S. troops in case North 
Korea invade South Korea, but only 39% of general public. While the elite participants 
supported more active use of U.S. military forces to defend other countries than general 
public did, even they were concerned with a collective action problem among allies. In 
surveys conducted by Foreign Policy Leadership Projects in 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, and
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1992, the majority of respondents agreed with the statement that “stationing American 
troops abroad encourages other countries to let us do their fighting for them” (Holsti, 
1996, p. 94).
Thus by developing strong power projection capabilities and maintaining overseas 
bases, the United States has tried to maintain its homeland security and the security of its 
key allies, especially NATO members and Japan.
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CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDY: REDEFINITION OF THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
Introduction
This chapter will demonstrate how the interdependent national security cultures of 
the United States and Japan, which were discussed in the previous chapters, framed the 
two countries’ decisions to keep their bilateral alliance after the Cold War. In spite of 
dramatic changes in the international system since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
basic framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance remained the same and the only changes in 
the alliance were incremental. The two allies not only decided to maintain their Cold 
War alliance but also to strengthen it by promoting integration of their military forces.
The process of strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance in the 1990s has been commonly 
called a “redefinition,” although the U.S. and the Japanese governments never adopted 
the term officially for fear of provoking skeptics and opponents of the alliance in Japan 
(Honda, 2001) and in neighboring countries.
The redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War has been a gradual 
and continuous process. Some analysts trace the origins of the redefinition process back 
to the Gulf War in 1991 (Funabashi, 1999; Giarra & Vogel, 2002), which was the first 
test of the alliance after the Cold War and which Japan failed miserably. Others point to 
publications of major policy papers from Washington and Tokyo, such as the Bottom-Up
Review of 1993 (Honda, 2001), the East Asia Strategic Review (EASR) of 1995 
( Hughes, 2004) and the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) of 1995.
But it is still possible to specify diplomatic negotiations and agreements that 
marked significant developments in the U.S.-Japan alliance. In the 1990s, the most 
important agreements regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance were the final report of the 
Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) of 1996 and the new Guidelines for 
U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation of 1997. They represent two competing forces behind 
the redefinition process of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War. While the former 
laid out the roadmap for reorganization of U.S. military bases in Japan in order to 
downsize The American military presence and ease the burdens of host communities in 
Okinawa, the latter provides a framework within which the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) 
and U.S. military forces could develop more active and effective defense cooperation 
both in peacetime and emergencies. Thus, the redefinition of the alliance was a two-level 
game (Singer, 1961), especially for the Japanese government, in which decision makers 
had to balance between domestic and foreign policy goals. In order to maintain credible 
deterrence against regional instability while reducing the American military presence in 
Okinawa, it was necessary for Japan to assume more active roles in the alliance. The 
SCAO final report and the New Guidelines have served as broad frameworks within 
which the two allies would pursue seemingly conflicting goals after the Cold War.
The following parts of the chapter will examine the drafting processes and the 
contents of six major defense policy documents leading to the SACO final report and the 
New Guidelines: the Bottom-Up Review, Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance, the East 
Asia Strategic Review, the Higuchi Report, the National Defense Program Outline, and
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the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security.
The Bottom-Up Review was the first major defense policy document produced by 
the Clinton administration to reconstruct U.S. military forces after the Cold War. 
Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance was a semiofficial report on the U.S.-Japan alliance 
by an informal study group of Japan specialists in Washington, D.C. From this the 
Department of Defense developed the East Asia Strategic Review, the first official report 
on U.S. East Asian policy.
The Japanese government followed a similar process to develop their own post­
Cold War defense strategy starting with a report by a semiofficial advisory group, the 
Higuchi Report, and then developing an official document, the National Defense Program 
Outline. The U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration signed by President Clinton and Prime 
Minister Hashimoto on April 16th, 1996 marked the point where the defense policy 
processes of the two allies met and started an official unified process to redefine their 
alliance. The Joint Declaration announced common understandings of the regional 
security environment and the interests the two allies shared, which had been already 
discussed in the EASR and the NDPO, and presented a unified vision for the future of the 
alliance. The new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation was the final key 
document to codify the commitments and pledges the United States and Japan made to 
the future of their bilateral alliance.
Policy making process of the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance demonstrated 
high level of cultural interdependence between the two countries in their foreign and 
defense policies. Even at the stages of post-Cold War national defense planning in 
respective countries, the United States and Japan maintained close contacts between
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foreign and defense policy makers. They formed informal study groups, exchanged 
drafts of respective national policy papers, and provided.
America’s National Interests in the Asia Pacific 
Region After the Cold War
Why did the United States decide to maintain the alliance with Japan after the 
Cold War? Why did it agree to return Futenma Air Station? Why did it encourage Japan 
to take more active roles in potential regional contingencies by revising the U.S.-Japan 
Defense Cooperation Guidelines? What were America’s national interests in the Asia- 
Pacific region after the Cold War? More specifically, what roles did China and North 
Korea play in America’s Asia policy after the Cold War? What domestic factors had 
impacts on the foreign policy process of the Clinton administration? In order to answer 
those questions above, this part will review two major U.S. defense policy documents 
released in the mid 1990s: the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of 1993 and the East Asia 
Strategic Review (EASR) of 1995. The former provided the global framework of U.S. 
national security policy by restating its national interest in the post-Cold War word and 
proposing the strategies to defend it. Within the framework the BUR established, EASR 
laid out more region-specific policy goals, proposed more concrete strategies, and served 
as the starting point for the United States in redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Bill Clinton: The First Post -Cold War President 
Bill Clinton was the first U.S. president elected after the Cold War, and the 
international and domestic environment in which he made foreign and defense policies
had different characteristics from that faced by his predecessors. First, the sources of 
national security threats were more diversified in kind and spread wider geographically. 
During the Cold War, the most serious national security threat to the United States came 
from the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the central stages of the bipolar struggle were Europe 
and East Asia. Although the two superpowers were involved in proxy wars almost all 
over the world, the priority placed on the eastern and the western ends of Eurasia was 
unmistakable. The Clinton administration had to deal with a wide range of national 
security issues, from human rights to nuclear nonproliferation, in its foreign policy 
without a clear-cut hierarchy among issues. In addition, the post-Cold War world had not 
been necessarily peaceful and armed conflict spread globally. The SIPRI Yearbook 
between 1987 and 1993 recorded more than 90 armed conflicts including those in Bosnia, 
Croatia, Somalia, Chechnya, Haiti, Rwanda, Iraq, Chiapas, Peru-Ecuador, Angola, 
Liberia, Georgia, Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Lebanon, Algeria, and Colombia 
(Jentleson, 1997). These post-Cold War international conflicts highlighted the need for 
American military involvement in addition to existing international organizations 
including the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which could 
not effectively replace American leadership (Lieber, 1997).
Second, economic issues increased their importance in international relations after 
the Cold War. Since the 1980s the United States had suffered from chronic twin deficits. 
As of 1992, the last year of the Bush administration, the U.S. fiscal deficit reached $ 290 
billion and the trade deficit $ 84 billion. Although the most expensive programs of the 
federal budget were entitlement programs such as Medicare and Medicaid, Clinton 
focused on cutting the defense budget to attack the fiscal deficit. The proposed defense
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cut of $88 billion by 1997 was at the center of Clinton’s long-term deficit reduction plan 
(Gellman, 1993). The United States had spent the largest amount for national security in 
the world. In 1993, the combined budget of the Departments of Defense and Veterans’ 
Affairs was 332.4 billion dollars, which was 21.6% of the federal budget and 4.8% of 
GDP. Not only is that number much higher than that of other NATO member countries, 
which, on average, spent 2.4 % of their GDP, but the United States spent more on defense 
than next six states combined (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994)
While major U.S. allies achieved remarkable economic recovery and growth, the 
massive trade and fiscal deficits experienced by the United States at the end of the Cold 
War could no longer be sustained. A foreign policy commentator even wrote, “The Cold 
War is over. Japan and West Germany have won” (Hook & Spanier, 2000, p. 274). 
Annual unemployment rate reached 7.5% at the end of 1992. By the mid-1990s the 
annual trade deficits with Japan and China alone averaged $80 billion. Important 
manufacturing sectors such as the auto industry suffered from foreign competition. 
Nothing was more telling about the frustration and sense of unfairness the American 
manufacturing sectors felt against foreign competitions, especially Japan than President 
Bush’s visit to Japan in January of 1991. President Bush accompanied the top executives 
of U.S. auto-makers and called for opening the Japanese auto market to the U.S. 
products, only to provoke more anti-American sentiments among the Japanese public.
By the early 1990s, more Americans viewed Japanese economic power as a bigger threat 
to American national interest than Russian military power (Destler & Nacht, 1993). 
Benjamin Cohen explains intensified economic disputes between the United States and 
its allies after the Cold War by the demise of common security threats from communist
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countries, which had served as “the most important adhesive” among the Western allies 
(Cohen, 1997, p. 77). Clinton’s campaign slogan, “It’s the economy, stupid,” captured 
the public sentiment that economic recovery of the United States should be the 
government’s top priority. The combined result of the changed domestic and 
international political environments was much more contentious international political 
economic relations, especially among developed countries.
Third, in the post-Cold War era, domestic factors played larger roles in foreign 
and defense policy than in the Cold War era. In the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign, the 
foreign policy agenda took second place to domestic issues. Only 9 % of voters listed 
foreign policy among the top two issues of concern (Lieber, 1997). As domestic and 
economic issues occupied more important places in the Clinton administration, foreign 
and defense policy became an instrument, as well as a goal itself, of the domestic 
political agenda. Closures of military bases and termination of new weapons programs in 
the United States caused intense debate among the military, the White House, and 
members of Congress who would have electoral interests affected by such decisions.
President Clinton is reported to have had much less interest in foreign policy in 
the early years of his presidency than did his predecessors. Toward the end of 1993, 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, and National 
Security Advisor Anthony Lake sent a memo to President Clinton asking for 1 hour a 
week to discuss foreign defense policy. Clinton agreed to meet them “when possible” 
(Lieber, 1997) .
In addition to public opinion on foreign policy and President Clinton’s personal 
preferences, the end of the Cold War also changed the balance of power between the
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White House and the Congress. Although the formal separation of powers regarding 
foreign policy did not change at the end of the Cold War, nevertheless, the Congress 
sought to increase its influence over foreign and defense policy. Through confirmation of 
top officials, ratification of treaties, and budget manipulation, the Congress challenged 
decisions made by President Clinton and his advisors. For President Clinton, the 
disappearance of the Soviet threat “made it more difficult to gather sufficient public and 
congressional support for ambitious foreign policy measures, whether these involve the 
possible commitment of troops abroad, funds for foreign assistance and UN peacekeeping 
or even active and assertive foreign policy posture.” (Lieber, 1997, p. 17).
As the title of one of the most popular foreign policy textbooks on American 
foreign policy in the 1990, Eagle Adrift, indicates, the Clinton administration would try to 
define America’s national interests and the strategies to defend them in a much more 
fluid and fragmented international and domestic environments and would repeat trials 
and errors in the post-Cold War era (Lieber, 1997).
The Bottom-Up Review o f 1993 
The Clinton administration had to pursue two conflicting goals in its defense 
policy. First they wanted to reduce the defense budget to fit the reality of the post-Cold 
War world, where the United States no longer faced a security threat from the Soviet 
Union. As he claimed during his presidential election, “It’s the economy, stupid!” Bill 
Clinton emphasized the importance of economic and domestic issues and downplayed 
that of traditional military and foreign policy issues in his administration. Cutting the 
defense budget was necessary not only to balance the federal budget, but also to revitalize
138
the American economy.
Second, the Clinton administration aimed at maintaining U.S. hegemony in global 
affairs. In his inaugural address, President Clinton declared his vision for American 
leadership in the world,
Today, as an old order passes, the new world is more free but less stable.
Communism's collapse has called forth old animosities and new dangers. Clearly
America must continue to lead the world we did so much to make. (Clinton, 1993,
^.11, italics added)
In spite of wide-spread speculation about the return of American isolationism, the 
Clinton administration ended up keeping basic Cold War strategies, including forward 
military presence in Europe and Asia, maintenance of the majority of the Cold War 
alliances, and the largest defense budget in the world. Colin Dueck argues that the 
continuation of the Cold War strategies was justified by the two basic assumptions about 
American foreign policy. First, the United States has to be the preeminent world power 
with vital interests and obligations in all key regions of the world. Second, the United 
States has to assume special leadership to promote liberal political and economic systems 
(Dueck, 2006). The BUR was the first major policy document in which Clinton 
expressed this liberal hegemonic vision of American national security policy after the 
Cold War.
In order to cut defense spending and keep preponderant American military power, 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin initiated a sweeping revision of U.S. defense policy as 
soon as he took office in January 1993. The first step of the revision was to rewrite the 
defense budget for fiscal 1994, which had been drafted by the Bush administration. The 
new $263.4 billion defense budget of the Clinton administration saved more than $11 
billion compared with that the Bush administration. Mostly the savings came from
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accelerating the personnel reductions planned for fiscal year 1995 to 1994 (Gellman, 
1993).
The second step was development of a midterm defense plan by rewriting the 
Base Force structure, a military reorganization plan developed by the Bush 
administration. The Base Force was a brainchild of Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. Powell planned to reduce the size and the cost of U.S. military forces by 
25% between 1989 and 1999. Powell set a timetable to transform U.S. military forces for 
the post-Cold War world. Based on the timetable, DOD would reduce the size of and the 
budget for military forces by 5 % a year between 1990 and 1995. As the result, the total 
number of uniformed military personnel would have been reduced from 3.3 million (2.1 
million active and 1.2 million guard and reserve) to 2.6 million (1.6 million active and 
0.9 million guard and reserve). The Base Force was planned to assume four major 
missions: first, to fight across the Atlantic; second, to fight across the Pacific; third, to 
have a contingency force in the U.S. that could be deployed rapidly to hot spots; and 
fourth to maintain a nuclear force of sufficient size to deter our nuclear adversaries. 
Powell identified six rogue states which would be the main threats to U.S. national 
security with their relatively large military forces and potential for developing weapons 
of mass destruction: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba and North Korea. Powell devised the 
two-war strategy in which U.S. military should be capable of two major regional conflicts 
(MRC). In order to deter a rogue state from taking an advantage when another rogue 
state engaged with the United States, the United States should retain military forces large 
enough to fight two wars almost simultaneously. For that purpose Powell proposed a 
Base Force consisting of 11 ground divisions, 10 tactical air wings, and 12 aircraft
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carriers with 1,626,000 active and 920,000 reserve personnel (Korb, 2000).
Aspin had been critical of the Base Force structure since he was Chairman of the 
House Armed Services Committee. For him the Base Force structure was a top-down 
review of defense policy based on the Pentagon's organizational needs rather than the real 
threats to U.S. interests. He devised four smaller levels of force structure and argued that 
the Base Force structure was too large and too expensive. Instead Aspin believed that 
after the Cold War “a defense budget should be built from a kind of conceptual clean 
slate” by “adding ‘from the bottom up’ the capabilities required to meet the new world 
threats” (Washington Post, 1993, ^. 10).
Aspin’s effort to override the Base Force met serious challenge of its author,
Colin Powell, who continued to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 
Clinton Administration. One of the major contentious points was the number of regional 
conflicts U.S. military forces had to deal with at once. Aspin first had an idea of a force 
premised on fighting one major conflict and a holding action against any other enemy 
until US military forces could finish the first fight (Barton & John, 1993). But, according 
to the Powell’s memoir, “Our South Korean allies immediately asked if they were the one 
who might be left ‘on hold’” (Powell & Persico, 1995, p. 579). In the end, Aspin 
accepted the two-war strategy developed in the Base Force structure.
The purpose of the BUR was “a comprehensive review of the nation’s defense 
strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations.” For those 
purposes, the BUR first identified new dangers facing U.S. interests in the post-Cold War 
era. They included (1) the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction; (2) regional dangers, posed primarily by the threat of large-scale aggression
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by major regional powers with opposing interests; (3) dangers to democracy and reform 
in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere; and (4) economic dangers to 
national security.
To meet those new challenges, the BUR proposed the new strategy of
engagement, partnership, and prevention. In order to prevent instability, the United
States would keep engaging in key parts of the world, not only militarily, but also
economically and politically by maintaining partnership with traditional allies and
developing new ties with other nations, including former enemies of the Cold War, by
promoting democratization and economic development.
The strategy of engagement can be seen as continuation of that of containment
during the Cold War because both of them aim at maintaining hegemonic status of the
United States in the world. The BUR reconfirmed American commitment to maintain the
most powerful military forces, the largest economy, and rule-making and maintaining
leadership in international institutions. In spite of Clinton’s campaign pledge on more
focus domestic and economic issues, the BUR warns against isolationism.
Our primary task, then, as a nation is to strengthen our society and economy for 
the demanding competitive environment of the 21st century, while at the same 
time avoiding the risks of precipitous reductions in defense capabilities and the 
overseas commitments they support. (United States. General Accounting Office., 
1995, p. 8)
But it tried to maintain American hegemony more cheaply by reducing U.S. 
military presence overseas and asking allies for more burden-sharing of international 
leadership. In order to sustain continued America’s international commitment, “this 
partnership will require the contributions of our allies and will depend on our ability to 
establish fair and equitable political, economic, and military relationships with them”
(United States General Accounting Office, 1995, p. 8). In addition, the BUR separates 
itself from traditional Cold War strategies by paying more attention to economic issues, 
democratization, and international institutions. Instead of containing its enemies and 
unfriendly nations by minimizing interactions and communication, the BUR argues for 
active involvement in liberalization of economic and political systems of those countries. 
Thus the BUR tries to achieve more collective and long-term interests not only for the 
United States, but also for world as a whole.
Among the four types of dangers cited above, the BUR identified regional 
aggression as the most serious one. The report used possible conflict involving North 
Korea, Bosnia, Iran, Iraq and others as examples. To deal with regional aggression and 
other regional dangers, DOD’s strategy was to (1) defeat aggressors in major regional 
conflicts; (2) maintain a presence overseas—the need for U.S. forces to conduct normal 
peacetime operations in critical regions—to deter conflicts and provide regional stability; 
and (3) conduct smaller-scale intervention operations, such as peacekeeping, 
humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. In order to deter and fight major regional 
conflicts, the BUR proposed the new force structure and maintaining about 100, 000 
troops each in Europe and North East Asia (see Table 2).
To counter growing threats from nuclear proliferation, the BUR proposed ballistic 
missile defense programs, similar to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) started by the 
Reagan administration. The BUR discussed two kinds of ballistic missile defense 
system; the National Missile Defense (NMD) and the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) 
systems. The former is designed to intercept long-range ballistic missiles coming to the 
U.S. homeland while the purpose of the latter is defense against theater short-range
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Table 2. U.S. Force Structure-1999
Army 10 divisions (active), 5 divisions plus (reserve)
Navy 11 aircraft carriers (active), 1 aircraft carrier (reserve and training), 45-55 attack 
submarines, 346 ships
Air Force 13 fighter wings (active), 7 fighter wings (reserve), up-to 184 bombers (B-52H, B -l, 
B-2)




18 ballistic missile submarines, up-to 94 B-52H bombers, 20 B-2 bombers, 500 
Minuteman III ICBMs (single warhead)
ballistic and cruise missiles, which would pose threat to U.S. allies and U.S. forces 
overseas.
Lastly the BUR argued “in the post-Cold War period, perhaps most important set
of dangers that U.S. strategy must confront is economic.” Recognizing a symbiotic
nature between military and economic power, the BUR maintained:
DoD can help America seize the opportunity presented by the end of the Cold 
War to enhance its economic security and Military power supports and is 
supported by political and economic power. Likewise, security relationships 
support and are supported by trade relationships. (p. 15)
When published in September 1993, the BUR was criticized for the mismatch
between expanded scope of missions U.S. military forces would assume and a downsized
force structure (Powell & Persico, 1995). But in the end the BUR contributed to reduce
U.S. defense budget significantly. Michael O’Hanlon writes, “The Clinton Pentagon
oversaw the most successful defense drawdown in U.S. history -cutting military
personnel by 15% more than the previous administration had planned while retaining a
high state of readiness and a strong global deterrence posture” (O'Hanlon, 2003, p. 3).
The issues of regional conflict, nuclear proliferation, and burden-sharing among
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allies albeit with significant modifications, would take central places in new Asian 
strategy of the Clinton administration and would be fully developed in the Nye Report.
Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Nye Report 
The Bottom-Up Review set the starting point for the post-Cold War U.S. alliance 
policies, from which the U.S.-Japan alliance has evolved. The Clinton administration had 
a more optimistic outlook for international relations in the Asia-Pacific region than other 
regions and developed its Asian policy putting more emphasis on economic issues than 
the Bush administration. Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, in his speech titled “Vision for a New Pacific Community” presented a positive 
assessment of regional situations, saying “in that area, you can look toward the fu tu re .. 
There are problems of security; but, essentially, again compared to other regions, it is a 
fairly stable area” (Lord, 1993). He justified his assessment by pointing out high 
economic growth and slow but steady progress of democratization in such nations as 
South Korea, the Philippines, and Cambodia. He went on to argue that the United States 
had to engage in the region in order to rebuild American economy. In order to decrease 
the trade and fiscal deficits, to enhance economic competitiveness, and to promote jobs 
and exports, the United States needed to develop closer economic ties with Asia (Lord, 
1993).
But these overly optimistic Asian policies did not last long. By the spring of
1994, Clinton’s Asia policy was “of disaster” because:
(t)he United States was drifting toward a military crisis with North Korea, a trade 
war with Japan, a confrontation with China over its most-favored-nation (MFN) 
status, and a clash with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
over human rights--all at the same time. (Harding, 1994, p. 58)
Joseph Nye Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 
realized the need for a “healthy dose of realism” (Nye, 2001, p. 95) in American Asia 
policy after the Cold War, advocating revitalizing military alliances with traditional allies 
and balancing against the biggest power in the region. He had been critical about U.S. 
policy toward Japan at the end of the Bush administration and the beginning of the 
Clinton administration, during which economic issues had taken priority over security 
issues and Japan had been even portrayed as a threat to the American primacy in the post­
Cold War world (Nye, 1993). It was rather ironic that Secretary Nye, a prominent 
political scientist known for his landmark contributions to liberal theories of international 
relations including Power and Interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 1977) and Bound to 
Lead (Nye, 1990), prescribed realist policies as a practitioner.
Nye’s concern with the status of the U.S.-Japanese relations was shared by a 
group of Japan specialists in Washington D.C. Ezra Vogel, the National Intelligence 
Officer for East Asia at the National Intelligence Council, Patrick Cronin, Senior 
Researcher at the Institute for National Strategic Studies for National Defense University, 
Paul Giarra, Director of the Japan Desk and Senior Country Director for Japan in the 
Office of Secretary of Defense, and Michael Green, analyst at the Institute for Defense 
Analysis formed an informal study group on Japan’s defense policy after the Cold War. 
First, Giarra submitted a policy proposal based on the study the group conducted and 
proposed revising U.S.-Japan alliance to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kent 
Wiedemann. But Widemann dismissed the proposal, saying “how can you tell we (the 
United States and Japan) are drifting?” (Funabashi, 1999, p. 228).
But Green and Cronin went forward anyway and published the result of the
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group’s study, Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo’s National Defense Program
as the 31st McNair Paper from National Defense University in November 1994. This
report first dismissed the myth of the stable U.S.-Japan alliance.
this close relationship is only a superficial continuation of policy trajectories 
established during the Cold War. The reality is that today the U.S.-Japan alliance 
is on shakier ground than most will admit... (T)he internal workings of the 
defense relationship are in need of more care and top-down leadership. (Green & 
Cronin, 1999, pp. 1-2)
The authors of the report were clearly alarmed with Japan’s “hedging” strategy of
seeking to reduce the dependence on the United States for its national defense by
gradually shifting emphasis on multilateral security organizations.
there are growing signs in Japan's policy planning of renewed attention to the 
United Nations, to regional multilateral mechanisms, and to stronger independent 
capabilities as means of hedging against possible U.S. withdrawal or fa tigue . 
(Green & Cronin, 1999, p. 3)
The report went on to analyze the reasons why Japan began to take the hedging 
strategy as follows:
the Japanese Government’s apparent hedging strategy is based on miscalculations 
about U.S. intentions. The Department of Defense (DoD) focus on the Bottom-up 
Review, host nation support, the so-called Technology for Technology (TFT) 
initiative which seeks to increase the flow of Japanese dual-use technology back 
to the United States--and joint cooperation on theater missile defense (TMD) all 
strike Japanese. (Green & Cronin, 1999, p. 2)
Cronin and Green seemed to develop their position through discussions with 
Chisato Yamaguchi, Masayoshi Shimbo, and Nobushige Takamizawa, JDA officers on 
exchange to the National Defense University, who voiced concern about American 
withdrawal from Asia after the Cold War (Funabashi, 1999).
The authors of Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance were particularly alarmed by a 
report prepared by the Higuchi Commission, a private council for Prime Minister
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Morihiro Hosokawa on national security issues. The report titled The Modality o f the
Security and Defense Capability o f Japan: the Outlook for the 21st Century was seen as
predicting the direction of the new National Defense Program Outline of Japan. So
Cronin and Green attached an English translation of the entire Higuchi Report to their
report and discussed it in length.
The report's main recommendation is that Japan formulate a new comprehensive 
security strategy for the post-Cold War world resting on three pillars: multilateral 
cooperation, alliance with the United States, and a modem and efficient military... 
elements of the report do have troubling implications for Japan's alliance policy and 
require clarification . T h e  report's attention to strengthening the bilateral defense 
relationship with the United States is overshadowed, however, by the emphasis 
given to multilateralism and autonomous capabilities. the report's 
recommendations suggest that multilateralism is a hedge against waning U.S. 
commitments to the alliance. (Green & Cronin, 1999, p. 9)
Cronin and Green did welcome Japan’s interest in a larger role in international
security but wanted to redirect it to strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance, not to weaken it.
In addition to the policy prescriptions, Cronin and Green were critical of the 
drafting process of the Higuchi Report, pointing out that “(t)he report was prepared with 
only limited input from the United States” (Green & Cronin, 1999, p. 8).
The lack of communication between allies raised concern because the authors 
believed that the longevity and stability of the U.S.-Japan alliance was “not just the 
natural byproduct of a common external threat; the alliance was nurtured from within” 
(Green & Cronin, 1999, p. 4). And they warned that the internal network within 
Washington and Tokyo that sustained the alliance was weakened by the end of the Cold 
War and political changes in the United States and Japan. The expanded defense 
constituency on the U.S. side included the Office of the Secretary of Defense, State 
Department, the National Security Council, the U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Forces
Japan. In the Japanese government, the Foreign Ministry's North American Affairs 
Bureau, the JDA, the JSDF and the defense caucus (boei zoku) of the LDP supported the 
U.S.-Japan alliance.
But it was not only Japan that was not communicating well with its ally. The 
intergovernmental network behind the bilateral alliance was weakened under the Clinton 
administration as it focused on economic issues in U.S.-Japanese relations. Hajime 
Hatakeyama, deputy director-general of the JDA, lamented, “I don’t know whom I 
should call in Washington” (Funabashi, 1999, p. 238) when he met Nye in September, 
1994. He wanted to know who was his counterpart in the Clinton administration and 
with whom he could discuss upcoming revision of the National Defense Program Outline 
of Japan. When Hatakeyama asked, “Where on earth should I phone?,” Nye assured that 
he would pick up Hatakeyama’s call any time (Funabashi, 1999, p. 238).
Cronin and Green concluded their report by recommending three policy goals: to 
maintain U.S. military presence in Asia, to encourage a more active Japanese defense 
policy “inpartnership with the United States’’ (Green & Cronin, 1999, p. 14). and to 
discourage Japan from developing independent military capabilities and missions from 
the United States.
To implement the above, the report proposes to replace the Guidelines for U.S.- 
Japan Security Cooperation with “the new Guidelines for Comprehensive Security 
Cooperation” and renew or create specific programs on base access, host-nation support, 
acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSA), joint exercise and training, missile 
defense, joint research and development of weapon systems, and joint intelligence 
gathering and sharing. All these concrete measures were necessary for better operation of
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the U.S.-Japan alliance in regional contingencies, which seemed more realistic after the
Cold War. In his interview with a Japanese journalist, Green emphasized that Japan
needed to prepare for not only a foreign attack against Japan, but also for regional
contingencies and argued that the bilateral alliance was a better means to deal with
regional contingencies.
Multilateralism is a false dream. Multilateralism is not a bad concept. But how 
useful can it be for the United States and Japan in case something happens in Asia? 
Multilateralism will not enhance our ability solve the problem. The real problem in 
the U.S.-Japan alliance today is that all the joint contingency plans between the two 
allies are designed for a foreign attack against Japan although the Cold War is over. 
The question the United States and Japan should have asked was how should the 
two countries jointly deal with a possible contingency in the Korean Peninsula. 
(Honda, 2001, p. 495)
In short, Green and Cronin recommended a preemptive attack against the hedging 
strategy of Tokyo and laid out a blueprint for a new form of the U.S-Japan alliance.
Much of their vision of the future U.S.-Japan alliance would be implemented by 2000.
Cronin and Green had submitted a strategy paper similar to Redefining the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance to Nye before he asked Secretary Perry permission to initiate official strategic 
talks with Japan. Reportedly the memo Nye submitted to Perry contained similar policy 
recommendations to those in Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance (Honda, 2001) . In 
addition some of the members of the informal study group joined Nye in drafting the Nye 
Report in the Defense Department. Thus once an informal study group would form a 
core of the drafting team of one of the most important Asian policy document of the 
United States after the Cold War.
Nye and his team kept close contact with the Japan Defense Agency while drafting 
the Nye Report. In November 1994, Nye visited Japan to introduce himself to top 
officials of the Japanese government. One of them was Tetsuya Nishimoto, former
Chairman of the Joint Staff Council of the Defense Agency. Funabashi suggests that Nye 
reassured the need to develop coordinated defense policy between the United States and 
Japan to deal with rising power of China when he met Nishimoto (Funabashi, 1999). In 
Washington D.C., Ezra Vogel, the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia at the 
National Intelligence Council, Patrick Cronin, Senior Researcher at the Institute for 
National Strategic Studies for National Defense University, Paul Giara, Director of Japan 
Desk, Senior Country Director for Japan in the Office of Secretary of Defense, and 
Michael Green, Analyst at the Institute for Defense Analysis, who worked on the Nye 
Report with Nye, formed an informal study group with Nobushige Takamizawa, Director, 
Defense Operations Division, Defense Policy Bureau, Bureau of Defense, JDA, who was 
studying at the National Defense University and Yutaka Iimura, Councilor at the 
Japanese Embassy to develop common vision for the U.S.-Japan alliance (Honda, 2001).
Simultaneously, the Defense Department sent the drafts of the Nye Report to the 
Japan Defense Agency and sought feedback. One of the suggestions the JDA made was 
toning down the parts of the report discussing threats from rising Chinese power. “The 
early draft (of the Nye Report) had very strong alarming tone against China,” one of the 
officials who reviewed the draft recalled (Honda, 2001, p. 501). Andrew Bennett,
Special Assistant to Nye, recognized the problem, saying, “the hardest part was the 
language. the most troubling ones; how to address China’s evolving role” (Funabashi, 
1999, p. 256).
In addition to taking in Japanese feedbacks, showing the draft report to the 
Japanese counterpart had another purpose for Nye. Nye was deeply interested in the new 
National Defense Program Outline of Japan, which would be announced in the fall 1995.
151
Nye expected the JDA to show and ask for inputs on the draft of the new NDPO. In other 
words, Nye hoped that the Japanese government would reciprocate the trust in Japan the 
United States showed in the process of developing in its new Asia strategy.
Within 6 months of his appointment as Assistant Secretary of Defense in 
September 1994, he issued the East Asia Strategic Review, which has been often referred 
to as the Nye Report, or the Nye Initiative. The report was a manifestation of what Nye 
himself calls America’s “leadership strategy” in the Asia-Pacific region (Nye, 1995a). 
While Nye recognized the importance of international economic relations, he warned that 
geopolitics still mattered after the Cold War. The Nye report compares security to 
oxygen. People do not realize its importance until they are running out of it. Nye 
attributes economic development in Asia after World War II to the American strategy in 
the region, which has “underwritten Asian security” and “underpinned Asia's economic 
development” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 6). Thus Nye tried 
to correct the overemphasis on economic issues in foreign policy which the Clinton 
administration had placed since its start.
In his press briefing on February 27th, 1995, Nye drew a historical lesson of 
America’s Asia policy. In 1975, when U.S. forces withdrew from Vietnam, many 
predicted chaotic international relations in Asia. On the contrary, the region maintained 
stability and achieved remarkable economic development. Nye explained the unexpected 
regional stability in the Asia-Pacific region after the Vietnam War by continued 
American military presence in the region (Nye, 1995b). In order to maintain and promote 
regional stability and economic growth, Nye introduced a four-part strategy: forward 
deployment of American troops, continuation of the Cold War alliances, development of
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multilateral institutions, and engagement of China (Nye, 2001).
After its introduction, the Nye Report proceeds with a section titled “America’s 
Permanent Interests in the Security of the Asia-Pacific Region” [Italics added]. This part 
lists four sets of national interests of the United States after the Cold War:
• to preserve the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with 
its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure;
• to advance a healthy and growing United States economy to ensure opportunity 
for individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and 
abroad;
• to promote a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, 
human rights, and democratic institutions flourish; and
• to enhance a system of healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with 
allies and friendly nations. (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 
5)
The list above is nothing new and self-evident. Yet by arguing that peace and 
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region are indispensable to defend and promote those 
national interests, the Nye Report set a basic assumption of the regional policy. As long 
as the interests listed above matter to the United States, which would not change in the 
foreseeable future, the United States would stay committed and engaged. Thus the 
United States would keep committed to peace and prosperity of the region permanently.
The similar arguments had been made in the BUR. Stable international relations 
in key areas of the world are a prerequisite of healthy world economy, in which the 
United States is the largest player and one of the largest beneficiaries. So the Nye Report 
writes, “the United States economy will be strengthened through trade and investment 
opportunities offered by the dynamic Asia economies” (Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense, 1995, p. 6). In order to maintain the hegemonic status with the strongest 
military power and the largest economic power, the United States could not withdraw
from the fastest growing economic region of the world, even though the archrival of the 
Cold War was gone.
The third section, titled “What Are the Challenges and Opportunities Facing 
America in Asia?” discusses America’s relations with key players and major international 
security issues in the region. The key players are categorized into three groups: 
Engagement, Enlargement, and Problems. The report maintains it is important to 
modernize and strengthen relations with traditional allies and friendly nations such as 
Japan, South Korea, Australia, ASEAN countries, New Zealand, and Pacific Island. It 
then suggests enlarging the circle of partnership by reaching beyond America’s 
traditional allies and friends and inviting China, Russia, and Vietnam to address the 
issues in the region together. By building closer, more constructive relations with all 
major players in the region, the United States can better address regional security 
problems regarding North Korea, Cambodia, the Spratly Islands, the Northern Territories, 
and Taiwan.
After America’s interests in the region and challenges to them, the last third of the 
Nye Report discusses the U.S. force structure in Asia. The report justifies continuation of 
Cold War bilateral alliances in Asia, instead of seeking to replace them with a new 
multilateral regional security institution. The report argues that “the leading states in the 
Asia-Pacific region have diverse threat perceptions and disparate cultures, histories, 
political systems, and levels of economic development” (Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense, 1995, p. 5). The U.S. military presence ensures political stability and the 
security of sea lanes from the Middle East, on which many Asian countries depend for oil 
supplies, and to the United States, on whose market many Asian economies rely.
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After highlighting how important the region is for the United States and the
benefits of the U.S. military presence, the next section identified four long standing
regional issues that might undermine international security in the Asia Pacific region:
North Korea, Cambodia, territorial disputes including the ones over the Spratly Islands
and the Northern Territory, and Taiwan. Although they are all possible sources of
regional conflicts in Asia, the Nye Report suggests different responses to each of them.
Among four long-standing regional issues above, the United States saw the North Korea
as the most serious source of regional conflict and “requires continue vigilance and
commitment of United States forces” because;
North Korea's history of aggression, threats to peace, and exports of missile 
technology have created a context in which its development of nuclear weapons 
would be an extremely dangerous threat to security on the Peninsula, in Asia and 
for global nonproliferation. (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 
18)
The Nye Report sees Cambodia as a challenging case for U.S. democratic 
promotion abroad, which the Clinton administration included among national security 
goals. Unlike in North Korea, Cambodia needed “the continued support of international 
community” such as the U.N. peace keeping and foreign aid for reconstruction and 
rehabilitation. Similarly, the Nye Report suggests multilateral and diplomatic solution 
for the territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands. “The United States takes no position 
on the legal merits of the competing claims and is willing to assist in the peaceful 
resolution” and praised the Indonesian sponsorship of “non-official workshops on 
managing potential conflict in the South China Sea” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, 1995, p. 20). Then the Nye Report spares only 57 words on the Taiwan issue 
and welcomed increased dialogue between Beijing and Taipei, although it justified the
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U.S. arms sales to Taipei.
The last problem the Nye Report takes up is weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
and missiles in the region. They pose “a major threat to our security and that of our allies 
and other friendly nations” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 28). In 
order to stem proliferation of WMDs in the region, the Nye Report proposes development 
of Regional Theater Defense Systems, maintenance of extended deterrence by the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal, and enforcement of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NTP) and the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
After discussing America’s interests in the region and the challenges to them, the 
Nye Report saves the last third to present the U.S. force structure in Asia after the Cold 
War. This is the most important part of the report because it wiped out the suspicion of 
American withdrawal from the region and declared the renewed America’s commitment 
to the regional security. This part of the report first listed the functions of U.S. forward 
military presence in Asia:
• to ensure a rapid and flexible worldwide response credibility
• to discourage the emergence of a regional hegemon
• to enhance our ability to influence a wide spectrum of important issues in the 
region
• to enable significant economy of force by reducing the number of the United 
States force required to national security objectives
• to overcome the handicaps of time and distance presented by the vast Pacific 
Ocean
• to demonstrate to our friends, allies and potential enemies alike a tangible 
indication of the United States’ interest in security of the entire region.
(Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 23)
In order to maintain these functions after the Cold War, the Nye Reports sets a
floor for America’s troop reduction in the Asia-Pacific region by announcing a concrete 
number; in contrast, its predecessors the East Asia Strategic Initiatives of 1990 and 1992, 
had only set the ceilings on the troop level. Consequently the number of U.S. troops in 
the region had fallen from 130, 000 in 1990 to 100,000 in 1994. The Nye report put a 
stop to reductions, reaffirming the American commitment “to maintain a stable forward 
presence in the region, at the existing level of about 100,000 troops, for the foreseeable 
future” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. i). Although Nye himself 
explained that 100,000 was not a fixed number and could be changed depending on 
regional security situations (Funabashi, 1999; Nye, 2001), he also recognized that the 
report needed to set forth a concrete level of regional forces to regain the credibility of 
the American commitment to regional security, which some countries began to question, 
especially after U.S. withdrawal from the Subic naval base and Clark Airfield in the 
Philippines in 1991. Nye explained that 100, 000 troops was the minimum number 
necessary to adequately deal with two regional contingencies at the same time, one of the 
key assumptions of the BUR.
The Nye Report left some of the important issues in Asia intentionally 
ambiguous. One such issue is the rise of China. Although China was the largest long­
term security concern for both the United States (Funabashi, 1999) and Japan (Samuels, 
2007), the Nye Report devoted relatively few pages to discussion of the potential threats 
from China’s growing military power. Instead of treating China as a threat, the Nye 
Report proposed that the United States should continue engagement with China and seek 
to take it into the group of nations which would support and play by the rules the United 
States and its allies had developed since the end of World War II.
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Nye repeated this point in his DoD press briefing on the day he released the Nye 
Report. When asked about the rise of the Chinese military power, he answered, “The 
report points out that we do not want to see China as an enemy” and warned the United 
States to “be careful not to put ourselves in a point where by predicting an adversarial 
relationship we create one. We want to be careful not to have a self-fulfilling fallacy 
here.” Instead of building anti-Chinese alliance emphasized the importance of military 
dialogue among China, its neighbors, and the United States to enhance transparency and 
build confidence (Nye, 1995b).
Most Chinese leaders saw continuation of the U.S.-Japan alliance in China’s 
interest because it would prevent Japanese remilitarization, give reassurance to Chinese 
neighbors anxious about rising China’s power, and stabilize the regional security 
environment (Garrett & Glaser, 1997). But the Chinese government was at least 
suspicious that some aspects of the renewed U.S.-Japan alliance including the Theater 
Missile Defense systems and more active roles for Japan in regional contingencies, were 
designed to containment China in the long run. In the triangular relations among China, 
Japan, and the United States, the closer the cooperation between America and Japan, the 
weaker China’s position. During the Cold War China accepted a strong American 
military presence in the region in exchange for a militarily weak Japan. But the revision 
of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War seemed to open the door to a more 
independent and militarily stronger Japan in exchange for a smaller U.S. military 
presence in Asia. The worst-case scenario for Beijing was U.S.-Japan joint military 
action in a possible contingency between China and Taiwan. In such a scenario, China 
would have to face both a large American military presence and a militarily stronger
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Japan. Warning against American efforts to encourage Japan to adopt a more active 
defense policy, one Chinese military analyst cited a traditional Chinese expression, 
“When one raises a tiger, one courts calamity” (Christensen, 1996, p. 44). Chinese 
Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang expressed his concern for a stronger U.S.- 
Japan alliance with the statement “we hope the bilateral defense arrangement between 
Japan and the United States will not go beyond its bilateral nature and will not touch on 
any third party” (Garrett & Glaser, 1997, p. 387).
Although the Nye Report seems to contradict the allegation that the United States 
and Japan revitalized their alliance in order to balance against rising Chinese power, a 
part of the Nye Report argues that U.S. military presence “denies political or economic 
control of the Asia-Pacific region by a rival, hostile power or coalition of powers, 
preventing any such group from having command over the vast resources, enormous 
wealth, and advanced technology of the Asia-Pacific region” (Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 5) Although it went unsaid, it is obvious that only China 
had the potential to develop its economic and military power to challenge American 
hegemony in Asia.
This is a quite similar logic to that George Kennan used when he laid out the
policy of containment:
[T]here were "only five centers of industrial and military power in the world 
which are important to us from the standpoint of national security." These were 
the United States, Great Britain, Germany and central Europe, the Soviet Union, 
and Japan. Only in these locations "would [you] get the requisite conditions of 
climate, of industrial strength, of population and of tradition which would enable 
people there to develop and launch the type of amphibious power which would 
have to be launched if our national security were seriously affected." ... the 
primary interest of the United States in world affairs, therefore, was to see to it 
that no others fell under such control. (Gaddis, 1982, p. 30)
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It is no wonder that China saw the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance, combined with
the enlargement of NATO, as part of a global U.S. strategy, designed to fixate and
institutionalize its military preponderance as the hegemon by denying Russia and China
any chance to catch up (Wang, 1998).
But the United States did not try to contain the growth of China’s power in the
region after the Cold War like it had done with the Soviet Union after World War II.
Rather, Nye suggested integrating China into the international system the United States
had created since the end of World War II. Instead of isolating China, the United States
should trade with, invest in, and cooperate with China on such issues as nuclear
nonproliferation. Also, the report was careful not provoke the Chinese government.
Although it refers to China’s growing defense budget and the modernization of the
People’s Liberation Army, as well as the transparency issue of China’s defense policy as
a whole, the report only minimally discussed the contentious issues related to Taiwan,
instead emphasizing the importance of the military-to-military dialogue between the
United States and China. The report shows the picture of Secretary of Defense William
Perry’s travel to Beijing on October 1994, during which he delivered a speech to senior
Chinese military officers at China’s National Defense University.
In the secret memoranda Perry sent to the Army, Navy, and Air Force Secretaries
in August, 1994, he emphasized the importance of communication between U.S. military
forces and the People’s Liberation Army.
China is fast becoming the world’s largest economic power, and that combined 
with its UN PermFive status, its political clout, its nuclear weapons and a 
modernizing military, make China a player with which the United States must 
work together. Our posture dramatically improves if China cooperates with us.
In order to gain that cooperation, we must rebuild mutual trust and understanding 
with the PLA, and this could only happen through high level dialogue and
working level contacts. (Perry, 1994)
But the Nye Report did not reflect true perceptions of growing Chinese power 
among key decision-makers in the Clinton administration. An anonymous source who 
participated in drafting the Nye Report testified that for Nye, the long-term goal of the 
redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance was to stabilize the U.S.-Chinese relations (Honda, 
2001). Nye himself confirmed this point in his interview with Funabashi. “I think we 
have a policy of engagement toward China, but it’s much better if the U.S. and Japan 
work together to engage China than letting China play off Japan against the U.S” 
(Funabashi, 1999, p. 255). For the United States, stability in the Asia-Pacific region 
meant that it would maintain hegemonic status, rather than seeking a balance of power 
among several major powers. By preventing the emergence of a multipolar system in 
Asia, where the United States, China, and Japan would balance against each other by 
repeatedly aligning and realigning among themselves (Mochizuki, 1997), Nye’s long­
term strategy aimed at preservation of the unipolar system where the United States should 
primarily keep order, maintaining power with help from Japan. Under this conception, 
China could be allowed to grow as long as it played by the rules established by the 
United States.
The long-term threat perception Nye expressed toward the rise of China and the 
relatively nonoffensive strategy toward it in the Nye Report seem contradictory. But Nye 
was not the only one who tried to develop more nuanced, although theoretically not 
coherent, approach to rising Chinese power. Political scientists were divided on the 
prospect of war and peace in Asia, after the Cold War and consequently on proper policy 
prescriptions toward rising Chinese power.
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Both realism and liberalism offer reasons to believe that a more powerful China 
would be a security threat to the United States and its regional interests in Asia.
Friedberg and Mearsheimer argue that a multipolar structure in Asia created by the 
relative rise of Chinese and Japanese power and relative decline of America’s would be 
less stable than the bipolar structure during the Cold War (Friedberg, 1993; Mearsheimer, 
2001). Mearsheimer saw China as more threatening to U.S. interests in the region than 
Japan particularly because of its vast population and its geographic characteristic as a 
land power, which would create conflicts with the United States, a maritime power. Roy 
argues that China would use its increased economic power to modernize its military 
forces, which would trigger a regional arms race (Roy, 1994).
Conversely, other realists predicted stable international relations in Asia after the 
Cold War. For example, Robert Ross focuses on geographical factors, as does Roy, but 
argues that China would be satisfied to be a dominant land power while the United States 
would settle to be the leading maritime power in the region. Applying insights from 
defensive realism, Ross looked into the costs China would have to pay to become a 
dominant naval power in the Asia Pacific region and the cost the United States would 
have to pay to dictate international relations on the east end of Eurasia. For either of 
them the marginal benefits they would gain would not be worth the costs (Ross, 1999). 
Strangely, both groups of realists have prescribed strategies of containment to deal with 
the rising power of China, similar to that of dealing with the Soviet threat after World 
War II (Betts, 1993; Friedberg, 1993; Ross, 1999). Betts, especially, discourages the 
United States from pursuing a hegemonic policy in Asia “because it is not worth the cost 
of attempting to achieve it” (Betts, 1993, p. 74). Like the United States and the Soviet
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Union dividing the world into two competing camps during the Cold War, China and 
America would similarly create independent spheres of influences in Asia. By limiting 
economic transactions with China, the United States could decrease vulnerability to 
Chinese financial blackmail, such as the threat of dumping U.S. treasury bonds, and 
control China’s economic growth, which has financed Chinese military modernization 
and double-digit increase in defense spending since the early 1990s.
Like realism, liberalism has been divided on the prospects of war and peace in the 
Asia-Pacific region after the Cold War and the nature of rising Chinese power. On one 
hand, liberalism would predict less stable international relations in Asia than in Europe 
because of the lower level of institutionalized international cooperation, fewer 
democracies, and weaker economic interdependence among regional powers (Betts,
1993; Friedberg, 1993; Ikenberry & Mastanduno, 2003). On the other hand, increased 
economic interdependence among the United States, China, and Japan would make war 
among them more costly (Ikenberry & Mastanduno, 2003) . Emerging regional security 
institutions, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Six-Party Talks on 
North Korean nuclear programs, would facilitate international cooperation among major 
powers in the region.
Liberal prescriptions for rising Chinese power would be, regardless of the 
evaluations of the current status of the regional economic and security environment and 
future prospects, more economic interdependence among major actors, a higher level of 
institutionalization of international cooperation, and the promotion of democratization in 
the region.
Thus neither realism nor liberalism offers coherent analysis and firm predictions
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of the consequences of rising Chinese power. Both realism and liberalism contain 
multiple factors which have impact on the prospects of war and peace in Asia and 
resultant policy prescriptions. Betts admits that both realism and liberalism are too 
general to predict the future of international relations in Asia and offer sound policy 
prescriptions for U.S. foreign policy toward the region. Then he argues that “(o)nly more 
specific theories within these broad schools offer clear predictions, which means that 
there is not yet any wide analytical consensus to serve as a basis for prescription”(Betts,
1993, pp. 74-75). The problem of under-specification, which both realism and liberalism 
suffer from, stems from their assumptions that actors of international relations behave 
rationally without asking what is the basis of rationality for given actors. In order to 
apply a general theory of international relations to a specific case, a researcher needs to 
consider the context that underlies actors’ rationality. Especially, the actors’ identities 
and norms in the case need to be one of the variables used to explain their behaviors.
Nye’s position on China can be better explained by the liberal hegemonic identity 
of the United States than either by realism or liberalism alone. Because of its liberal 
hegemonic identity, the United States should pursue foreign and defense policies that are 
designed to maintain the preponderance of America’s military and economic power and 
the spread of liberal political and economic systems in Asia. To maintain its hegemonic 
status in the region, the United States had to maintain its major alliances and a large 
military presence, while trading with and investing in the region and revitalizing its 
domestic economic bases in short term. In the long run, the liberal hegemonic identity 
prescribes policies of democratization of and economic interdependence with all major 
regional powers, including China.
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As the United States successfully encouraged democratization of and economic 
interdependence with its regional allies, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the 
Philippines, Nye seemed to envision peaceful and long-term solutions for the threat 
which a rising China might pose to America’s vital national interests in the region. As 
the United States allowed West Germany and Japan to grow more powerful within the 
Western camp as they liberalized economically and politically, economic and political 
liberalization strategies toward China minimize the risk that its rising power should pose 
threats to the international system that the United States had created. Thus it was rational 
for the United States to choose a long-term liberalization policy toward China rather than 
a more confrontational containment policy.
The United States could have contained China with its preponderant economic 
and military power in the 1990s. As of 1994, the U.S. defense budget was $278,730 
million, more than 10 times larger than that of China. Economic disparity was even 
larger. The nominal GDP of the United States was $6,737 billion in 1994 while that of 
China was $509 billion (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995, pp. 264-265). 
In spite of its rapid modernization, the Chinese military was technologically 20 to 30 
years behind the U.S. military (Christensen, 2001). Unlike the Soviet Union at the end of 
World War II, China was not projecting its military power outside its territory. In short, 
China after the Cold War was more susceptible to a strategy of containment than was the 
Soviet Union after World War II.
But the Clinton administration chose to engage in China because a containment 
strategy could have killed opportunities to advance the liberalization of China’s political 
and economic systems. The Soviet Union rejected joining the liberal international
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economic order the United States was trying to establish at the end of World War II by 
rejecting the offer of the Marshall Plan and denouncing the Bretton Woods institutions 
including the IMF and World Bank. Instead, the Communist states formed their own 
economic blocs, such as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Gaddis, 1982; 
Leffler, 1992). China, in contrast, has joined global capitalist institutions, including the 
WTO, and actively traded with major capitalist economies, most notably the United 
States.
Compared with economic liberalization, the speed and degree of democratization 
in China in the early 1990s were far from satisfactory. Although the Clinton 
administration occasionally pressured the Chinese government on human right issues, 
mostly as a response to the demands from the Congress, it did not have many choices 
other than to wait and monitor the slow progress of democratization of China. Although 
Clinton criticized President Bush for not being tough enough on the Chinese government 
after the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, forceful democratization of China was not 
an option, unlike the situation at the end of World War II when the United States could 
impose democratization on defeated Japan and Germany.
Another point of ambiguity in the Nye Report was its treatment of multilateral 
security institutions in Asia. The Nye report differentiates itself from the East Asia 
Strategic Initiatives of 1990 and 1992 on its emphasis of regional security institutions. 
Particularly the report focuses on the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), expecting it “can 
play a useful role in conveying governments’ intentions, easing tensions, constraining 
arms races and cultivating habits of consultation and cooperation on security issues” 
(Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 13). The emphasis on multilateral
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institutions and preventive diplomacy seems natural application of the liberal strategy
proposed by the BUR to the regional strategy for the Asia-Pacific. But Nye explained
that the United States was not replacing bilateral alliances with multilateral institutions.
But let me make an important point here. The strategy is not based on 
multilateralism. The strategy is based on reaffirmation of the bilateral alliances we 
have. Japan, Australia, South Korea, so forth. What we are doing is adding a set 
of multilateral institutions, if you want, as a surrounding around this core of the 
bilateral relationship. So while we are indeed stressing the increased importance 
of multilateral institutions, it's not at the cost of our primary intention to 
reinforcing the traditional security alliances we have in the region. (Nye, 1995b, 
italics added)
Thus the Nye Report was carefully developed through collaboration between 
Washington and Tokyo. But selling the Nye Report outside of the U.S. and the Japanese 
governments was another matter. The most public and strong criticism of the Nye Report 
came from Chalmers Johnson, President of the Japan Policy Research Institute, in his 
article published in Foreign Affairs in 1995. The article titled “The Pentagon's Ossified 
Strategy” criticized the Nye Report for failing in recognizing erosion of American 
hegemony and increased importance of economic issues over security issues and for 
maintaining the same regional strategy dating back to the early 1950s (Johnson & Keehn,
1995).
Criticism of the Nye Report came not only from the United States but also from 
Japan. Former Prime Minister Morihoro Hosokawa, who set up the Higuchi Commission 
to review Japan’s long-term defense strategy after the Cold War, went so far to write “It 
is egoistic for Americans to believe that the United States has done Japan a favor by 
defending it all these years by stationing its forces within the country” (Hosokawa, 1998, 
p. 4).
But the most serious challenge to the Nye Report came from Governor Masahide
Ota of Okinawa Prefecture. He was shocked by the concrete troop level in the Asia- 
Pacific region the Nye Report announced. The number of the U.S. troops should be fixed 
for the next 10 to 20 years; he had no hope for realignment or reduction of American 
military bases in Okinawa. He was also angry with the top-down and one-sided way in 
which officials of Pentagon in Washington handled base issues in Okinawa. He even 
compared the U.S. Defense Department to the Japanese Imperial Army Headquarters and 
blamed it for “the tragic result of operations proposed at the tables ... hundreds of miles 
away from Okinawa”(Funabashi, 1999, p. 148). The mistrust Ota had in U.S. military 
forces and the Japanese government would play a significant role in the alliance 
redefinition process following publication of the Nye Report.
Japan’s National Interests in the Asia Pacific Region After the Cold War
Like the United States, Japan went through a series of defense policy revision. 
Among them, the following section will focus on the Higuchi Report and the National 
Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in and after FY1996, which had prepared Japan for the 
negotiation of the new Guidelines for Defense Cooperation with the United States.
The Higuchi Report and the New National Defense Program Outline 
The National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in and after FY1996 was the first 
major defense policy paper the Japanese government adopted after the Cold War. It 
assessed both the international and domestic environments in which the Japanese 
government had to develop national security policies, defined the purposes of its defense 
capabilities, and set the basic direction for the long-term defense capability of Japan.
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Similar to the original NDPO published in 1976, the new NDPO was expected to remain 
effect for at least 10 to 15 years (Akiyama, 2002).
Officially the drafting process of the new NDPO started when Prime Minister 
Morihiro Hosokawa gathered the Advisory Group on Defense Issues, the so-called the 
Higuchi Commission named after its chair, Hitotaro Higuchi, chairman of Asahi 
Breweries, Ltd. in February 1994. The mission of the Higuchi Commission was to 
discuss “what kind of defense capability makes sense, taking into consideration the 
collapse of the Cold War international structure and the progress in science and 
technologies” (Honda, 2001, p. 498). Prime Minister Hosokawa wanted ideas for a new 
Japan defense policy after the Cold War from the broad basis of Japanese society as a 
whole in addition to the perspectives of the foreign and defense bureaucracies. The 
Higuchi Commission consisted of five businessmen including Mr. Higuchi, two 
academics, and two retired bureaucrats. Among the members of the Higuchi 
Commission, Seiki Nishihiro was Hosokawa’s point man. Nishihiro was the former 
Administrative Vice Minister of the JDA and was known as “Mr. JDA”; Hosokawa also 
found him to be “the most liberal of all the JDA old boys” (Funabashi, 1999, p. 233). 
Additionally Nishihiro selected the rest of the members of the Higuchi Commission (Ina,
1996).
Hosokawa came to believe that the SDF could be downsized after witnessing the 
dominance of U.S. high-technology weapons in the Gulf War of 1991. In his interview 
with Funabashi, Hosokawa said, “The number of Japan’s land self-defense forces had 
hardly changed even though the Cold war is over. I thought we needed to cut back the 
land forces and switch to a defense structure centered on the maritime and air forces.
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That’s why I had Nshihiro put the question at the start of the advisory group whether we 
couldn’t cut the land division by half or a third” (Funabashi, 1999, p. 233).
In this sense, Hosokawa and Clinton shared their commitment to cut the size of 
military forces and defense spending of their countries. But in the end, Clinton achieved 
more radical downsizing of the military and reduction of defense budget than his 
counterpart. For example, the number of the numbers of armed forces had been reduced 
by 32% from 2.2 million to 1.5 million and the defense budget was cut by 21% from 
$352.6 billion to $277.8 billion between 1985 and 1995 in the United States. On the 
other hand, the Japanese defense budget had increased by 71% from $29,4 billion to 
$50.2 billion between 1985 and 1995 while the numbers in armed forces were cut from
243,000 to 239,500 thousand in the same period (International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1996).
Although Hosokawa had his own preferences on the new defense policy of Japan, 
he did not impose them on the Commission. Rather the members of the Commission felt 
at a loss because Hosokawa did not give any concrete direction to the discussion 
(Watanabe & Murata, 1998). In the first meting, Hosokawa only asked the Commission 
to “reorganize basic ideas in the (original) NDPO and examine the modality of Japan’s 
national defense from mid and long-term perspectives” (Asagumo Shimbun, 1994, p. 2).
It was the only meeting Hosokawa attended and both of his successors, Prime Ministers 
Tsutomu Hata and Tomiichi Murayama followed suit. In the absence of specific high- 
level direction, the Commission first had to decide the scope of its discussion. Some of 
the members argued that they only had to discuss the modality of defense capabilities, 
which would be the third chapter of the Commission’s final report. Others suggested first
170
defining the meaning of national security. In the end, the Commission members agreed 
on covering both theoretical and practical aspects of defense policy (Watanabe & Murata, 
1998).
In particular, the Constitution was a difficult issue to discuss because the members 
had widely diverse opinions on it. Is the SDF constitutional? Should the Japanese 
government change official interpretation of Article 9? In the end the members decided 
to skirt more controversial issues and agreed to focus on what Japan could do to defend 
its national interest within the existing official interpretation of the Constitution. The 
commission members did not expect the Japanese government to accept any policy 
recommendations that would require major constitutional reinterpretation. At the same 
time, some of the members thought Japan could take a more active national security 
policy within the existing institutional framework (Watanabe & Murata, 1998). Instead 
of replacing old institutions with new ones, the Higuchi Commission tried to redefine 
Japan’s role within existing national security institutions such as the United Nations, the 
U.S.-Japan alliance, and the Self Defense Forces.
The early draft of the Higuchi report was secretly sent to Japan experts in 
Washington, especially former foreign and defense policy makers of Republican 
administrations including Richard Armitage, in hopes of receiving informed but 
unofficial comments (Funabashi, 1999; Watanabe, 1998). Those who read the draft 
report almost unanimously voiced their concern that multilateral security organizations 
were discussed first and the U.S.-Japan alliance came second. Despite such alarmed 
comments from the United States, Professor Watanabe, the main writer of the Higuchi 
Report, intentionally kept the order. He wanted to explore the proper place of the U.S.-
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Japan alliance in a cooperative security environment after the Cold War, in which, he 
believed, multilateral security institutions would increase in importance. He tried to 
avoid an oversimplified choice between multilateral and bilateral security institutions.
He was afraid that someday the Japanese public would want to replace the U.S.-Japan 
alliance with a regional multilateral security organization if the policy makers and the 
experts kept asking them to choose between the two. Japan would need both bilateral and 
multilateral security institutions in the 21st century. Watanabe believed that more effort 
was necessary to strengthen multilateral bases for the defense of Japan because the 
bilateral base was already well developed (Watanabe & Murata, 1998).
On the other hand, Nishihiro emphasized continuing importance of the U.S.- 
Japan alliance and the need to transform the SDF to meet new challenges after the Cold 
War. Nishihiro had a certain vision for Japan’s long-term national security policy well 
before he was invited to the Higuchi Commission. During the Bush administration, 
Nishihiro suggested to Brent Scrowcroft, the National Security Advisor to the President, 
that the United States and Japan should start joint strategy talks to coordinate their China 
policies after the Cold War. Although the joint strategy talks never materialized during 
Nishishiro’s term as the Vice Minister of JDA (Funabashi, 1999), he passed on his ideas 
to one of his successors. When Akiyama, who later became Vice Minister of the JDA, 
visited Nishihiro in 1993, they had an hour and half talk on the defense of Japan. 
Nishihiro believed that China’s threat to Japan’s national security in the 21st century 
would be political, social, and economical rather than military. He did not believe that 
the U.S.-Japan alliance would last forever; however, the bilateral alliance with America 
would be the best policy option based on which Japan should develop its national security
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policy in good years of the 21st century. For that purpose, the two allies needed to solve
some problems; otherwise, the alliance would not function in contingencies. The SDF
needed to increase the efficiency of military forces by significantly cutting back the
number of the troops in the Ground Self Defense Force, by reducing the number of the
Maritime Self Defense Force’s P3C aircraft which had watched Soviet submarines during
the Cold War, by downsizing the MSDF’s mine sweeper units which had been
established in the aftermath of the Korean War, and by upgrading its intelligence
capabilities (Akiyama, 2002).
In August 1994, after 20 meetings, the Higuchi Commission published its final
report, The Modality o f the Security and Defense Capabilities o f Japan: The Outlook for
the 21st Century. The report argued for a more active national security policy:
Japan should extricate itself from its security policy of the past that was, if 
anything, passive and henceforth play an active role in shaping a new order. 
Indeed, Japan has the responsibility of playing such a role. (Cronin & Green,
1994, p. 30)
For this purpose, the report recommended the development of a comprehensive 
national security policy consisting of three specific strategies. First, Japan should 
promote multilateral cooperation for regional and global security. Second, it should 
strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. Third, it should develop more efficient defense 
capabilities based on better intelligence and more agile emergency response. Simply put, 
the Higuchi Report was a synthesis of Watanabe’s and Nishihiro’s visions. The former 
emphasized changes in the international security environment of Japan, new dimensions 
of national security such as peacekeeping, disaster relief, and cyber threat, and the need 
for stronger multilateral defense cooperation. The latter focused on the continuing 
importance of military forces in national security, the importance of great powers in
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international relations, and the unchanged centrality of the U.S.-Japan alliance in Japan’s 
defense policy. Accordingly, the section titled “Multilateral Security Cooperation” in the 
second chapter of the Higuchi report reflected Watanabe’s opinion, while the sections 
titled “Enhancing the Functions of the Japan-U.S. Security Cooperation Relationship” 
and “Maintenance and Qualitative Improvement of Self-Defense Capability” were based 
on Nishihara’s ideas (Akiyama, 2000, p. 144).
But the Higuchi Commission’s recommendations served as just one of the bases 
of the new NDPO. In the drafting process of the new NDPO, not only the Prime 
Minister, whom the Higuchi Commission reported to, but also U.S. Defense Department 
and the Japan Defense Agency played critical roles.
The Higuchi Commission’s emphasis on multilateral security organizations as one 
of the three pillars of the Japanese defense policy was intentionally used by Michel Green 
and others to put pressure on the Defense Department to refocus on the U.S.-Japan 
alliance. Green met Watanabe in Tokyo after the Higuchi Report was published. 
Although Green seemed concerned with the increased importance of multilateral 
institutions in the Japanese defense in the Higuchi Report, he expressed his understanding 
of Watanabe’s point in the end. So Watanabe was surprised to the “overreaction” to the 
Higuchi Report by the U.S. government (Watanabe & Murata, 1998).
After returning from Japan, Green co-authored a strategic paper titled Redefining 
the U.S.-Japan Alliance with Patrick Cronin and published it from the National Defense 
University in November 1994 (Cronin & Green, 1994). It was intentionally provocative, 
emphasizing Japan’s hedging strategy and characterizing the status of the bilateral 
alliance as drifting. In his interview with Akiyama in September 2000, Green confessed
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that the Higuchi Report served as a Gaiatsu (external pressure) and put pressure on the 
Clinton administration to shift its focus from economic to security issues in the U.S.- 
Japanese relations. Green even called the Higuchi Report a “balloon fish with a little 
poison” (Akiyama, 2000, p. 144).
Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, Jr. agreed with Green and Cronin on 
the need for revitalizing the U.S.-Japan alliance. He ordered his team to exchange the 
drafts of the U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region and the new NDPO. 
By allowing the Japanese government to participate in the drafting process of America’s 
post-Cold War Asia policy, Nye expected to the Japanese government to do the same 
(Honda, 2001).
The Nye Report influenced the new National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) 
of Japan in two ways. First, new NDPO put more emphasis on the U.S.-Japan alliance 
than either the 1976 NDPO or the Higuchi report did. The new NDPO mentions “Japan- 
U.S. security arrangements” 11 times in the text while the old NDPO did so only twice. 
Second, the new NDPO broadened the geographic scope of national defense by including 
“regions surrounding Japan” within the scope of the bilateral alliance (Mochizuki, 1997).
As the United States could not develop its Asia policy without considering the 
U.S.-Japan alliance, the Japanese government started searching for an appropriate role of 
the alliance within its new grand strategy after the Cold War. As early as in 1990, several 
informal study groups met to discuss future of Japanese defense policy. But the official 
process of revising the NDPO began in JDA in February 1994. The JDA established the 
“Forum for Discussing Defense in a New Era” to provide information and opinions to the 
Higuchi Commission and discuss ideas for the new NDPO after the publication of the
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Higuchi Report. The forum consisted of the Director General, Vice Ministers of the 
JDA, Chair of the Joint Chiefs, and chiefs of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. Through twenty- 
one meetings, the JDA and the SDF reconciled differences among the services and 
developed a consensus on the new NDPO (Akiyama, 2002).
For example, the GSDF accepted the reduction of troops from 180,000 to 160,
000 upon condition of establishing a new ready reserve force, which would receive a 
higher level of training than regular reserves so it could be more rapidly mobilized. In 
the interest of fairness to the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF agreed to reduce their 
force levels in exchange for upgrading and modernizing their weapons (Akiyama, 2002).
After a consensus was formed within the Defense Agency, the next step of 
drafting the new NDPO was the Security Council of Japan (SCJ). The SCJ is an internal 
organ of the Cabinet to deliberate on important defense matters and adopt major defense 
policies such as the National Defense Program Outline and the Midterm Defense 
Program. Its members include the Prime Minister, the Director of the Defense Agency, 
Foreign Minister and other major cabinet members relevant to defense issues (Japan 
Defense Agency, 1996; Sajima, 2004). Based on the outcomes of the discussions by the 
Defense Agency and the Higuchi Commissions, the SCJ had 10 meetings between July 
and November to discuss and adopt the new NDPO. Depending on the topics, relevant 
ministers and agencies were invited for briefings. While general diplomatic and military 
issues were discussed based on the briefings by the MOFA and the JDA, officials of the 
Ministry of Finance were invited when the SCJ discussed fiscal imitations on defense 
policy. In the SCJ meeting on October 18th the Ministry of Trade and Industry presented 
its cases for defense industries (Jieitai). After 21 meetings the SCJ adopted the new
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NDPO on November 28th, 1995.
The Japanese government needed a new NDPO to adjust to the changes brought 
by the end of the Cold War. The original NDPO was published in 1976 and most of the 
defense build-up plans it specified had been completed. In addition, the current Midterm 
Defense Program (MTDP) was about to expire by March 1996. The Japanese 
government was expected to develop a new NDPO first so that the MTDP for FY 1996­
2001 could be developed within the framework of the new NDPO (Ina, 1996).
While the original NDPO was developed based on the assumption of stable 
bipolar international system, the new NDPO starts with the assessment that the post-Cold 
War international relations are more complicated and unpredictable, posing both 
promises and challenges. Instead of large scale military conflicts driven by global 
ideological struggle between the West and the East camps, future international security 
challenges would come from regional conflicts caused by unresolved territorial disputes 
and historical ethnic problems sealed by the Cold War. As for relations among the major 
powers, they were driven by economic interdependence and could be expected to remain 
generally peaceful. The opportunities for arms control, nonproliferation, and 
peacekeeping through international organizations such as the United Nations had 
increased. However, the new NDPO does not fail to recognize what country matters 
most in the unipolar world and states that “the United States, with its great power, 
continues to play a significant role for world peace and stability” (Defense Agency, 1995,
1  6).
But the new NDPO provided a more cautious assessment of the regional security 
environment in Asia: “there still remain large-scale military capabilities including nuclear
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arsenals and many countries in the region are expanding or modernizing their military 
capabilities mainly against the background of their economic development” (Defense 
Agency, 1995, .^ 3).
Not only externally, but also internally, the environment surrounding the JDA and 
the SDF had changed since the original NDPO was published in 1976. The Japanese 
public expected the SDF not only to assume the main responsibility for Japan’s national 
defense but also to play more active roles in disaster relief and peacekeeping operations 
(PKO) of the United Nations. The heightened expectation for the U.N. PKO derived from 
the SDF’s successful first mission in Cambodia in 1992. Already the SDF had been 
deployed in 4,653cases for disaster relief operations between FY1991 and 1995, 
including the earthquake in Kobe in January and the terrorist attacks against Tokyo 
subways in March, 1995 (Japan Defense Agency, 1996). After the Kobe earthquake, the 
SDF deployed 2.2 million troops and 34,000 vehicles in 100 days (Akiyama, 2002). As 
the result, 72.2% of the respondents to the Public Opinion Poll on the SDF and Defense 
Issues by the Cabinet Office in 1994 listed disaster relief as the most useful mission the 
SDF had accomplished(Japan Defense Agency, 1995). In addition to natural disaster 
such as earthquakes and typhoons, the drafters of the new NDPO meant to include 
terrorism in the “disaster” to which the SDFs should be deployed. Fresh out of the 
poison gas attacks in Tokyo subways in 1994, the Japanese government took the threat 
from terrorism very seriously.
But the JDA and SDF were conditioned to expand their scope of activities with 
reduced resources, considering “such factors as recent advances in science and 
technology, a decreasing population of young people and increasingly severe economic
178
179
and fiscal conditions” (Defense Agency, 1995, ^. 6).
In order to meet the uncertain and unpredictable regional security environment, 
the new NDPO argued it necessary “to maintain firmly the Japan-U.S. security 
arrangements and to build up appropriate” (Defense Agency, 1995, ^. 1). On the other 
hand, multilateral security institutions, which were emphasized in the Higuchi Report, 
were given secondary missions such as peacekeeping operations and disaster relief. In 
that sense, the treatment of multilateral security institutions with respect to U.S.-Japanese 
relations in the new NDPO is closer to that in the Nye Report than the Higuchi Report. 
While the Higuchi Report gave equal emphasis on multilateral institutions, the U.S.- 
Japan alliance, and the Self Defense Forces as means of achieving national security goals, 
the new NDPO, like the Nye Report, suggested supplementing the bilateral alliance with 
multilateral organizations. Asahi Shimbun critically points out that the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, which the Japanese government claimed its international leadership in the 
establishment of, is mentioned nowhere in the new NDPO (Asahi Shimbun, 1995). The 
omission is even more ironic considering the fact that the Nye Report has higher 
expectation for the ARF, stating, “We envision that the ARF will develop over time into 
an effective region-wide forum for enhancing preventive diplomacy and developing 
confidence-building measures” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p.
13).
The new NDPO emphasizes the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance not only
for the defense of Japan, but also for the security and stability of Asia.
The close cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, based on 
the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, will help to create a stable security 
environment, provide the foundation for securing the engagement of the United 
States and the U.S. military presence which are necessary for peace and stability
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in this region, and thus will continue to play a key role for the security of Japan, 
as well as the stability of the international community. (Defense Agency, 1995, ^. 
6)
Based on that recognition, the new NDPO reveals Japan’s willingness to play
more active roles in regional security within the framework of the bilateral alliance.
Should a situation arise in the areas surrounding Japan, which will have an 
important influence on national peace and security, [Japan will] take appropriate 
response in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws and regulations, 
for example, by properly supporting the [sic] U.N. activities when needed, and by 
ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security 
Arrangements (Defense Agency, 1995, ^. 10).
The new NDPO goes on to stress the need to upgrade the alliance “to enhance the 
credibility of the U.S.-Japan Security Arrangements and ensure their effective 
implementation” (Defense Agency, 1995, ^. 2) through increased and upgraded policy 
consultations, joint studies, mutual exchanges of equipment and technology, and 
facilitation of smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.
In the end, the new NDPO laid out new force structure of the SDF. The number 
of the Self-Defense personnel was reduced from 180,000 to 160, 000, including 15,000 
ready reserves. In the Maritime Self Defense Force, the destroyer units in regional 
districts were reduced from 10 to 7 divisions and the minesweeping units were halved 
from 2 to 1 unit. The new NDPO required relatively modest downsizing for the Air 
Defense Force. For example, out of 10 interceptor units, 9 were maintained (Forum,
1996).
Scholarly evaluations of the new NDPO vary, with some seeing continuity with 
the past and others significant departures there from. In the former camp, Professor 
Christopher Hughes of the University of Warwick found more continuity than change in 
the new NDPO, which “reflected the conservatism of the defense establishment and
confirmed many traditional principles and patterns” (Hughes, 2004, p. 169). In his view, 
the new NDPO builds on the concept of basic and standard defense, exclusively defense- 
oriented defense, and three nonnuclear principles, like its predecessor. The force 
structure the new NDPO set forth still contained the majority of the ASDF’s interceptor 
aircraft, the MSDF’s ASW warships, and the GSDF’s main battle tanks. But the most 
important element of continuity in the Japanese post-Cold War defense policy was the 
U.S.-Japan alliance.
The renewed commitment to the bilateral alliance in new NDPO was 
enthusiastically welcomed in Washington, D.C. Secretary Perry awarded medals of 
recognition to Campbell and his team in December 1995 soon after the Japanese 
government authorized the new NDPO. Hisayoshi Ina of Nikkei Shimbun suggests that 
the medals were given because Campbell and his team successfully influenced the 
drafting process of the new NDPO and the document recognizes the centrality of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance in Japanese defense policy (Ina, 1996). The level of emphasis on the 
U.S.-Japan alliance in the new NDPO was even more surprising considering the fact it 
was adopted by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, the head of the Japanese Socialist 
Party (JSP). The JSP had argued that the SDF was unconstitutional and been opposed to 
the U.S.-Japan alliance until it took power in 1994. The members of Commission were 
afraid that the Murayama administration would abort the Higuchi Commission or order 
radical changes in the agenda and contents of the final report after the LDP-Socialist 
coalition took back power from Hosokawa’s Shinshin Party.
The Murayama Cabinet tried to show some resistance to further integration 
between American and Japanese defense policies. Murayama declined diplomatic
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negotiations to revise the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation when it 
announced the new NDPO even though it mentions the need to address regional 
contingencies (Funabashi, 1999) . It was not until Ryutaro Hashimoto of LDP became 
the Prime Minister that the Japanese government started official negotiations for revising 
the Guidelines.
The new NDPO was not only the most basic document of Japan’s defense 
planning after the Cold War, but also was a response from Tokyo to the Bottom-Up 
Review and the Nye Report. Based on the new NDPO Japan negotiated with the United 
States and together they developed the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security of 1996 
and the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation of 1997.
Bilateral Negotiations and Agreements
The Final Report o f the Special Action Committee on Okinawa 
The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in 
November 1995 in response to a rape incident in Okinawa on September 4th of the same 
year. Three U.S. servicemen abducted and raped a 12-year-old elementary school girl in 
the northern part of Okinawa. On September 28th, Governor Masahide Ota of Okinawa 
announced that he would not sign the resale agreements of the land confiscated by the 
Japanese government on behalf of U.S. forces. Okinawa Governor had authority to sign 
the lease agreement of land for U.S. military bases as eminent domain in case the 
individual owners of the land refused to sign the contracts. The rape incident resulted in 
the largest public demonstration against U.S. military bases in Okinawa since its 
reversion to Japan in 1972. On October 21st, over 8,5000 citizens gathered at the Seaside
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Park in Ginowan City and over 700 organizations, including all major political parties in 
the prefectural assembly, labor unions, business organizations, and women’s right 
organizations participated in the demonstration (Funabashi, 1999; Honda, 2001; Okinawa 
Times, 1996).
The United States government and military responded to the crisis more quickly 
and sincerely than ever before. The American Naval Criminal Investigation Service held 
the suspects in custody on September 8th after the Okinawa prefectural police had a 
warrant of arrest. The first official apology came from the U.S. consul-general in 
Okinawa, Aloysius O’Neill on September 11th when he visited Governor Masahide Ota 
(Funabashi, 1999). On September 20th Ambassador Walter Mondale met Governor Ota 
and said, “Please accept my heartfelt apologies to the victim, her family, and the 
Okinawan people”(Mainichi Daily News, 1995, p. 1). In his meeting with Foreign 
Minister Yohei Kono on September 21st, Mondale was reported to describe the suspects 
as “inhuman” and “animals” (Funabashi, 1999, p. 301). Secretary Perry followed 
Ambassador Mondale and said, "On behalf of all members of the armed forces, I want to 
express my deep sorrow and anger for this terrible act” (Kristof, 1995, p. 7). President 
Clinton mentioned the rape incident in his radio address and promised that “We will not 
allow any injustice to the Japanese people to be taken lightly” (Kristof, 1995, p. 7).
On September 19th the Okinawa Prefectural assembly passed the resolution of 
protest against the rape incident and demanded revising the Status of Force Agreement 
(SOFA) and downsizing the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. But Tokyo was slow and 
reactive to the incident. Foreign Minister When Governor Ota asked Foreign Minister 
Yohei Kohno to start negotiating the revision of the SOFA, he declined it, saying “I have
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heard the investigation is conducted smoothly. It is too extreme to demand immediate 
revision of the SOFA” (Honda, 2001, p. 511).
The rape incident of September 1995 was a wake-up call for top officials in 
Tokyo and Washington. They recognized that military bases in Okinawa were critically 
important for the U.S.-Japan alliance and realized that failing to address the base issues 
would endanger the survival of the alliance (Funabashi, 1999; Honda, 2001). Before the 
incidents, technocrats of the Defense Facilities Administrative Agency (DFAA) of Japan 
and uniform officers of U.S. Forces in Japan or the Pacific Command, not high-ranking 
political appointees, had dealt with issues and problems regarding U.S. military bases in 
Japan (Akiyama, 2002). After the rape incident, one of the top civilian officials of the 
JDA, Akiyama Masahiro was shocked to learn that the Japanese government had never 
asked the U.S. government why there was so many bases in Okinawa and if they could be 
reorganized or consolidated (Honda, 2001).
On October 24th, Foreign Minister Kohno and Ambassador Mondale agreed to 
speed up the trial process of U.S. servicemen committing crimes within the existing 
Status of Forces Agreement and set up a committee to discuss reorganization and 
downsizing of U.S. military bases in Okinawa and named it the Special Action 
Committee on Okinawa (SACO). The members of SACO included Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Charles 
Kartman, and State Department’s Deputy Chief of Mission, Tokyo, Rust Deming from 
the American side. The Japanese government was represented by Bureau of Defense 
Policy Director Masahiro Akiyama, Counselor to the Bureau of Defense, Takemasa 
Moriya from the Defense Agency, and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director
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General of the North American Affairs Bureau Masaki Orita, and Deputy Director 
General of the North American Affairs Bureau Hitoshi Tanaka (Funabashi, 1999). The 
membership the SACO demonstrated upgraded interest in and sense of urgency of the 
base issues in Okinawa. In addition to high-ranking civilian officials of the JDA, instead 
of DFAA, the Japanese government was represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Similarly, the U.S. government sent both civilian officials of Defense Department and 
diplomats of State Department to the SACO (Akiyama, 2002).
The goal of SACO was “to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa” by 
recommending reorganization plans for U.S. military facilities to meet the new realities 
after the Cold War. The final report recommended that about “21 percent of the total 
acreage of the US facilities and areas in Okinawa” should be returned. Among forty 
some U.S. military facilities in Okinawa, the report recommended to return Futenma Air 
Station, the Northern Training Area, Sobe Communication Site, Camp Kuwae, and 
others. The report also recommended adjusting training and operational procedures to 
reduce the risks accidents and the noises. For example, U.S. military forces would 
terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104 and limit night flight training 
operations. Finally, the report recommended improving Status of Forces Agreement 
procedures. Tokyo and Washington had already agreed to speed up transfer of the 
accused in serious criminal cases, including murder and rape, as early as in October 1995. 
The final report added other issues to be addressed including accidents reports in and 
around the U.S. military bases, and transparency of the Joint Committee on Status of 
Force Agreement procedures. The secretaries of Defense and State of the United States, 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director of the Defense Agency of Japan
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approved the final report on December 2, 1996. Considering the fact that the Japanese 
government had never before asked the United States government why U.S. military 
forces had so many bases in Okinawa and whether it could reorganize and reduce the size 
of its bases (Honda, 2001), the SACO final report was a landmark achievement of the 
Hashimoto administration. But the very central part of the report, reversion of Futenma 
Air Station, would turn out to be the most difficult agreement to be implemented. As of 
today, the airfield has not been retuned and has become one of the most controversial 
issues between the United States and Japan since the Democratic Party of Japan took 
power in September 2009.
The New Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation 
The new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (the new Guidelines) 
represents a renewed effort to develop more concrete plans for military cooperation 
between the United States and Japan in cases of foreign military attacks against Japan and 
regional contingencies around Japan, as well as in peacetime.
In the Joint Declaration on Security of April 1996 Japan and the United States
agreed:
to initiate a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation to 
build upon the close working relationship already established between Japan and 
the United States.
The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, 
including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may 
emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence 
on the peace and security of Japan. (President of the United States & Prime 
Minister of Japan, 1996, ^. 5)
The review was conducted by the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) 
under SCC. SDC consisted of the director general of the Bureau of Defense Policy, the
Defense Agency, representative of the Joint Staff Council of The Self-Defense Force on 
the Japanese side, and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense and State, the representative 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the representative of the U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), 
and the representative of the U.S. Forces, Japan (USFJ) on the American side. The report 
was intended to promote understanding of the review and to provide a basis for domestic 
discussion (Japan Defense Agency, 1997). SDC met in California in August, Tokyo in 
October, Hawaii in December of 1996 and Tokyo in February 2007 to conduct simulation 
of regional contingencies and discussed specific scenarios such as North Korea’s 
invasion of South Korea (Honda, 2001). Although the New Guidelines emphasize 
continuity from the original guidelines and consistency with the existing legal 
frameworks of American and Japanese defense policies such as the Constitution of Japan, 
the U.S-Japan Security Treaty, and the U.N. Charter, it is the most significant change in 
the alliance since the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960. The New 
Guidelines aim at both widening of the scope the alliance and deepening the level of 
defense cooperation between the United States and Japan.
The most significant difference between the original Guidelines and the New 
Guidelines is the emphasis on defense cooperation in “situations surrounding Japan” 
(shuhen jitai). Like the original Guidelines, the New Guidelines lay out three scenarios 
in which the United States and Japan take joint military actions. The first of them is 
normal circumstances. During peacetime, the two countries exchange intelligence, 
engage in consultation, and participate in joint training. The U.S.-Japan Security 
Consultative Committee (SCC) of the secretaries of Defense and State, and the Director 
of JDA and Minister of Foreign Affairs in particular provides an important forum where
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the top officials of the two governments meet regularly to discuss foreign and defense 
issues. The two allies also cooperate to promote cooperation in arms control, 
peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian relief missions of the United Nations.
The second scenario is foreign military attack on Japan. This part is divided into 
two subsections. One is “When an Armed Attack against Japan is Imminent” and the 
other is “When an Armed Attack against Japan Takes Place” (The Guidelines for Japan- 
U.S. Defense Cooperation, 1997).
In the former case
The two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and 
policy consultations, and initiate at an early stage the operation of a bilateral 
coordination mechanism. (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,
1997)
This part of the new Guidelines reminds of deterrence effects of U.S. military 
bases in Japan by writing “Japan will establish and maintain the basis for U.S. 
reinforcements.” In addition to the part on regional contingencies, this part represents a 
significant departure from the old Guideline, which writes: “Japan by itself will repel 
limited, small-scale aggression” (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,
1997). The old guidelines sets more clear conditions for American participation in 
military operation in defense of Japan. “When it is difficult to repel aggression alone due 
to the scale, type and other factors of aggression, Japan will repel it with the cooperation 
of the United States” (The Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation & Committee, 1978,
1. 3). In other words, under the new Guideline, U.S. military forces could join the SDF in 
any foreign attack against Japan. Although the new Guideline has a sentence writing, 
“bilateral cooperation may vary according to the scale, type, phase, and other factors of 
the armed attack” (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, 1997), it does
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not prohibits the United States from using military forces. Here again the drafters of the
New Guidelines emphasized the importance regional contingencies:
Recognizing that a situation in areas surrounding Japan may develop into an 
armed attack against Japan, the two Governments will be mindful of the close 
interrelationship of the two requirements: preparations for the defense of Japan 
and responses to or preparations for situations in areas surrounding Japan. (The 
Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, 1997)
In the latter case, “Japan will have primary responsibility immediately to take
action and to repel an armed attack against Japan as soon as possible”. But the United
States will support Japan in “coordinated bilateral operations, steps to prevent further
deterioration of the situation, surveillance, and intelligence sharing” (The Guidelines for
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, 1997) .
The original 1978 Guidelines put the most emphasis on this part, using 772 words
to spell out plans for the bilateral defense cooperation while using only 178 words for
regional contingencies. The Japanese government has faced fewer legal obstacles to
cooperate with the U.S. when it defends its own territory and population. A joint study
on contingencies in Japan was roughly completed in the summer of 1981 for submission
to Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki although that on regional contingencies never completed
(Murata, 2007). Since the adoption of the original Guidelines, the Self Defense Forces
have participated in joint military exercises with U.S. military forces more actively. The
Air Self Defense Force conducted the first joint military exercise with U.S. Air force in
November 1978 and the Ground Defense Force followed suit in 1981, all of which were
designed for foreign military attacks against Japan (Chosashitsu, 1997). The new
Guidelines have more specific items of defense cooperation between Japan and the
United States, including command and coordination, communications, intelligence, and
logistics. This part of the new Guidelines also highlighted the need for cooperation in 
missile defense, reflecting new development in the Korean Peninsula since the end of the 
Cold War.
The third scenario is regional contingencies, which is called “situation in areas 
surround Japan.” The New Guidelines uses 1716 words in this part, compared with 178 
words in the original Guidelines. In addition, the three-page annex document to the new 
Guidelines spells out 40 concrete measures the Self-Defense Force could take to support 
U.S. military forces in contingencies happening in “areas surrounding Japan”(The 
Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, 1997), including logistic support for the 
U.S. forces in rear areas (noncombat zones), inspection of ships under economic 
sanctions, evacuation of civilians, mine sweeping, and others.
This part grew out of bitter lessons the United States and Japan had learnt during 
the North Korean Missile Crisis in 1993 and the Taiwan Crisis of March 1996. In the 
both crises, Washington and Tokyo failed in working together as allies. There were no 
policy talks during the crisis and cooperation between U.S. military forces and the 
Japanese Self Defense Force was “nonexistent” (Funabashi, 1999, p. 398).
The new Guidelines have had significant impacts on domestic legislation of Japan 
although “[t]he Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines will not obligate either 
Government to take legislative, budgetary or administrative measures”(The Guidelines 
for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, 1997). As the new Guidelines write below, the 
U.S. government expected the Japanese government to take major legislative measures to 
implement defense support for U.S. forces.
However, since the objective of the Guidelines and programs under the
Guidelines is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two
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Governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these 
efforts, based on their own judgments, in their specific policies and measures. All 
actions taken by Japan will be consistent with its laws and regulations then in 
effect. (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, 1997)
The Japanese government answered that expectation by passing so called
Guidelines related acts, namely the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and
Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, the Revised Acquisition and
Cross-Servicing Agreement and the Revised the Self-Defense Force Law in June 1999.
Thus the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan Alliance in the 1990 not only secured the
continuity of the alliance, it laid the groundwork for upcoming changes of the Japanese
defense policy in the 21st century.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The present dissertation has demonstrated importance of identities and norms of 
states in national security policy by synthesizing three major theories of international 
relations: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. The eclectic model of military alliance 
proposed in the dissertation not only provides a rich description of what happened to the 
U.S.-Japan alliance in the critical transition from the Cold War to the-Post Cold War era, 
but also demonstrates how the national security cultures of the two allies have been 
institutionalized, defined their national interests, and rationalized their threat perceptions 
toward North Korea and China. Instead of singling out one of the factors emphasized by 
realism, liberalism, or constructivism in order to explain the endurance of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance after the Cold War, the preceding chapters have analyzed how identities, norms, 
and institutions of national security and threat perceptions are related. Building on a 
constructivist model of national security culture in which cultural and institutional 
structures, identity, interest and policy are related in five ways, the present dissertation 
has focused on the two most important ways through which national security culture 
shapes national security policy. While national security identities define the contents of 
national interest, national security norms provide a framework of defense policies within 
which states choose the proper means of defending the nation. When applied to alliance
politics, cultural model of national security better explains the endurance and evolution of 
America’s Cold War alliances than does the balance of power model alone. The U.S.- 
Japan alliance survived the end of the Cold War because of their interdependent national 
security cultures. While the two countries’ shared identities as capitalist democracies 
defined the common foreign policy goals, their interdependent national security norms 
made the two partners indispensable to each other in ensuring national security. By 
tracing the decision-making processes of both nations internally and externally with each 
other as they refined their bilateral alliance, the dissertation has also provided a model of 
holistic analysis that synthesizes both the domestic and international politics of military 
alliance.
As displayed in Figure 5, which was introduced and fully explicated in Chapter 2, 
in addition to their shared identity as capitalist democracies, compatible national security 
norms between the two countries have been crucial to the endurance and evolution of 
U.S.-Japan alliance despite the demise of the major Cold War threats that had been the 
raison d ’etre of the alliance. True, regional threats persisted, but America’s strong and 
continuing interest in promoting democracy overseas, developing global markets, and 
assuming international leadership cannot not be explained solely by the replacement of 
the Soviet threat with growing security threats from North Korea and China. Likewise, 
the peaceful end of the Cold War did not change Japan’s interest in maintaining national 
security and pursuing economic prosperity in the liberal international order the United 
States and its Western allies have established. At the end of the Cold War, Japan was not 
ready to assume more independent responsibilities in its national defense, much less 
leadership in international security, because of its institutionalized culture of
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antimilitarism. While America’s norms of homeland security and respect for the military 
have required and allowed it to pursue a hegemonic national security policy, Japan’s 
norm of antimilitarism required an alliance with the United States, including the 
continuing presence of U.S. military bases in Japan. Although Asia was the most 
dangerous region in the world during the Cold War, where two “hot” wars were fought, 
Japan became the first mature democracy in Asia and one of the most successful 
industrialized economies in the 20th century. The bilateral alliance has not only served 
the national security of Japan, but also that of South Korea, Taiwan, and even countries in 
the Gulf regions. The U.S.-Japan alliance has transformed the worst enemies of World 
War II into the closest allies and served as the anchor of regional security in the Asia- 
Pacific region.
The cultural explanation for the endurance of the U.S.-Japan alliance can be 
applied to other American alliances that survived the end of the Cold War. By comparing 
the U.S.-Japan alliance with other American Cold War alliances, such studies will reveal 
the relations between the level of cultural interdependence and the alliance endurance.
For example, the existing literature on NATO focuses on a single factor to explain its 
survival after the Cold War, including democratic identity among its members (Risse- 
Kappen, 1996) and its highly institutionalized nature (McCalla, 1996). Like the U.S.- 
Japan alliance, the endurance of NATO can be better explained by the interdependence of 
national security cultures between the United States and its trans-Atlantic allies. Through 
World War I and II, European counties, both the victors and vanquished alike, learned the 
futility or war as a means of national security because the wars were fought in their 
homelands and claimed large numbers of civilian casualties (Muller & Wright, 1994).
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The low confidence in the efficacy of military forces, combined with the Soviet threat, 
made even former great powers, such as Britain and France, accept an asymmetrical 
alliance with the United States. The peaceful end of the Cold War validated the 
legitimacy of NATO and promoted its transformation from an anti-Communist military 
alliance into a regional collective security organization. While the shared identity as 
democratic capitalist states and economic interdependence among NATO members 
deepened through the Cold War, differences in national security cultures between the 
U.S. and other NATO members widened. The victory of the Cold War reconfirmed 
America’s norm of homeland security and expansive power projection policy and 
validated the defensive national security policies with limited military capabilities of 
other NATO members. Although the trans-Atlantic allies disputed how best to fight 
against terrorism after 9/11 because of their different national security cultures (Kagan, 
2003), general long term stability and peaceful relations among Western democracies is 
also product of their interdependent national security cultures. Some scholars even 
suggest that Western democracies have established a zone of peace in which major war is 
unthinkable (Adler & Barnett, 1998; Jervis, 2002).
But the interdependence of national security cultures between the United States 
and its allies has also caused some problems. Behind the “success” story of the U.S.- 
Japan alliance were collective action problems of national security both in the United 
States and Japan. In order to maintain homeland security and pursue global hegemony, 
the United States must maintain large standing military forces with strong power 
projection capabilities even in peacetime. Although the American public in general has 
paid the fiscal cost of national defense through taxes, military personnel and their
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families, representing only a small proportion of the population, have shouldered the 
most serious costs of war in human casualties, loss of life, and suffering. While the 
general public has enjoyed safety and comfort on the American homeland, soldiers and 
their families are sent to overseas military bases and battlefields. Although the U.S. 
military has enjoyed higher levels of respect and support from civilian society than its 
counterparts in other developed nations, civil-military relations in the United States have 
displayed an ever-widening gap, especially since the termination of military conscription 
after the Vietnam War.
For its part, Japan faces a different kind of collective action problem than the 
United States. In order to maintain its antimilitarist national security culture while 
dealing with dangerous national security issues in the region, notably China’s rising 
military power and North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, Japan has deepened its level 
of military integration with the United States. While the benefits of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance has been enjoyed by the entire nation, people in Okinawa have paid 
disproportionate costs by hosting over 75% of U.S. military bases in Japan. Although 
Japanese public opinion in general has been sympathetic to the predicament of 
Okinawans, no other prefectures of Japan are ready to accept more U.S. military bases.
In short, the general public of neither the United States nor Japan have seriously 
questioned the real costs of their national security policies, especially the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, supporting them instead by focusing solely on their benefits. In other words, the 
cultural bases of the U.S-Japan alliance have not been tested by rational cost-benefit 
calculations and contain the risk of losing public support if the general public of either 
nation ever begins to seriously understand and question the true costs of the alliance.
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By identifying long-term sources of stability and problems the alliance has faced, 
the present research will provide an analytical starting point for understanding the 
significant changes that the alliance has undergone since 9/11. By comparing 
continuities in the 1990s and changes since 9/11 in the alliance, one can better understand 
the dynamics among competing factors affecting the alliance. In the 1990s when external 
threats were relatively small compared with those confronted during the Cold War, such 
domestic factors as established national security institutions and the culture behind them 
secured continuity of the alliance, despite the evaporation of the existential threats to 
entire country. In spite of a significant shift in the regional balance of power, neither 
United States nor Japan tried to end the alliance. Although both countries went through 
quantitative reductions to their military forces by cutting defense budgets and reducing 
the size of the military forces, their grand strategies did not change qualitatively. The 
United States maintained its hegemonic grand strategy and major Cold War alliances 
with its worldwide network of overseas bases. Similarly, Japan did not divert from the 
Yoshida Doctrine, keeping a relatively low-profile defense policy and focusing on 
economic and diplomatic means of statecraft. In sum, the peaceful end of the Cold War 
was a validation for the national security institutions of Japan and the United States. The 
two nations did not feel the need to change their national security cultures.
But the stability and continuity of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the 1990s stand in 
stark contrast with the dynamics of national security policies in the United States and 
Japan since 9/11. The U.S. norm of homeland security was most seriously challenged by 
the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., which killed more than
3,000 civilians in the World Trade Center and 184 Defense Department workers. But
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rather than causing the U.S. to abandon its homeland security norm, 9/11 served to 
strengthen this aspect of its national security culture. The Bush administration reaffirmed 
the vital interests of homeland security by creating the Department of Homeland Security 
in order to defend American citizens from terrorism on American soil. The Bush 
Doctrine announced in 2012 reasserted the efficacy of military forces in national defense 
by defining terrorism as act of war which can be best dealt with by military force. This is 
a uniquely American interpretation of counter-terrorism. In other countries, terrorism 
had been mostly interpreted as a domestic crime, dealt with by the police and other law 
enforcement institutions. The United Sates has renewed its determination to maintain 
homeland security, not only traditional threats from other great powers, but also from 
terrorism committed by nongovernmental organizations such as Al Qaeda. The United 
States expanded, rather than contracted, its network of alliances to include such countries 
as Pakistan and projected its military power by deploying large-scale military forces to 
Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. interests in maintaining leadership in developing and 
defending a liberal international order have not changed, either. Rather the United States 
renewed its efforts to support democratization all over the world because it believes 
undemocratic regimes are more likely to support terrorism or radicalize their citizens.
Ironically, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, along with changes in 
the regional security environment in Asia, have caused more significant cultural changes 
in the Japanese defense policy. While the democratic and capitalist identity of Japan has 
not changed, the norm of antimilitarism has been challenged slowly but steadily. In order 
to support the United States in the War on Terrorism, Japan deployed its Self Defense 
Force to Iraq and the Indian Ocean. While Japan still believes that its national security is
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best maintained by the alliance with the United States, rather than by developing large 
and independent military forces with strong power projection capabilities of their own, 
the national security crisis of its senior ally has precipitated national security cultural 
changes across the Pacific. Though this study has focused on a cultural continuity in 
alliances, changes do occur anytime and not in the case of a strong negative shock such 
as 9/11. The development of cultural model of alliance change which would complement 
the cultural model of alliance endurance developed in the present dissertation, is essential 
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